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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Shaposhnikov Appeal on Nagorno-Karabakh

92UM0624B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Appeal by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Unified Armed Forces, to the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States: "Prevent the Involvement of Transcaucasus Military District Troops in Combat Operations"]

[Text] Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Unified Armed Forces, has appealed to the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The document states:

Events surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are acquiring an increasingly tense and threatening nature. The scale of combat operations is expanding. The number of victims is increasing. Cities and villages are being destroyed. Attempts to involve servicemen in the conflict and the seizure of arms, military equipment and reserves of materiel from the Transcaucasus District have not ceased.

All of these actions fundamentally contradict the 14 February 1992 declaration of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States concerning the inadmissibility of the use or the threat of the use of force and of the need to resolve disputes exclusively through peaceful means and through negotiations.

The situation is being aggravated by the persistent attempts of Azerbaijani Republic leaders to create their own armed force based on the Transcaucasus Military District's 4th Army which, in turn, is prompting the Armenian side to create its own army based on the Transcaucasus Military District's 7th Army.

The realization of these intentions will result in the involvement of Transcaucasus Military District regular division-sized and smaller units in combat operations and will inevitably transform the conflict into a large-scale fratricidal war.

The development of events in the Transcaucasus causes serious anxiety in the neighboring states of the Azerbaijani Republic and the Armenian Republic.

The High Command of the Commonwealth's Unified Armed Forces thinks it will be necessary to undertake urgent measures to prevent the involvement of Transcaucasus Military District troops in combat operations and to prevent the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh from spreading. For this purpose, it seems advisable to resolve the following priority issues:

1. Utilize all the political prestige and the capabilities of the leaders of the independent states to resolve the conflict surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh through political means.

2. The states in the Transcaucasus region should refrain from forming their own armed forces until the problem is solved through political means.

3. Examine the issue of forming a Commonwealth of Independent State's interstate armed forces contingent that is subordinate to the Council of the Heads of State participating in the CIS to maintain order, stabilize the situation and guarantee a solution to interethnic and domestic political tasks through political means.

Russia's 'Iron Lady' Possible Defense Minister

92UM0710A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by S. Kukhianidze: "Will the 'Iron Lady' of Russia Sleep Less?"]

[Text] The government of Boris Yeltsin is unusual in many regards. For example, in it there is no post of minister of defense. Incidentally, there will soon be one. And it is possible that it will be filled by a woman.

This, by the way, will be the second representative of the weaker sex—after Ella Pamfilova, the 39-year-old minister of social protection—in the current Russian government.

Russia did not want to do this, but, as they say, life insisted. The Federation will have its own Armed Forces.

At present, judging from everything, there are few observers who would doubt this. The recent meeting in Minsk for the leaders of the independent states brought together under the abbreviation of CIS has certainly brought nearer the establishing of an independent army in Russia.

Any troop unit should have a leader. And while the question of the Russian Army, it can be said, is more or less clear, we still do not know who will assume command over the disorganized Russian soldiers and officers.

One name has been mentioned by all, and that is Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, while another has come up recently, Galina Starovoytova, the adviser of Boris Yeltsin for interethnic relations.

As far as I know, a woman has never headed the military in Russia, if one does not count, in truth, Catherine II. I do not know what the opinion of Galina Vasilyevna [Starovoytova] is toward the former empress, but on the other hand I do know that she greatly esteems Margaret Thatcher and is very happy, incidentally, when she is compared with her. By the way, Galina Starovoytova sleeps almost as much as the former British Prime Minister: just five hours a night.

As it is, the 'Iron Lady' of Russia will, seemingly, sleep even less as some sources are asserting that Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] is more and more inclined to appoint Galina Starovoytova to the post of minister of defense.

Galina Vasilyevna herself does not like discussion of this question. Yesterday during a meeting with correspondents at the Press Center of the Russian Federation's government, she said that if she were offered this post, she would try to refuse. But Galina Starovoytova at the same time stressed that if the leadership of the military ministry were to be offered to her, she would be forced to "obey discipline."

Shortage of Warrant Officers

92UM0624A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain A. Davidyuk, under the rubric: "From Chita": "Warrant Officers—in the Red Book, the Warrant Officers School—Under Lock and Key"]

[Text] There have always been problems with manning units and subunits with warrant officers in Transbaykal Military District troops. The situation has worsened recently. Shortages of this category of servicemen reach 70-80 percent in many military district units. This already enormous figure continues to increase since those wishing to wear the warrant officer's shoulder boards are declining.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. Suprunenko, head of the military district warrant officer school, cited this eloquent statistic:

"We trained 368 specialists for the military district in 1988, in 1989—193, in 1990—156. Today, there are 104 students in the school instead of the 360 we are staffed for. And, moreover, I do not believe that we will be able to send even 70 or 80 warrant officers to military district troops after completion of training. Nearly 20 of the students have already requested to be sent back to their native areas, to Ukraine or to Belarus after graduation..."

Functions of Russian Information Center 'Armiya'

92UM0648A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "RIC [Russian Information Center] 'Armiya' Provides Help"]

[Text] Where and how does an officer find a job as a "civilian?" Those being discharged, or preparing for discharge from the Armed Forces are inevitably confronted with this question. The Russian Information Center (RIC) "Armiya" will be providing help from now on in this matter to our officers and army and navy warrant officers. What kind of organization is it? How did it originate and what objectives does it set for itself? We addressed these questions to the chairman of a meeting of the founders of

the RIC "Armiya," Dr. of Philosophy, Professor Major-General of the Reserves N. Chaldymov.

[Chaldymov] Our center was created in December of 1991 on the initiative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Invalids and Veterans of War and Labor, and for Social Welfare for Military Servicemembers. At this time a very large number of officers are being discharged into the reserves. A further reduction of 700,000 has been announced. Individuals in epaulets will have to integrate back into "civilian" life and find work. It is not easy to make a smooth transition. Therefore, one of our center's primary objectives is to help officers and army and navy warrant officers discharged into the reserves socially adapt. How do we intend to accomplish this? Above all with the aid of a data bank, in which all pertinent information on servicemembers desiring employment will be entered. We are obligated to inform our clients of possible lucrative employment opportunities, and help them to acquire specialized civilian skills. Various options involving study, on-the-job training, and work abroad are also considered.

[Question] So, you act as a middleman between the employer (enterprise, organization) and the servicemember?

[Chaldymov] Simply put, this is true. But our functions are broader. At present we have approached the government of Russia in order to work out a draft program for the social adaptation of officers. We are establishing contacts with enterprises, organizations, factories, and kolkhozes so that we may also compile a data bank of the available positions and personnel requirements they have. In perspective, the RIC "Armiya" is viewed as one of the subdivisions within the state employment service. Presently we already have employment offers for officers in the most diverse specialties. The Ministry of Agriculture, for example, is ready to provide them with housing, land, and loans for organizing farming ventures.

In conclusion, I am including the questionnaire we send to our clients. The information that we obtain with the help of this questionnaire is only passed on to official representatives of interested organizations, without disclosing the name or address of the applicant. The RIC is obligated to inform servicemembers of offers they may find of interest.

1. Last name
2. First name
3. Middle name
4. Year of birth
5. Military rank
6. Position
7. Have you been discharged: (Yes, No)
8. If yes, what year
9. If no, expected discharge date
10. Marital status
11. Number of children
12. Education

13. Educational institution completed
14. Your specialty (specialties)
15. Education and specialty of wife
16. Do you wish to acquire another specialty: (Yes, No)
17. If yes, which

Send completed questionnaire to the following address:
103575, Moscow, Panfilova St., Bldg. 15a, NII [Scientific Research Institute] OSChM [expansion not given],
RIC "Armiya" Telephone 370-18-87.

Lack Of Tactical Manuals From Voenizdat

92UM0648B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel A. Korabelnikov, PhD military science; "Only 'Popular Hits' At Officers' Disposal"]

[Text] It is paradoxical, but a fact. During the last five years Voenizdat has not published one tactical training manual. Never before has an officer's professional library been so depleted of this type of literature. Voenizdat, on the other hand, has been forced to publish a barrage of popular detective works. Authors of needed professional literature are finding their work going to waste, even when it has been recognized as useful.

I will give a classic example. Retired Major-General I. Borobyev, a Doctor of Military Science and professor, worked over a ten year period on a military-theoretical work, "The Principles of Combined-Arms Battle." The fundamental work he created, 80 pages long in print, was, in the opinion of those who reviewed it, unprecedented both at home and abroad. However, even he encountered many obstacles. The book is only being published for internal purposes at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. Thanks is due to the Chief of Staff of Ground Forces, Colonel-General Yu. Bukhreyev who assisted in its publication by allocating funds for professional literature.

A similar phenomenon has become common when books on tactics are "not picked up" for publication. For example, A book typeset for publication at Voenizdat, "Withdrawal From Battle And Retreat," written by N. Moiseyenko, had to be "torn down." A revised version of "Tactics In Combat Examples (Regiment)" was not published, nor was the manual "Armament And Technology of Foreign Armies," "Tactics of Formations, Units, and Sub-Units of Foreign Armies," "A Reference Guide For The Sergeant of Motorized-Rifle and Tank Troops," "The Battalion in Combined Arms Battle," and many other books greatly needed for troops (about 100 titles in all). This is thought to be extremely unwise and shortsighted. I understand that the problem is not whether Voenizdat wants to publish this type of literature or not. Its job has been reduced to a matter of profitability. The unprofitable production of these or other special books has to be subsidized. And that is already another problem that the government agencies concerned will have to resolve.

Hazing, Other Problems Spur Desertion

92UM0695C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
25 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Ovsyanikov: "Legitimate Desertions?"]

[Text] The mother of Sgt Sergey Balabanov came with a heavy heart to Odessa from Zaporozhye Oblast. She was informed that her son had been brought before the garrison military procuracy for improper relations.

The investigation is still going on and for this reason it makes no sense to try to interpret the events, let alone assess what happened. Anyway that is not what I wanted to bring up. Of course hazing is a shameful phenomenon for the army, but even worse for any soldier and citizen of the republic is desertion and this in recent years has assumed a very broad scope. Referring to the harsh conditions of service and to the same hazing, the soldiers have begun to flee their units. Coming to their aid have been the public and the soldiers' mothers committee. The deserters have been forgiven and viewed as the victims. Such an attitude has served as an impetus for others. Now those who merely want to serve closer to home have begun to desert. One had merely to go to the procuracy or commandant's office at the place of residence and the deserter was immediately sent to a local troop unit.

There have been instances when the deserters did not turn themselves in anywhere, but rather lived at home and committed criminal offenses.

Then the Supreme Court of the former Union handed down an indulgence to the deserters, obliging all to return to their units or ones closest to their place of residence.

Again not all of them went back. One can completely understand the desire of the young fellows to serve on the territory of their republic. But how can one explain the soldiers of the last induction who are no longer satisfied with even this but want to be closer to home or even at home. And so the "victims" of the hazing by Sgt Balabanov fled home and stated that they did not want to serve at all. Sitting at home were Pvt Kucher, Semenenko and Andryukhanov fully satisfied as to their rectitude. And the soldiers' mothers committee which was formed in Zaporozhye as a body for defending the soldiers against hazing is now forced to adjust. Coming with the mother of Sergey Balabanov was the representative from the committee in order to now defend the sergeant who is to be discharged this spring. His wife and child are awaiting him at home.

Times change and standards do as well. Ukraine has established its own army and the draftees do not serve beyond it. However, the reticence of certain fellows to serve in the army is based on simple selfishness. For example, many now use the taking of the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people as a pretext not to serve at all.

Thus, in just one of the units of the Odessa Garrison, about 100 persons deserted. Here some 17 of them were citizens of the republic. Among them were Pvts Kucher, Semenenko and Andryukhanov and incidentally they are fellow citizens of Sgt Balabanov. As the company commander Capt Aleksandr Kovalenko said, these soldiers immediately announced that they did not want to serve at all.

What conclusion will be drawn by the investigation and what the decision will be of the tribunal—all this is yet to be seen. However, without encouraging the heavy-handedness of the sergeant, we equally do not want to foster desertion.

CIS: POLICY

Maj Gen Stolyarov on Personnel, Cultural Issues

92UM0706A Moscow KULTURA in Russian
No 8, 22 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, scholar-philosopher and head of the Committee for Personnel Work, by Stanislav Babayev: "The Best Traditions in Service!"]

[Text]

[Babayev] Nikolay Sergeyevich, our country has been split into a good score independent states. And the splitting process is far from over. The army, the Armed Forces, remain the sole element which still links together the former USSR. Now we are seeing that this unity is actively being destroyed. What awaits us in the future?

[Stolyarov] The officer assembly was virtually unanimous in favoring the unity of the Armed Forces. Whatever the politicians may propose, they must take this desire of the people into account. And these are not simply people, but people in epaulets and with weapons in hand. I am hoping that all the problems will be resolved on a civilized level. And here, incidentally, I see a connecting role for culture and the unified cultural field. Presently in the Armed Forces there is an extensive network of cultural institutions: some 900 officer clubs, 6,000 soldier clubs, 8,000 libraries, a thousand military bands, 700 museums and some forty Army and Navy song and dance ensembles. This is without mentioning such standardbearers of Army culture as the Central Academy Theater of the Soviet Army, the Central Armed Forces Museum, the Military Artists' Studio imeni Grekov, the Song and Dance Ensemble imeni Aleksandrov and others. It is possible to take this lightly but one must judge very seriously the fact that from Brest to Sakhalin, from Kushka to Novaya Zemlya, everywhere the soldiers sing the same songs, they carry out the same rituals and assimilate common traditions. All together this makes up a very significant, unifying and consolidating potential, and it would be unwise, to put it mildly, not to take it into account.

[Babayev] The Committee for Personnel Work which you head has set up a Culture Directorate. I know that the opponents of this structure have made the following argument: the Army, in the course of its reform is declining in numbers, and you are setting up an entire directorate in the place of the Main Culture Department under GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate]. How would you answer this?

[Stolyarov] No matter how much the army is reduced, we still must devote significant attention to culture. Yes, if we cannot provide enough funds (forgive me, but in the present situation, when the people have no place to live and there is nothing, you don't have the heart to ask for a lot of money) we could pay more attention to this. The soldier should live in a human way and rest also in a human way.

[Babayev] In a human way... I have heard that the first document which you sent out over your signature to the troops stated the need to remove all the ideologized visual agitation from the territory of the troop units and the Lenin rooms were to be turned into leisure-time rooms. Does this not mean that instead of "Long Live the USSR—the Union of Fraternal Peoples" there will be "Long Live the CIS—also something of a something else..."?

[Stolyarov] In no way. Let a good print be put up in the place of some stupidly drawn poster with an almost unintelligible phrase on it. This is not to be found? Then it would be better to have nothing.

[Babayev] And what new will be contributed to the work by the newly established Culture Directorate?

[Stolyarov] Just let me name the departments which make up the directorate and you will understand that our intentions are rather serious. The First Department is for military culture and leisure institutions, the Second for movie and photo filming of TV and radio programs, the Third is for ties with cultural organizations and with religious sects and the Fourth the cultural-commercial one...

[Babayev] If possible, could you give us a bit more detail on the Third and Fourth Departments? The Army and religion? The Army and commerce?

[Stolyarov] And why not? We have a number of major cultural and educational institutions which are quite able to earn money and even foreign exchange. And they must be given such an opportunity. They, in turn, can partially support the rest. As for religion... I feel that there is no need to speak of its enormous significance. At present concern for the spiritual world of the individual, for the morality of a soldier is our common concern. Up to now we have not had any accurate data on the percentage of believers in the Army and Navy. One can only guess that they are at least 30-40 percent. Here, of course, we include both those who observe religious rituals as well as those in whom faith is a hidden part of their lives. We propose establishing close contacts not

only with the Orthodox Church but also with other religious beliefs. It must be considered that among the soldiers there are many Muslims, Catholics and so forth. So you can see for yourself that there is much that is new in our program. But let me repeat that difficult times await us.

[Babayev] How, in your opinion, can the traditions of the Russian Army and Navy help us in these difficult times?

[Stolyarov] Certainly we must not idealize the past too much as then there were the stocks and the rod. Nevertheless it is very beneficial to turn to the experience of the past. How can one not extol the Russian officers who added to the glory of the fatherland not only on the battlefields but also in music, painting, literature, theater and poetry... How many talents have the Army and Navy presented to Russian and world art! And the relations among the officers? Even the obligatory formal "you" by any senior with any junior is worth a great deal. The honor of the man in service—whether he is a soldier, officer or general—was strictly protected by the law. We have already forgotten but even in the oath of the Russian Army it was stated that the order of a superior is always obligatory for execution, except in those instances when it infringes the honor and dignity of a subordinate. An officer who used the soldiers for personal, selfish purposes was threatened with Siberia... The best traditions of the Russian Army such as patriotism, a high feeling for duty, morality and others are as essential as air and we need them precisely now in our very difficult times. The Russian officers never remained removed from the concerns and cares of their fatherland. I feel that this is the case now, too.

[Babayev] In what, Nikolay Sergeyevich, do you see your main task?

[Stolyarov] We must not build castles in the skies. We must not allow the destruction of what is viable, although there are more than enough things gravitating to "total" destruction. Room must be provided for the new.

Government Adopts Resolution on Retraining Ex-Servicemen

*PM0103144592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Feb 92 First Edition p 7*

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Resolution Adopted": "Businessmen Will Help Officers"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Government has adopted a resolution "On Activity Connected With the Retraining of Officers Discharged into the Reserve in Connection With Armed Forces Reductions" which provides for the formation under the Russian Federation Government Coordinating Council of a Council for the Problems of Retraining Officers Discharged into the Reserve (Chairman B.A. Mikhaylov).

The indicated council has been tasked with drafting and submitting for examination by the Russian Federation Government state programs for the retraining and job placement of officers discharged into the reserve and the coordination of actions by state, social, and other organs and organizations participating in the implementation of these programs.

The same resolution provides for the formation of an All-Russian Center for Retraining Officers Discharged into the Reserve, whose income will be directed towards organizing and carrying out the retraining and job placement of officers discharged into the reserve in connection with Armed Forces reductions in specialties necessary in market economy conditions.

The "Nevikon" joint-stock company and the "Rosstroy-impeks" foreign economic association will take part in financing the center's activity.

Bonner Warns of Dissemination of Mass Destruction Weapons

*92UM0670A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Feb 92 Morning edition p 2*

[Article by Yelena Bonner: "Who Controls the Dissemination of Weapons?"]

[Text] For a long time Azerbaijan's leaders denied the use of Grad launchers in military operations against the Armenian enclave of Nagornyy- Karabakh and the shelling of Stepanakert. It has now been confirmed by independent observers from the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] (their complete report will be submitted at a conference in Prague in February). It was confirmed by Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov in a speech at the Supreme Soviet of Russia. While only two launchers were being discussed just a week ago, however, on 22 February five were reported on television. Correlating this with the fact that two soldiers of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] forces and two Azerbaijanis have recently been killed in the city of Gyandzh, one can conclude that Grad launchers have been captured by Azerbaijanis in a CIS military unit stationed in the city of Gyandzh, located a considerable distance from the borders of Nagornyy Karabakh and the borders of Armenia. On 23 February there were reports that a military unit located in the outskirts of Stepanakert was also shelled with Grad launchers. There were casualties, both dead and wounded, among CIS military personnel. Constant shelling with Grad launchers has made it difficult to aid the hundreds of wounded in the city. It is reported that attacks on military personnel have continued during the past few days and that a very large army ammunition dump has been captured in Agdam. The situation is critical.

Those in charge of the Commonwealth's armed forces say that the CIS forces are maintaining neutrality in Nagornyy Karabakh. This is with the agreement of Russia and apparently the other CIS members, since

none of them has issued a protest concerning the genocide in Nagorny Karabakh. The Azerbaijani side's employment of the Grad, which is forbidden by international convention (as a weapon of mass destruction) and other heavy weapons, specifically military helicopters, however, forces one to believe that it is not neutrality but a disinclination or inability on the part of the army to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is creating fear that control could be lost over the spread of chemical and other banned weapons as well.

Given the tragedy which is being played out in Nagorny Karabakh and North Ossetia today, and given the complexities of relations among the peoples of the North Caucasus and between them and the Russian population, in the Dniester region and in Moldova, as well as in other regions of the former USSR, the matter of controlling such weapons of mass destruction as the Grad, chemical weapons and others is becoming acute not just for the peoples who live in the areas of conflict, but for the entire population of the CIS, because military units and formations are located throughout the territory of the former USSR, and there is apparently a fairly large ammunition supply, including weapons of mass destruction.

In view of the above I would like answers to the following questions: Can the joint CIS army halt the spread of weapons in general, first and foremost weapons of mass destruction, and assume control over them throughout the CIS, up to the point of its reorganization and the formation of armies in those states which have made this decision? Does the army have the power and does it have a mandate to do this from the governments and chiefs of state of the Commonwealth, even if they have chosen a policy of neutrality instead of protecting the right to self-determination? Who bears responsibility for violations of the USSR's commitments not to use weapons of mass destruction: its legal successors, the CIS states and their leaders, or the army subordinate to them and Ye. Shaposhnikov personally as its commander in chief?

New Union To Promote Reserve, Retired Officers' Interests

PM0403150192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under the "Loyalty to the Fatherland" rubric: "Union of Reserve Officers Registered"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice has registered the Russian Union of Reserve Officers. This patriotic organization, which today unites 100,000 generals, admirals, and other officers of the reserve or in retirement, has found real opportunities for fruitful work.

Our organization has extensive plans, Colonel of the Reserve Igor Semenov, coordinator of the union, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent. Our main task in the difficult conditions of transition to the market, he noted, is to help reserve officers found their own business, obtain a plot of land, find a job, and improve their social and

living conditions. Therefore the union is drawing up and implementing assistance programs to help former career officers organize small private collectives, leasehold enterprises, joint-stock companies and firms, housing construction cooperatives, and private farms.

Moreover, an important area of the union's work is to support the policy of economic reforms, to reconstitute the traditions of Russian officers, and to inculcate a spirit of loyalty to Russia's national and state interests in young people. This will be promoted by the following union programs: the Officers' Fund, Rodnik, and the New Officers of Russia—a program preparing young people for entry to military schools.

Officer's Assembly Council to Meet

92UM0713A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Zyubin: "The Coordinating Council is to Meet Again"]

[Text] The decision to convene the assembly again was taken at the expanded session of the Presidium of the Coordinating Council of the Officer Assemblies in the CIS Joint Armed Forces. As the editors were informed by the Co-chairman of the Coordinating Council, Capt 1st Rank A. Petrov, the session will be held on 11-12 March, in Moscow at the Central Club of the Soviet Army imeni M.V. Frunze. A review of the following questions is planned: the results of the Minsk meeting for the Commonwealth heads of state and the tasks of the Coordinating Council in preparing its representatives for the next meeting in Kiev; the tasks of the Coordinating Council in the area of working out and implementing programs for the social protection of the servicemen. There are also plans to prepare a statement on behalf of the Council on the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and the other so-called "hot spots" in the Commonwealth.

It is expected that a report will be heard by the Chairman of the Coordinating Council, Capt 1st Rank A. Mochaykin on his work during the Minsk meeting and a group of documents will be reviewed as prepared for the next meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state in Kiev. Incidentally, the Council on its own behalf plans to submit as a separate document a draft interstate agreement on the social protection of servicemen who have been caught in the troop reductions. In the opinion of the Presidium of the Coordinating Council, the agreement adopted in Minsk on this question defines only the general approaches and it is necessary to provide more concrete guarantees for the servicemen being discharged in receiving housing, pensions and one-shot monetary assistance.

They are to invite to the session of the Coordinating Council the representatives of the funds, associations and commercial structures concerned with the social protection of the servicemen. Life demands a pooling of

effort on this question, since at present there are many programs but they often duplicate one another and do not encompass the entire range of problems. The establishing of an Officer Assembly Bank (Fund) will make it possible not only to have a proper coordinating center, but also given the work greater publicity and consider the opinion of the officer assemblies in allocating the profits from the operations of these structures.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Efficacy of Political Controls Over Nuclear Launches Questioned

924P0091A Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 4, Jan 92 pp 20-23

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov: "Security Problems: The Mysteries of the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] "Only I can start a nuclear war," Mikhail Gorbachev said in a French television interview shortly before his resignation. The former President's idea was not to scare but to reassure the world public: just rely on me, he implied, and I won't let you down. Can an important matter like that depend on the personal qualities of this or that leader? Obviously, more reliable safeguards are required. After all, nuclear arms control remains the key factor of global security. Information about the nuclear button in Moscow remains almost nothing. In the USA, which is no less security-minded than we are, this question is a subject of extensive press coverage and public discussion.

A Skeleton Key To the Electronic Lock

"The Button" is a journalistic image, of course, and it does not exist physically. The whole system is based on codes, ciphers, computers, various radio and telephone communication channels; the launching as such is done by a simultaneous turn of two keys.

Experts single-out two nuclear arms control principles which can be referred to, conventionally, as the negative and the positive one. The negative principle means the use of technical facilities, system and procedures designed to rule out bringing nuclear weapons into action without the government's authorization.

This system was arranged in such a way—both in the USA and in the former USSR—that neither the personnel of ground-based IBM control stations, nor missile carrying submarine and strategic bomber crews, nor the command posts of strategic units and fighting arms could physically start a nuclear attack unless they received special codes from above. If sent to missile crews via special communication lines, the codes are supposed to "unlatch" electric "locks" on nuclear arms.

The accepted launching procedures call for synchronous actions by many links in the system as a precaution against error, evil intent or mental derangement. Commands issued by any command station will be fulfilled

only if acknowledged by all the others. The units which guard and maintain nuclear facilities in depots are accountable to superiors other than those of the missile forces. Unauthorized attempts to launch missiles trigger an alarm signal and can be blocked from above. Regulations demand that if ordered by his immediate superior to launch a missile, an operator should do so only upon the Presidential confirmation of the order.

As to the positive control system, it comprises the ways and means of guaranteeing authorized use of nuclear weapons despite likely obstacles or opposition. These facilities include, above all, multiplexed channels of underground, underwater, ground, atmospheric and space communication channels connecting those in command with the missilemen. At the action level, the destruction of some launch control posts does not prevent the same missiles from being launched from the surviving posts. As a last resort, certain types of missiles can be launched directly by a command from the centre, by-passing local launch control posts.

In times of crisis, launch control posts can be authorized to act on their own if the country's leadership is eliminated by a surprise strike. In that case the very communication blackout may serve as a signal to launch ballistic missiles.

This probably explains what transpired after the August putsch: Gorbachev was not the only one to possess the "attache case"—the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff also had them. If only the three of them could sanction a nuclear strike together (i.e., shared the unlocking code among themselves), this arrangement strikes me as strange. After all, the President stands higher in the hierarchy than the heads of the Defence Ministry. The latter's job is not to confirm or cancel the decisions of the head of state but rather to execute them. The existence of three "attache cases" can be explained by the desire to have other buttons besides the President's.

Communicating Vessels

As a matter of fact, the control system is not divided into negative and positive ones. It is a single system of control and communications which comprises elements of negative and positive control. What's more, these elements are like communicating vessels: the higher the level in one, the less full the other. This means that the higher the guarantee of striking a retaliatory blow under the least favourable circumstances, the less reliable the insurance against a non-sanctioned launching or against a nuclear strike caused by an error or overreaction to a threat.

Here is an illustration. If elevated to the absolute, positive control would mean a direct connection of early warning satellites and radars and of nuclear blast pickups with missile launching sites. The system could be made fully automatic and launch missiles even upon losing contact with early warning systems and with the central

leadership. In that case, retaliation would be fully guaranteed, but the risk of a nuclear war breaking out through a technical fault would be enormous.

The other extreme is to divide negative control among dozen or so officers and to make the unlocking of weapons at the launching site level practically impossible unless all the "attache case" owners sanction it. In that case an unsanctioned nuclear strike or one carried out by mistake would be extremely unlikely. However, if at least one of the leaders gets killed or otherwise unreachable, the retaliation potential will be paralyzed.

It should be pointed out for fairness' sake that even in the past decades of the cold war, both the USA and the USSR emphasized negative control for fear of causing a global holocaust as a result of unsanctioned actions by missilemen or a technical error. There were substantial differences between the two nations' systems, however.

Is There "Military-Political Leadership" in Washington?

Division of authority and the military command's unqualified subordination to the lawfully elected political leadership have also been the very basis of the American system of government. This finds its expression, above all, in the President appointing a civilian Defence Secretary who has an enormous staff under him, and in the National Security Council and Congress having control over all military matters.

The US Constitution has established the following sequence of power transfer in the event of the President's death or removal from office: the Vice-President; the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Senate majority leader; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defence and so on. The "button" of the strategic forces control system changes hands in the same order.

Billions have been invested in ensuring political control over the use of strategic arms even after a multiple exchange of nuclear strikes. The only function assigned to the military—from the top level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to the missile crews—is to execute orders.

In the Soviet Union, the control system mirrored the totalitarian and highly militarized nature of the political regime. Much attention was paid to the negative control over local action stations, and any division of authority or primacy of political leadership, let alone a legalized sequence of power transfer, were out of the question. Even the standard Soviet term, "military-political leadership," having no analogues in Western vocabulary, speaks for itself.

The leadership of the Party exercised control over Army generals through the Glavpur (Military Political Administration) and by personnel manipulations. The Army was counterbalanced, to some extent, by the KGB which,

in particular, was responsible for government communications and had certain links of the nuclear forces' command and security system under its control. Outside that, the military were free to decide on the ways and means of waging a war and winning a "victory" in a global nuclear conflict.

If the General Secretary Oversleeps...

The USSR's strategic forces, in which stationary ground-based IBMs predominated, constituting up to 70 percent of the total in terms of warheads, were intended for a preventive strike and, in the 1970-1980s, for a so-called counter- or retaliative-counter strike. That is to say, they were to be launched before the war-heads of US missiles hit our launching sites and launch control posts. Why so? Because the launching of the missiles at signals received from warning systems would make it possible to drop seven thousand megatons of nuclear explosives on American territory. On the other hand, if American warheads had hit their targets before that, the attack would have left us with "only" a few hundred or one to two thousand megatons with which to retaliate.

The generals have always dismissed as nonsense the argument that several thousand megatons differs little from a few hundred megatons. The point is that 150 largest US cities harbour over 50 percent of the US population and 2/3 of industry.

As a matter of fact, our strategy amounts to depriving the political leadership of the right to make a decision to use nuclear weapons. The time parameters of a nuclear cataclysm are such that a counter-strike can succeed only if politicians are capable of a split-second reaction, and even then only if everything works smoothly. Besides, the politicians will have to depend wholly on signals—mysterious to them—coming in from satellites and warning radars, or rather on the interpretations of these signals by the military.

If a strike is delivered with a submarine-borne ballistic missile at a relatively short distance from the target, even the most efficient control system will be of no use. In anticipation of that, politicians may be asked to sanction a nuclear strike in advance on the grounds that there will be no time for drawing up new plans of operations if the existing ones are thwarted. The leader's role will be reduced to that of a chimpanzee used for testing: he will just have to push a button when a lamp comes on.

Now if the General Secretary has over-slept, become unreachable or been removed from office, the go-ahead can be given without his authorization. All the codes are converted into action, and all the communication channels are maintained by military services for which instructions from their immediate superiors are law.

In other words, at the top level of leadership, positive control has always taken precedence over negative control. The monopoly of the military on working out the control system and operations plans (for a counter-strike, above all) has materialized in a concept which

guards not against an accidental strike due to a mistake, a nervous breakdown or a technical problem, but against failure to respond to an attack promptly and on a massive scale.

This is a reflection of a typically militaristic mentality—the main goal is to crush the enemy, deterrence is just a sideline. For a politician, on the other hand, deterrence comes first. If deterrents fail to work and a nuclear attack is made, all the rest will make no difference any longer.

Many remain under the spell of military declarations like “an immediate and crushing retaliation” which “no aggressor will avoid.” Even Yuri Rostov, the anchor man of a TV news programme whom I highly respect, has said recently that a nuclear attack should be “instantly” reacted to, otherwise catastrophe will ensue.

What does he mean by “catastrophe?” The prospect of us dropping fewer megatons on the US than planned by our General Staff? If we indeed come under a nuclear attack, this will be catastrophe in and of itself, and our fate will hardly depend in this case on how many million Americans we kill in retaliation. If we react “instantly” but mistakenly, we shall really bring catastrophe upon ourselves and upon the rest of the world.

In the past decades this system did work, however, probably for the reason that it never underwent a real test. The superpowers feared each other so much that after the Cuban missile crisis they never pushed the world to the brink. Nevertheless, our system has proved to be no good at all in the dramatically changing situation inside the country.

It's Against the Rules, But It Can Be Done

When we had the “military-political” leadership—the triumvirate of the CPSU, the KGB and the Military-Industrial Complex—our nuclear forces were under reliable centralized control (its reliability was not, thank God, given the acid test like the one failed by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant's control system). The deepening rift in our society and Gorbachev's prolonged vacillation between the Right and the Left led to the August putsch which, in addition to everything else, demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the old nuclear arms control system under new circumstances. Having colluded, the top brass and the KGB debarred the President from control over nuclear weapons with amazing ease.

The vague subsequent assurances to the effect that everything was in perfect order and that details are state secrets hardly make sense. It sounds incredible that without the President's sanctions and the codes there are no means of launching the missiles. The military know, of course, that they are not supposed to do that, but then they are not supposed to stage coups, either. The important thing is that this is probably possible technically, otherwise the counter-strike strategy would be impractical. Surely, certain arrangements have been made to deal with a situation where the leader is no longer in

control. And if it is technically possible to launch a missile without the President following a nuclear attack, then this can be done following a coup also.

It is not hard to guess who was, on those days, in charge of the services which make up codes and combinations and which maintain government communications with the strategic missile launch posts. Besides, there are facilities for launching missiles right from the centre, by-passing local triggering systems.

Some political scientists are trying to reassure themselves and others by reasoning that the conspirators—all of them top executives of the Gorbachev government—would have displayed a sense of responsibility in the matter of “button control.” What would have happened, however, if the putsch hadn't failed so quickly? What if the White House had been taken by storm with all the consequences—civil war, a split of the Army, the warring factions' attempts to win outside support? There are no answers to these questions, but one thing is clear—the old control system is unfit for the new reality.

The “Attache Case” Changes Hands

The breakup of the USSR after the August events, the formation of the CIS, the signing of the agreements on joint measures as regards nuclear weapons and on strategic forces—all this has lent special urgency to the “button” problem.

Matters have certainly been simplified by the agreement reached by the independent states to the effect that technical control is to be exercised by the President of Russia only. The heads of the other Republics which have strategic nuclear arms on their territories so far are to give oral consent to the use of these arms, if necessary. The sharing of the “button” among the independent states would contradict the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

There are quite a few problems, however. The President of Russia has control over all nuclear weapons, but other Republics maintain that the missiles deployed on their territories do not belong to Russia. By forbidding the withdrawal or elimination of these missiles without their knowledge and consent, the Republics claim certain rights to strategic weapons and do not recognize Russia as the nuclear successor to the USSR. However, they have no technical control over the use of these weapons.

Further, although the President of Russia does have control over the “Button,” the Commander-in-Chief and the joint command of strategic forces, obliged to take their instructions from political leadership, are subordinated not to him but to the Council of the CIS Heads of State. The other presidents are not in control of the “button,” however, and their vetoes or sanctions are of a procedural character. Does that mean that strategic forces are subordinated to Russia after all? No, Russia has no army of its own, and nuclear facilities belong to the joint command within the framework of the CIS. At

the same time, the Commonwealth has no central authorities, it is a union of states, not a state. It has its centre in Minsk, and its Defence Ministry and General Staff in Moscow.

It looks as if under the circumstances no political power is in control of the Army and, in particular, of strategic forces.

The "attache case," it is true, has been handed over by Gorbachev to Yeltsin. They showed on television the other day how the military teach Yeltsin to handle his new "luggage." This is probably the same "attache case" that was lost in Foros last August. This means that the control system, crowned with the "button," remains actually the same. The President of Russia has probably not yet taken precautions against landing in his federal predecessor's predicament.

The System in Need of Readjustment

The most logical and consistent thing to do would be to eliminate all the strategic weapons and tactical nuclear facilities on the territories outside Russia. A model for this is found in the Minsk agreement as regards Ukraine. The reduction of the nuclear potential in this way fits in with the obligations ensuing from the Soviet-American treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction signed in the summer of 1991, and from the exchange of the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives that autumn. Therefore, no "pumping over" of nuclear might from the Republics to Russia will take place: the arsenals on Russian territory will be reduced even further.

The missiles stationed outside Russia are to be deactivated in good time. In that case, everything—the deployment procedure, the right to ownership and use, the control system—will click back into place.

This is far from all. It is necessary to restructure the control system in Russia so as to get rid of the faults inherited from the totalitarian militarist structure of the USSR. Specifically, the working out of sanctioning codes and ciphers, putting them into the control post computers, installing the locking devices, maintaining special communications—all these functions should be handed over to a service independent of the Defence Ministry and the KGB and subordinated to the President only.

It appears that in our case "negative" control ought to be divided among the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of Parliament so that the sanctioning of a nuclear strike should call for the technical alignment of all three parts of the code. It is also necessary to determine, by a special law, the continuity of transfer of the authority over nuclear weapons from the three top executives to the subordinate civilian officials.

It is time we gave up the counter-strike strategy which reduces the political leadership's control over the Army to a fiction and leaves open the ways to by-pass the President's button in peacetime.

It is necessary to eliminate the facilities for prompt missile launchings in case of the President's death in a nuclear attack. Instead, we had better provide the technical means for a prompt and efficient transfer of his powers to his lawful successors.

Finally, in order to prevent an unconstitutional takeover of power, measures should be taken for the control system to be completely "switched off" in such an event—i.e., for making it technically impossible, for a lengthy period, to launch strategic missiles.

Military experts will argue, of course, that all this is bound to impede nuclear retaliation, to reduce its impact, to weaken deterrence. This is true, I agree, but military potential is not a thing in itself—the fundamental changes now in progress within the country and in the rest of the world call for its restructuring.

The potential of deterrence at the level of reasonable sufficiency should be preserved as an inalienable element of global strategic stability. The very criteria of sufficiency are to be revised, however. The USA is now less likely than ever to mount a surprise nuclear attack, and it is hard to think up convincing reasons why the situation should change in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, the danger of nuclear arms control loosening up as a result of ethnic strife and domestic social and political unrest in the former USSR has grown. In their turn, the radical transformations of society and the state call for a substantial readjustment of the nuclear weapons control system. Otherwise, events like the August putsch, dangerous to our country and to the whole world, may recur.

It stands to reason that no organizational or technical measures will make up for the absence of economic and socio-political stability in society and in the Army. The fact remains, though, that the USSR has built up a huge nuclear arsenal, so it is our moral duty to see to it that the mistakes we make at home should not put the entire civilized world in mortal danger.

Problems in Training Vehicle Drivers

92UM0655A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent with RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] Motor-Transport Support Service Chief Major-General Valeriy Nikolayevich Kudinov: "Megatons on Wheels"]

[Text] *You, the reader, have probably seen—at least on television—a mobile missile system. The canisters are seemingly not even accommodated on the prime movers, and their forward portion hangs out over two seemingly small cabs. One of them is the driver's position. More accurately, his combat post. After all, it is not simply a hundred-ton freight on the seven-axle mover, it is a combat missile with a warhead containing a nuclear*

charge... What skill and confidence in his abilities should be possessed by a person to control a missile carrier!

The RVSN contains more than missile prime movers, however—they also have quite a few motor and armored vehicles. Driver is the most common field among the missile troops, and one out of four soldiers masters it. There are a great many problems in the training and indoctrination of the military drivers. Our correspondent discussed them with RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] Motor-Transport Support Service Chief Major-General V. KUDINOV.

[A. Dolinin] Valeriy Nikolayevich, what bothers you the most on the plane of the professional training of military drivers?

[V.N. Kudinov] The missile troops are not battleworthy without wheels. We thus approach the training of the driver corps with exceptional responsibility, especially when singling out such unique specialists as the drivers of large-load vehicles—the missile prime movers.

The training of drivers for the heavy, multiple-axle vehicles is organized over two years at a school for military technicians, which is equivalent in status to a secondary teaching institution. The field acquired there is unique. How is that expressed? Such specialists are no longer being trained anywhere except in the missile troops. They study the most complex automotive hardware that exists in the armed forces. The speciality has many fields. The technician of a nationwide type, aside from a diploma, is awarded certification as the driver of a special type of vehicle, as well as being assigned to a category with the right of international shipments.

The cadets receive a great deal of military knowledge here. They are also awarded the corresponding skills classification upon graduation from the school with the rank of warrant officer. There used to be no respite from those wishing to get into this school until recently. Acceptance was on a competitive basis, with no fewer than two people for each place. Today the competition has decreased...

[A. Dolinin] What is the reason?

[V.N. Kudinov] The school for technicians is in the Ukraine. So the local fellows who were dying to get into it have now cooled, because the drivers have to serve after graduation outside the boundaries of the republic. I would moreover emphasize that not everyone can become a driver. They have to undergo strict psychological selection. A special technique has been developed in the missile troops. There are psychologist/physicians on the staffs of the missile troops. The motor-vehicle subunits and schools are filled with a regard for their recommendations and the conclusion of a special commission. A mobile and a stationary laboratory for psycho-physiological study and assessment of habitability have been created through the efforts of scientists at NIIs [scientific-research institutes] and our specialists. They are intended for the rapid performance of group and

individual study of the personnel under field conditions, and the assessment of the functional state and working conditions of the military specialists.

The base training for the drivers of missile prime movers is not limited to this alone. They are also perfecting their knowledge and skills during everyday life in accordance with a program of combat training. The same way as pilots are not permitted to fly without a certain number of hours of total flying time, the drivers are not allowed to go on combat duty without practice drills. All of this together makes it possible for them to become true professionals. They do not cede much in training to the drivers of other combat vehicles. They study for 5.5 months in motor-vehicle training units.

There are problems with the drivers of transport and light motor vehicles everywhere. These are overwhelmingly graduates of the former DOSAAF with little actual driving time. There are, according to our general opinion, great complaints against them. Both the drivers of armored personnel carriers and all the rest have to be trained further right in the units. We are now forced to put officers and warrant officers behind the wheel of special vehicles due to the shortages of soldiers and NCOs. Their own program has been developed for them.

[A. Dolinin] Valeriy Nikolayevich, do the physical facilities for training correspond to contemporary requirements?

[V.N. Kudinov] The level is quite high among the troops. Unique simulators that, I would be so bold as to say, do not exist among the other troops have been developed and are being produced at the repair plant for the missile troops. The skills of the drivers are practiced on the simulators with a regard for dozens of variables. It moreover makes it possible to have interaction between the driver and the commander. The streamlining of the combat crews occurs during the course of the simulations.

Training vehicles to substitute for the SPUs by weight and cargo have been made for the purpose of nuclear safety among the country's troops. There are quite a few other technical innovations under in training as well. There are driver-training areas in particular that are equipped with everything essential to the training classes.

I would like to stress one problem in speaking of support for the training process. Our training subdivisions, and once again in the Ukraine, have been left without fuels and lubricants today. Politics are politics, but the missile drivers of the Strategic Forces can't be trained on nothing...

[A. Dolinin] Work to prevent road and transport accidents ranks with the problems of personnel training and support. How is that organized among the troops? What are the causes of accidents?

[V.N. Kudinov] The problem exists, but I would make the stipulation at once that there have been no accidents in the operation of combat vehicles, and especially the SPUs. There are, unfortunately, plenty enough of them with the light and transport vehicles. People moreover suffer and are killed therein, and the material damages are considerable.

Almost half of the accidents (44 percent) occur due to breaches of the rules for passing and maneuvering, and 40 percent due to excessive speed or the inability of the driver to predict the situation that is taking shape. Those are the statistics from last year.

The conditions into which young drivers get themselves are also the cause of accidents. Planned training for them is unfortunately not organized at the proper level in all units. The greatest extent of missing classes in the rear units is due to the ever-expanding volume of quartermaster chores, due to the decentralization of supplies. One also cannot discount the wear and tear on the vehicle fleet.

Accidents occur most of all during the harvest time. Some 2,500-3,000 units of equipment are sent out every year for this reason. This has always been a serious test for us.

There are no suitable conditions in the local areas for the work of young drivers. They stand idle for weeks with nothing to do because of the bungling of the supply personnel, and then they have to work at a crash pace at nights. We both reap accidents or else people are killed from such an approach to business.

We have never refused to help the agricultural workers, and this year will not be an exception either. Preparatory work has already been launched among the troops. But I would like to see that the prior disasters in organization did not arise, in which help from the Russian government is undoubtedly needed.

Especially in material support for the motor-transport battalions. We have no reserves of either gasoline or spare parts. It is a disaster with batteries. Read this document from January 25 of this year: "Some 322,000 batteries, including 117,000 of domestic manufacture and 205,000 from imports, were not supplied to the Ministry of Defense over 1989-91.

"Domestic industry has decided to supply batteries in the amount of 30 percent of requirements, but even that is not being done due to insufficiency of raw and other materials. Foreign-currency appropriations for their procurement abroad have not yet been allocated."

What can be done in that case? We can see only one way out as yet—economize everything, limit the use of equipment and resources to reasonable limits.

[A. Dolinin] What specifically is being done by the RVSN motor-transport support service to prevent road and transport accidents?

[V.N. Kudinov] A whole system of work exists in that direction. A specially created central commission headed by the first deputy commander-in-chief of the RVSN is occupied with organizing it. Corresponding commissions also exist in the larger units. The deputy commanders at all levels are also occupied with this. The work is comprehensive, and the participation of all other officials in it is desirable, together helping to set up the correct work right in the units to ensure model internal service in the motor pools, the creation of a training base for drivers and the solution of all other problematic issues.

Questioning the Loyalty of Strategic Forces Personnel

92UM0659A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Dolinin: "Agreements Say One Thing, but Another Is Actually Done. The Missile Troops Are Now Taking the Blow"]

[Text] The current situation of the Strategic Missile Troops, from the point of view of their integrated nature, appears to be more favorable than that in other services of the Armed Forces. However, despite agreements achieved with regard to the Strategic Forces, cases of claims made to these forces against the background of political battles have also surfaced. The officers and cadets of the Kharkov Missile School were among the first to feel this...

The story of the Kharkov Higher Military Command and Engineer School of the Missile Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union N.I. Krylov is part and parcel of the history of the Strategic Missile Troops. I used the full name of the school deliberately since it actually reflects the entire history of the school. The school, at one time a technical, and subsequently an aviation school, switched to training officer cadres for the then nascent Strategic Missile Troops in December 1959. The "Krylovians" got the forces started, and now many of them hold key command positions.

The scientific potential of the school is the highest in the Missile Troops. It graduates specialists in the area of mechanics, cybernetics, ballistics, and metrology. The instruction facilities are the most modern...

Recently, more than 90 percent of the officers, almost all warrant officers and personnel in extended service, and half of the cadets of the school swore allegiance to Ukraine. This gives us food for thought. An obvious conflict appeared between the status of the Strategic Forces, of which the Strategic Missile Troops are the foundation, and the Ukrainian oath.

Politics had little to do with the motivation of those who took the oath. Colonel A. Popov, a senior combat training officer of the Strategic Missile Troops who

recently returned from temporary duty at the school, incidentally himself a "Krylovian," shared his observations:

"Mundane problems, pure and simple, and a lack of confidence in the future prompted the people from Kharkov to take the Ukrainian oath rather than political or ethnic convictions. It is instructive that servicemen of Ukrainian nationality were not the only ones to take the oath."

Major-General V. Tolubko, chief of the school, was the first to take the oath. He did not make his choice hastily. As early as the meeting of the Officer Assemblies of the Missile Troops he argued for his choice thus:

"The school is in an ambiguous situation. Nobody is giving any thought to the fact that we may become hostages or pariahs in the states where we serve. The cases of the Riga OMON [Special Purposes Militia Detachment] and the Riga School are in plain view. We have become attached to Kharkov in terms of our family roots, housing, job placement, and daily routine. Virtually no one will go anywhere else no matter how events turn out. Swearing allegiance to Ukraine guarantees us social and legal protection."

Did those who took the oath have another choice? What are the reasons for this occurrence, which shook many people in the Missile Troops?

Representatives of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Troops, who have been on site, are of the same opinion. Officers and warrant officers of the school found legislative documents adopted by the Ukrainian parliament attractive, especially those on the social and legal protection of servicemen and their families, and on retirement benefits. In no other state of the CIS have we seen a consistent legal basis for the life and work of servicemen provided so promptly.

Many of them followed the lead of the mass media. An appeal by President L. Kravchuk to servicemen serving in Ukraine and beyond its borders was a factor. The Missile Troops personnel could not but note the following thought of the president: "All groups of troops and forces deployed in the territory of Ukraine, except for troops which Ukraine will include in the composition of Strategic Forces, (emphasis mine—note by A. D.) constitute the Armed Forces of Ukraine. By 20 January of this year, the servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine must take a military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine." The Kharkov school, which was at that time in a legal vacuum, indeed faced an ambiguous situation. In addition, there was the procrastination of the Strategic Missile Troops command in working out a solution, and there was financial hardship. At that time funds had not been transferred to the school for a single item of expenditure in the new academic year; material and technical supplies had stopped arriving; there had not even been a plan to admit cadets. In a word, promises by the Ukrainian side were effective.

The peculiarities of staffing the school with permanent and temporary personnel should also have been taken into account. Persons born in Ukraine and graduates of the school account for 80 percent of the faculty; half of the cadets are local.

In the opinion of the forces command, the command of the school took little care to carry out the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces and the Commander of the Strategic Missile Troops, displaying obvious haste in taking the oath.

Is it worthwhile to analyze this fact in such detail? Perhaps it is not if we count the military oath for nothing and approach the Strategic Missile Troops in general, flippantly. However, we do understand that haste in military policy is fraught with serious consequences. In the Cadres Directorate of the Strategic Missile Troops I was shown requests from dozens of officers of various nationalities indicating their desire to serve within their republics. The division of officers along ethnic lines is obvious. What can this bring about for the Missile Troops? How can a commander allow officers around the proverbial "nuclear button" when they have sworn allegiance to different states?

The episode involving the Kharkov school gave rise to many problems. In essence, confidence in agreements is being undermined. The uniform process of training officer cadres for the Missile Troops is being disrupted. Separating this process out from the established system—if it comes to this—will also call for much funding. All of this painfully affects the people. Even now they are perceptibly hurt by the ambiguity of the situation which has only become more acute after the taking of the oath. Cadets, especially the graduating class, are in a difficult situation. Taking the Ukrainian oath may result in complications for them as far as both the completion of their studies and prospects in the service are concerned. So, are they to take yet another oath if they are posted to another independent state?

I believe that the euphoria among experienced officers in the Kharkov school has worn off. The future of the CIS Armed Forces, including Ukraine, remains unclear to this day, to put it mildly. There is less and less doubt as to the fact that many servicemen will have to get out of uniform prematurely and not of their own volition.

As I ascertained at the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Troops, no sanctions against those who have taken the oath are expected. However, it is legitimate that they, having taken "someone else's" oath, will not serve in the Strategic Missile Troops deployed in other states.

...While this article was being prepared for print the episode involving the Kharkov School continued. I was informed that the taking of the oath has spread to some other missile units in Ukraine. Despite every norm and legislative act, including those of Ukraine, the Union of Officers of Ukraine is inciting missile personnel to take the oath. For example, on a recent Sunday dozens of cadets from a military technician school left their unit

without official leave and swore allegiance to Ukraine on a city square with the blessing of Colonel Martirosyan and two members of the clergy, a Catholic and an Orthodox...

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Commander NWGF Mironov Interviewed

92UM0634A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov, commander, Northwestern Group of Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "Troop Withdrawal from Baltic": "We Lived Together a Half Century and Are Obligated To Part Without a Quarrel"; uncaptioned photograph of Mironov included]

[Text]

[Poroskov] Valeriy Ivanovich, one more was added to your many concerns as commander of Northwestern Group of Forces—now you are the Russian Federation representative for the temporary presence and withdrawal of Army and Navy forces from Baltic territory. What new functions appeared for you?

[Mironov] President B. Yeltsin's Ukase on taking the Group and Fleet forces under Russian jurisdiction eliminated many problems. While people "were up in the air" following the USSR's abolition, we now sense whom we represent here—a fully specific state and its peoples. And the new "position" is a demand of the time. Delegations still will come from Russia for talks, but there must be an official person who would decide certain questions locally in the period between talks. It is another matter that the representative's rights and duties must be specified. There is only a draft government decree for now.

[Poroskov] Do you believe it possible to leave our troops in sovereign Baltic states as was the case at one time in Eastern Europe?

[Mironov] I do not see such an option today, although it would be justified both from a military and an economic standpoint; still, we lived together for a half century in a common space. There are Fleet bases and air defense positions here. Much depends on the Baltic states. Perhaps with the establishment of their own self-defense forces they will deem it possible to resolve certain matters in an alliance with Russia, but forces are striving for power that are in not just a national, but a nationalistic mood...

[Poroskov] What kind of troop withdrawal do you see under these conditions?

[Mironov] I would not set great hopes only on everyday arrangements and social protection. The withdrawal

problem must be viewed from different aspects. What defense does Russia need? On what lines? Which forces should be disbanded, which ones should be moved to new stations, and how are they to be accommodated? We have not fully found our position in these matters for now.

Naturally, the political situation in the Baltic states leaves an imprint. It has a tendency to become complicated. Not long ago Estonia was the last to adopt a law nationalizing personal and real property, including military equipment and armament. And the questions of repatriating the Russian-language population are not being decided there in a very civilized manner (which also is characteristic of Latvia, by the way). In short, the heat of passions is high and political solutions are required.

[Poroskov] You often speak about the need for political solutions. But what can the commander himself do? I do not mean leading the troops. Is there a spectrum of problems where you can influence the political situation?

[Mironov] I am not assuming the role of a major political figure, but in the sphere of "small" politics... Not one case of armed confrontation has been allowed on the territory where the Group is stationed. This is the result not just of desire alone, but of complicated work.

Funds have not been allotted to the Group for food, POL and so on for a long time, but not one officer or enlisted man will say that he has received less than he was due in something.

[Poroskov] How is this being done?

[Mironov] We have contact with heads of Supreme Soviets, government heads, ministries, departments and local authorities. We paid for 161 apartments using income from selling military-technical property, including a portion of reserves for the execution period. This is not much against the background of tens of thousands of people who need them, but it is necessary to provide at least for officers being discharged to the reserve.

There is an agreement with a number of heads of Russian and Belarus oblasts—they are ready to allocate rather substantial "patches" of land for construction in Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod and Vitebsk oblasts.

With respect to food, Kaliningrad Oblast and Latvia pledged to supply the troops approximately at last year's level, Lithuania at 70 percent, and Estonia at 30 percent. There is also a return from subsidiary farms, but funds have to be invested in them and the important thing is where to get the mixed feed.

[Poroskov] What did the first round of the recent interstate talks produce?

[Mironov] I would call them working meetings of state delegations. They marked only the fact that talks had begun. No agreements or treaties were signed. A number

of communiques were adopted. There was no talk about any withdrawal timetables; what is important is that the months for the beginning of our forces' withdrawal were noted, but this is purely a political declaration.

[Poroskov] Today we talk more about life support and social protection, but how about concepts of combat readiness and combat training that are sacred to the Army? Have they not faded into the background?

[Mironov] It is possible to name many factors keeping us from maintaining combat readiness at the level to which we have become accustomed, but it is also impossible to say that there is no combat training. I am familiar with comments of a number of political and military figures about a visit to the Severnyy post. They were surprised by the high degree of combat readiness and level of proficiency. Nevertheless, we would like to see it enormously higher. It depends on manpower acquisition in the quantitative and qualitative aspect. Today units and subunits have to limit combat training to narrow bounds: every slight troop movement (even a platoon in three vehicles) generates a stir—it is perceived almost as the beginning of large-scale operations or a military coup. Still, we are capable of performing the missions facing us in peacetime.

[Poroskov] You receive information from the troops about the mood of enlisted men and officers, you receive letters and you hold receptions on personal matters. What is the nature of appeals to the commander?

[Mironov] Most often these are questions of the future and of social protection: When and where will they be sent and what will the new duty conditions be like? Reservists and retired officers complain about the unbearable moral climate and request apartments in Russia. A decision was made on pension support of servicemen living in countries of the Baltic by the government of Russia, but things are not clear regarding their medical support and about benefits for internationalist soldiers and those who were at Chernobyl. Only Estonia has made a decision on the last ones.

[Poroskov] Nationalization of military property is proceeding in a far from correct form, in the Transcaucasus, for example, and at times has turned into open robbery. How is it with you?

[Mironov] I told representatives of the parliaments: measures nationalizing property and military equipment are one-sided and illegal. The nature of privatization is not the same as in the Transcaucasus, but the situation is very dangerous. In view of the absence of or only a conception of institutions of armed forces, the leaders of all three republics have assigned tasks of nationalizing military property to paramilitary force elements, which in my view have no legal status. They consist of representatives of some kind of political currents, often extremist. These people have not been trained for such a mission either of themselves or in the legal sense.

In December of last year home guardsmen in Latvia fired on a bus with civilian passengers on the Lithuanian border. On 24 January a group of armed home guardsmen tried to penetrate onto the territory of a SAM brigade to nationalize all materiel. The unit was placed on combat alert and the leadership of the home guard was summoned. They declared that they sent the people only to observe the military unit. It is well that the unit commander correctly assessed and localized the situation, but what if a hothead had been in his place? There have been instances of attempts at seizing weapons both by individuals as well as by groups of persons.

[Poroskov] What instructions do units have on actions in such cases? The civilian is perplexed: If the Army cannot protect itself against amateur, armed force elements, how will it be able to protect the country?

[Mironov] The political and military leadership must make an objective, realistic assessment of such instances. This also will dictate our actions. I do not place myself among aggressive people, but I deeply disagree with Tolstoyism—turn the other cheek. If attackers in the Transcaucasus had been resolutely rebuffed in a number of instances, I think extremism would have diminished there.

What is our reaction here? We have to get to the first persons of the republics and present notes of protest. We are reinforcing the daily detail service and guard service and are outfitting posts appropriately...

[Poroskov] Nevertheless, a commander often is faced with a tormenting dilemma: to use or not to use weapons, and if they are used, then for injuring or...

[Mironov] My order to the Group is unequivocal—in an attack on a post act in accordance with the regulation in force: challenge, warning shot, and then fire for effect if the attacker does not carry out the sentry's demand.

[Poroskov] Governments of the Baltic states made the decision to hold an inspection of military equipment except special equipment. What instructions did you give the troops in this regard?

[Mironov] We inform the kray security department and coordinate with customs on movements of specialized equipment and secret gear. In this case the cargo is sealed. But the movement of equipment generally has been restricted: after adoption of nationalization laws the local authorities try not to let anything outside the republic. Vehicles with POL, food products and construction materials are detained and then stand around for days. We look into each case. The situation is abnormal. Our position is mild; it is dictated by the desire to hold talks constructively.

I would also make note here of a purely human aspect. The director of the Latvian Ministry of Finance Customs Department declared on the "Doms kaya ploshchad" radio program that servicemen can take out personal articles within the scope of strict limitations. This means

that even articles acquired not in Latvia, but much earlier—earned by life, one can say—can be moved by an officer only partially.

[Poroskov] But this borders on robbery.

[Mironov] Let us call things by their own names—it is robbery!

[Poroskov] You transferred the training center in Riga to local authorities. This is not the only instance?

[Mironov] The land has been transferred; we will talk more about the buildings. Local leaders are rejecting their joint operation or monetary compensation, saying this is all theirs. So it goes quite often. But today we have real property of two billion rubles in 1991 prices. I do not agree to have all this transferred gratis.

[Poroskov] Have there been instances where military units' accounts in Baltic banks have been frozen?

[Mironov] We have opened a network of Gosbank field establishments which have contact with national banks in all kinds of financial operations. The republic can neither attach nor freeze field establishment accounts.

[Poroskov] Is the transfer of a portion of military structures to a Russian commune possible?

[Mironov] I supported such a petition on the part of the commune, and there also is a fundamental agreement of the CinC Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. But local laws are such that any deals on the sale or transfer of real property are impossible without authorization. In case it is received, the commune's appeal will be realized.

[Poroskov] It is apparent that relations with local authorities cannot be called serene and that mutual understanding does not always succeed in being reached.

[Mironov] If I do not understand their laws, and they ours... In discovering general laws, philosophers and jurists evidently did not suspect the possibility of such a situation.

If spouses have divorced and the apartment has not been able to be changed, then in the best case they say hello to each other and in the worst case they curse each other. We say hello. With smiling faces there is nonconstructive contact.

[Poroskov] At one time Margaret Thatcher said it will take 5-7 years to withdraw the Army of the Rhine from Germany. The Northwestern Group's numerical strength is much larger. What time periods and withdrawal conditions would you give for it?

[Mironov] If all withdrawal problems were resolved with a plus sign, then a minimum of five years with supreme organization, and only the Ground Forces; without the Fleet and air defense. There is a fixed system there—positions, support services—which was created over the years.

There is an extreme need to open a Russian embassy or consulate-general and to determine the legal basis of our presence here.

366th Withdrawing to Azerbaijan

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3 Mar 92 First edition p 1

[Report by Capt 2nd Rank V. Urban and Maj K. Litvinov: "The 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment Will Leave Karabakh"]

[Text]

Armenia and Azerbaijan Accelerate Military Preparations

According to reports received at the editorial office of the command group of the Transcaucasus Military District, there was an unusual, tranquil atmosphere in Stepanakert (Hankendi) Monday morning. For several days now the 366th msp [Motorized Rifle Regiment] has not been subjected to shelling. And the regiment itself is preparing to withdraw from Nagornyy Karabakh.

It does not have far to go, to be sure. The 366th regiment will be stationed in an area of Azerbaijan and not in Russia, as certain of the mass media have hastened to report. A group of staff officers from the Transcaucasus Military District headed by Lt Gen Iosif Oganyan has arrived in Stepanakert (Hankendi) from Tbilisi. In an interview with our correspondent he avoided giving specific dates for the regiment's withdrawal, but he made clear that it would not be drawn out.

I would point out that three servicemen were killed and more than 10 were wounded here by shells fired from the direction of Shusha. As was foreseen, however, the 366th regiment's departure is generating opposite reactions on the two sides in the conflict. Baku if not concealing its satisfaction. It has been reported by telephone by an official of the NKR [Nagornyy Karabakh Republic], however, the population of Stepanakert (Hankendi) "is bewildered and confused."

On 1 March the district military council approved a statement which stresses the military council's hope that both sides will demonstrate reason and restraint with respect to the withdrawal of the 366th msp and will not engage in any excesses as the regiment redeploys. At the same time the military council announced that it will take all possible steps to see that the withdrawal of the 366th msp is carried out in an organized manner, with all necessary combat support and cover.

And so, the regiment is departing Stepanakert (Hankendi). The conflict in and around Nagornyy Karabakh is growing. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are now vigorously accelerating military preparations.

We reported in the latest issue that the Ministry of Defense of Armenia had begun forming a regular national army. Among other things, it has called upon all

Armenian officers to return to the homeland and join the Armenian army. "In the situation of colonial war being waged by Azerbaijan against Nagorny Karabakh, the movement of the Azerbaijani national army up to the borders of Armenia and the shelling of the republic's border villages, only a regular army can guarantee the republic's security," states an appeal from the ministry.

According to certain information received by the editors from well-informed sources it is planned to administer the republic oath in Yerevan to a division of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] stationed there. This division's depots in Abovyan have been seized. All the officers are being asked to remain to serve in the Armenian national army. Preliminary estimates show that 15% of the officers have agreed to this. Armenian authorities plan to increase their pay 5- to 10-fold.

It is planned to form a national guard unit out of a motorized rifle regiment billeted in Yerevan. It will be formed mainly of armed formations presently active in Nagorny Karabakh and 300 Armenian cadets from training subunits of the Transcaucasus Military District.

The Azerbaijani side is also extremely active right now. The RIA [Russian Information Agency] has reported that representatives of the Azerbaijani president have arrived in Riga to meet with officers and warrant officers of the Northern Group of Forces who want to return to Azerbaijan to continue their military service. On 24 February Azerbaijan's minister of defense asked Col Gen Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwest Group of Forces to help transfer those servicemen who agree to return to the republic. They will be provided with housing, material support and medical services.

Observers predict that a new round of the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh is possible within the next few days.

Incidentally: The command element of the Transcaucasus Military District is taking steps to prepare and transfer the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment from Stepanakert. Lt Col Nikolay Medvedev, acting chief of the press center of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, confirmed this report for an ITAR-TASS correspondent on 2 March.

With respect to reports that families of servicemen are being evacuated from the Transcaucasus Military District, the acting press center chief emphasizes that this does not conform to the reality. The families of some officers are at their own request indeed being flown on military transports to other areas, since it is dangerous, sometimes impossible, to leave by land. This is not an organized or large-scale undertaking, however.

Nikolay Medvedev disavowed a report broadcast once again on the Sunday television program *Itogi* that there are chemical weapons on the territory of the Transcaucasus Military District. "We repeat: There are no chemical weapons belonging to the Joint Armed Forces of CIS in the Transcaucasus," he said in conclusion.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MiG-31 Flight-Technical Specifications

92UM0636A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
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[Article by Aleksandr Bolotin: "Among the Clairvoyant—the 'MiG'"]

[Text] The end of June brought a sensation to the aviation world: the newest Soviet fighter, the MiG-31, was shown at the Le Bourget Air Show. Outwardly, as was written in KRYLYA RODINY issue 6-91 ("They Are Discovering Aircraft Anew Here"), it is very similar to the MiG-25. The steel construction is also twin-finned and has a two-engine configuration, box-shaped side air intakes, and a delta wing displaced to the rear so much that it almost flows together with the stabilizer... But after that... After that, everything is different!

Let us call upon Rostislav Appolosovich Belyakov, chief designer of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan, to speak:

"Let us recall the 1970's. That is when cruise missile platforms appeared in America. Now let us look at the map of our country... Yes, it turned out to be totally unprotected from the north. And the 'MiG' firm saw this clearly: there are few good quality airfields and observation posts there. At the polar sites they can detect an aircraft when it passes directly overhead... Of course, in this situation we immediately had to create a long-range interceptor which could "operate" both over the huge unpopulated territory and protect industrial installations. Hence the requirements for the aircraft: long range and tremendous speed. The requirement: to destroy the enemy—a nuclear weapons platform—"before target duplication," as the specialists say, and not have to combat each cruise missile individually."

Rostislav Appolosovich says frankly that the design bureau scrupulously used all the technology of the MiG-25 for the MiG-31 and its design, developed for flying at great speeds with a high degree of heating. They borrowed production decisions and work of the series plant that made the MiG-25's. Hence the similarity between the MiG-31 and MiG-25. Therefore, I believe that long-promised drawings of the MiG-25 being published for the first time today will also largely show our readers the new aircraft. Of course, we developed for it a fundamentally new engine that is more fuel-efficient at low altitudes and speeds, which at the same time ensured the possibility of flying at significant indicated airspeeds at low altitudes. We also managed to increase the intercept radius substantially.

A new weapons system and armament control system were made for the MiG-31. This made it possible to increase the range of detecting targets in a large zone and to launch missiles at considerable distances to destroy the platforms. It has a completely new system for controlling aircraft in a group. For example, if one of the

crews receive target information, it can relay it to the displays of the other aircraft.

A group of MiG-31's usually consists of four aircraft. The corridor that it "searches" is as much as 1,000 meters. Its commander uses guidance from the control system to determine the most dangerous targets—taking into account their approach to important defense installations and speed. Thus, sequence of destroying enemy aircraft is established.

A group of "MiG's" can conduct combat operations in virtually the entire altitude range up to 30 km at great distances.

To some extent, the MiG-31 is similar in specifications and performance characteristics to the U.S. F-14 carrier-based aircraft (see the rubric "Collection" in this issue). The American fighter also has a long range of fire (a good missile). But the F-14 "sees" the target and can destroy it only within a narrow zone of plus or minus 6 degrees.

The MiG-31 has unique avionics. It turns the interceptor into a sort of mini-AWACS. The basis of this equipment is a powerful radar with a so-called phased-array antenna...

E.K. Kostrubskiy, deputy chief designer of the design bureau, explains:

"The phased array differs from existing antennas. An electronic shifting of the beam takes place in it—both vertical and horizontal scanning. What does this mean? Normal radar antennas are made so that the beam scans in only one plane and is shifted to the other by means of mechanical movement of the antenna. That is how all antennas of fighter aircraft in the world are built today, except...the MiG-31. Its antenna is fixed. This made it possible to increase its diameter (the space is not needed for movement). It was possible to insert a large antenna in the same aircraft nose. The larger its diameter, the better the characteristics: range and angles of sight.

We also talked with Eduard Karlovich [Kostrubskiy] about a second advantage: electronic scanning sharply reduces the time for scanning space. Incidentally, only the B-2 bomber has a phased-array antenna, but it appeared 10 years earlier on the MiG-31.

The MiG-31's crew sees 10 targets simultaneously and can fire missiles simultaneously against four of them.

Another secret must be revealed: Why is the MiG-31 a two-seater?

Let us recall that the first specially designed Soviet Yak-25 interceptor was also a two-seater. But then they created single-seat aircraft of this type. Is this a step backwards?..

No. The MiG-31's weapons control system has become complex and multifunctional. Without a navigator-operator, it is very difficult for one pilot to assess the

overall situation in the air. That is why the crew commander only makes the final decision in combat, and all the preparation for this decision is done by his assistant. Plotting the route, processing information, observing and selecting the target, participating in group actions, and many other duties—that is why it is hard to call the second crew member an assistant. The navigator-operator of the MiG-31 is a new aviation specialty. Cadets at military schools are now being trained in this specialty.

Valeriy Sergeyevich Zaytsev became the first navigator-operator of the "MiG" firm. He came to this job with much experience (he was an An-12 pilot) and sound technical knowledge behind him. Valeriy thoroughly knew the entire system and had a splendid understanding of the schematics. A surprisingly kind person. During the tests, they called him "Zaychik" [spot of reflected light]. Zaytsev and Leonid Popov carried the entire burden of development of the system—and this involved hundreds of flights!

We will come back to the navigator-operator profession later. Now it is time to clarify in more detail: What is new about the engines? These are highly efficient D-30 FB bypass engines, which develop a thrust of 15,500 kgf each on full afterburner. They were created at the Perm Experimental Design Bureau under the supervision of P.A. Solovyev. His first deputy was V.M. Chepkin, who was directly involved with this. Not everything went smoothly and simply. Here is what Valeriy Yevgenovich Menitskiy, the chief pilot of the "MiG" firm, has to say:

"Once during flight, a fuel line weld ruptured—a manufacturing defect. They determined from flowmeter readings that the fuel jettisoning had engaged—fuel was being consumed so quickly. They ran out of fuel shortly before landing. Fortunately, this happened in the vicinity of the airfield. They did not make it to the runway and landed on the dirt.

"In this situation, the navigator-operator, Viktor Ryndin (he was a pilot, but was working in this position)," Menitskiy says, "proved to be brilliant. When the crew's situation became clear, he figured out a route a little farther from the city. The commander ordered Ryndin to abandon the aircraft. But Ryndin replied firmly: only in the most extreme case and together!"

The aircraft which had been saved then suggested much to the designers.

In talking about the MiG-31, we must remember one of the best pilots of our time, A.V. Fedotov (an essay about him is contained in KRYLYA RODINY 7-90). He was the one who made the first flight on 16 September 1975 in the MiG-31 test aircraft No 831. Fedotov perished together with the first navigator-operator, Zaytsev. I will remind you that the magazine told how Aleksandr Vasilyevich [Fedotov] believed the instruments, which erroneously showed a very high fuel consumption. He began to save the aircraft. The aircraft began to stall. He brought the "MiG" out of the stall, but did not have

enough altitude. He was literally a second late in his decision to eject. Last year, the magazine did not write that this was a MiG-31...

I know that the experimental design bureau tested specific regimes (large angles and spins) following the fatal crash—B. Orlov, A. Fastovets, and V. Menitskiy. All pilots of the design bureau were taken through two flights for stall and spin. As a result, the MiG-31 (the aircraft is not for a dogfight), despite its impressive dimensions, "mastered" expert-level advanced aerobatic maneuvers. Menitskiy also demonstrated it at Le Bourget. True, the MiG-29's aerobatic maneuvers are more miniature and tighter. And the weather there sometimes did not enable spectators to see everything; unfortunately, the aircraft was constantly hidden in the clouds.

Another thing new in the 46-ton MiG-31 is the two-wheel main landing gear. The wheels are positioned in spread tandem, that is, the second wheel does not follow in the path of the first. Pressure on the ground is reduced, and it can land on a dirt airstrip...

The flight to Paris and back is generally pretty far for a fighter... But not for the MiG-31. It turns out that earlier it had tested itself much more seriously. The MiG-31 became the first fighter to conquer the pole (test pilots R. Taskayev and L. Popov). Later, it flew from Murmansk to Anadyr over the North Pole (executing combat maneuvering during the flight). The flight was made by Hero of the Soviet Union T. Aubakirov. Of course, the MiG-31 was refueled in the air by an Il-76 tanker (and perhaps also by a Su-24). The duration of the flight without refueling is 3.5 hours, and the distance 3,000 km.

It is curious that after reaching the tanker search area, the MiG-31, using its powerful radar and navigation equipment, found the tanker quickly itself. During the refueling, the pilots had to work a lot with the engine control stick. It must be said that the engines have a very good response, and the engine control stick revolutions characteristic is practically linear. That is why an average pilot will be able to perform an aerial refueling after gaining certain skills.

Still, not just any pilot can fly the MiG-31. On the one hand, the aircraft is more exacting in control; on the other hand, the missions it carries out require great skill. Pilots who have an aptitude for analysis, like complex equipment, and have endurance (the G-loads and flight duration are great) go into the MiG-31. The fighter is not for novices, but lieutenants also fly it.

So, what kind of an impression did the MiG-31 make on specialists at Le Bourget?

There is none like it in the world—that is their general opinion.

Flight-Technical Specifications

The MiG-31 is designed for destroying air targets flying at low and high altitudes, in the forward and rear hemispheres, in free airspace and against the background of the ground, in visual and instrument meteorological conditions, and when the enemy uses maneuver and active countermeasures. Combat operations are carried out using information from the automatic control and guidance system in the command guidance and semi-autonomous operating (coordinate support) modes, alone or as part of a group of up to four interceptors with automatic exchange of information and target allocation as part of the group.

Specifications	
Crew size	2
Takeoff weight with full fuel load, kg	41,000
with full fuel load and full tanks, kg	46,200
Maximum speed at 17,500 meters, km/hr	3,000
at ground level, km/hr	1,500
Maximum flight duration:	
with external tanks, hrs	3.6
with aerial refueling, hrs	6-7
Ferry range, km	3,000
Intercept point:	
at supersonic cruising speed (M=2.35), km	720
with external tanks, km	1,400
Takeoff run, meters	1,200
Landing run, meters	800
Armament control system:	
—onboard phased-array radar	
—forward-hemisphere thermal direction finder	
—tactical situation display	
Number of targets tracked simultaneously	10
Number of targets attacked simultaneously	4
Field of simultaneous tracking of and firing on targets	plus or minus 70 degrees azimuth and from plus 70 to minus 60 degrees elevation
Air-to-air missiles:	
—4 long-range radar-seeker missiles	
—2 medium-range heat-seeker missiles	
—4 short-range heat-seeker missiles	
23-mm cannon (260 rounds)	

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CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Comment on Submarine Collision

92UM0650A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 22 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Baturin: "Where Else Will the Baton Rouge Surface"]

[Text] A submarine weighing 7,000 tons needs a vast amount of space to come to a stop. Nobody really knew the exact number of collisions there have been between Soviet and American submarines; the number has been kept secret and it turned out that there had never been any such collisions at all. The Russians have usually employed a tactic to force the Americans to maintain their distance—a stylized turn, known in the American Navy as the "Crazy Ivan". Having decided there was no threat of being rammed, the American captain went aft toward the sonar equipment...

Obviously, the captains of the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge, with Tomahawk missiles on board, and of a former "red" NATO Sierra Class submarine recently attempted to actually replicate the plot from Tom Clancy's novel, "The Hunt for Red October", a best seller and a few years ago the most popular book in the Pentagon.

The use of naval forces as a political tool is an ordinary matter. Especially the appearance of military vessels off the coast of some state or other during domestic crises. But just what political goal was the United States trying to attain with its military instrument? It could hardly be called lightweight in spite of its enviable buoyancy. Further, Russia's declarations that the United States is now our "natural ally" are well known. Questions. Can we consider it natural for a foreign missile submarine to sail around in our territorial waters? If so, can it be a "one-sided" ally? Can we understand the category of "natural ally" in the sense of the unconstrained nature of the investigation of similar types of incidents at the highest political level?

The argument about whether or not the vessels were within or outside the 12 mile territorial limit is an ordinary matter. There is no agreement in the definition of the point of departure for calculating the width of the territorial waters and also the criteria and techniques for performing this calculation. The question arises: are the interested states not conducting negotiations on clarifying the border line in the Barents Sea as this was done with the United States near our northeastern shores? If not, why not? If yes, then why has nothing been heard about this and will a series of scandals not break out later, like after concluding an agreement with the Americans?

Having read Tom Clancy, the American captain decided he had no reason to believe he would be rammed. He did not consider the rich experience of the Russians in recent years: there was the sinking of their own submarines (Petr Vasev and Admiral Nakhimov) and M. Rust's

unimpeded flight to the Kremlin (it is also good that it would be difficult for that class of submarine to surface in the Moscow River) and nuclear submarine catastrophes (the Komsomolets). If experience teaches nothing, still can it certainly explain why a navy, so rich in every kind of detection and monitoring systems, loses foreign submarines in the "acoustic shadow" of its own territorial waters? How does it justify the possible loss of a foreign submarine from the moral point of view and, from an ecological point of view, how is it safer with the sinking of native reactors?

It is possible that the Americans, having sent tons of humanitarian aid to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], felt themselves to be significantly freer in a far from humanitarian sphere. The Russian captain could have freely decided to manifest restraint and not take the uninvited guest down a peg. But here the main question also arises. Officers and enlisted men in the U.S. Navy enjoy significant freedom of initiative and are accountable for their actions. "It is freedom of initiative," thinks Tom Clancy, "that is our primary advantage over the Russian Armed Forces." I am afraid that the Americans have already lost this advantage. Combat aircraft take off (and fly away) when they want to and commanders are disarming their own subunits, while transferring assault rifles and vehicles to guerrillas, and submarines try to ram. How are things among our troops with freedom of initiative?

Judging by everything, the number of techniques we can use to burst bubbles continues to increase.

Swedish Report on Soviet Submarine Violations Noted

92UM0650B Moscow IVZESTIYA in Russian
24 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondence Marat Zubko, Stockholm: "Uninvited Guests in the Swedish Fjords"]

[Text] Foreign submarines continued to penetrate Sweden's territorial waters in 1991, but evidently these intrusions ceased in September—that conclusion is contained in a report which Swedish Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Bengt Gustafsson submitted to the country's government.

The commander-in-chief compiles annual reports about violations of Sweden's airspace and territorial waters and their appearance is regarded with restraint here. But, this time, the Swedes impatiently awaited Bengt Gustafsson's reports on the causes for them. Not long ago, Commander Carl Andersson, famous for his active participation in the hunt for submarines, literally dumbfounded his countrymen with his declaration that all the commotion about submarine incursions is simply a chimera, like the story of flying saucers (IZVESTIYA, No. 230).

How did the general confirm his story? He confirms that the country's coast guard recorded "approximately five probable violations" off Sweden's eastern coast to the north and south of Stockholm. In his words, there was an additional pair of incursions, but with a lesser degree of probability.

As we can see, this is a question of probable incursions, but nevertheless, the commander-in-chief says he was 100 percent convinced that foreign submarines have entered the country's territorial waters.

The report notes that Swedish seamen twice managed to record "submarine noises" which, according to military experts, were identical to those recorded for the first time during the violation of Sweden's sea boundaries on the west coast in 1984, and then "caught" 40 more times.

By the nature of the noises, the Swedes sort of established that they are dealing with a mini-submarine 25-35 meters long.

However, the primary evidence that incursions are taking place in principle, in the words of ministry of defense representatives, is contained in the video-film "Uninvited Guests," which is attached to the report. Specifically, this film contains frames that were taken at the bottom of one of the bays of Sweden's Gotland Island, in which damage to the underwater anti-submarine warning cable is visible. The film states that an underwater all-terrain vehicle deployed from aboard a submarine might have damaged the signal system.

And still even this did not appear to be adequately convincing to many Swedes. A number of experts expressed the opinion that ships' anchors or bottom trawl nets could have damaged the cable.

However, there is a detail in the commander-in-chief's report that calls special attention to itself: violations of Swedish waters ceased in September 1991. And although Bengt Gustafsson says that it is still early to come to a conclusion on the subject of the cessation of the incursions, there is still something to ponder here.

First of all, this question arises: isn't the disappearance of periscopes from Swedish waters not associated with the replacement of the former USSR's Ministry of Defense leadership after the August putsch? If it is associated, doesn't it signify that our submarines were nevertheless violating Swedish territorial waters? The sooner the answer is given on that score, the better.

However, that does not completely rule out that this is only a temporary break in the "periscope hunt" in Sweden and that entirely different forces are related to the incursions. In this regard, attention is directed to a recent article by Investigator Tommi Lindfors in the Stockholm newspaper DAGENS NYUKHETER which told a story that was unknown to the Swedish public. In February 1984, a foreign submarine which appeared to be... American was detected in the coastal waters of southern Sweden, near Karlskrona Naval Base.

Having fired 22 depth-charges at the submarine, the coast guard attempted to detain it, but it did not manage to catch or destroy it. Why? Maybe because on that very same day the American ABC television company reported that U.S. Navy mini-submarines "are visiting the waters of friendly states" for the purpose of studying underwater objects. It is easy to understand that the Swedes were given the signal not to bomb too zealously. At that time, IZVESTIYA wrote about CBS's acknowledgement.

In December 1991, General Gustafsson ordered the coast guard to act more energetically in the event of territorial water violations, specifically, to immediately open fire if sonar detects the presence of unidentified mini-submarines about 30 meters long. Now, we assume that measures will be even more severe. While commenting on the commander-in-chief's report, Defense Minister Anders Bjork stated:

"We will never reconcile ourselves to that fact that some state is violating Swedish waters. Neither now, nor in the future..."

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Finance Chief Comments on Yeltsin Social Protection Decree

92UM0652A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by N. Burbyga: "Decree Military Was Waiting For"]

[Text] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin's decree on "measures for enhancing social protection of servicemen and individuals discharged from military service" has been adopted.

We asked Lieutenant-General Vasily Vorobyev, chief, Central Finance Directorate of the CIS Combined Armed Forces, to comment on the decree.

The entire package of measures adopted may be symbolically divided into several sections.

First are the Russian Government's measures for stimulating military labor. In particular, provision has been made for increasing the position pay of officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service personnel. A resolution has been adopted to increase lump-sum payments upon discharge for conscripts serving the normal period from the 100 rubles that was previously paid to 500 rubles, and to 2,000 rubles for orphaned children and children left without parental guardianship. I especially want to highlight the timeliness of this specific measure since we will at last be able to help those servicemen who served their two years.

HOUSING. More than 195,000 servicemen are without housing in Russia alone. The withdrawal of forces from

Eastern Europe and the migration processes associated with the reduction of the Armed Forces are complicating this situation even further. The decree stipulates that already in the first half of 1992 all governmental agencies will eliminate the backlog in allocation of living space to servicemen, to include share holding in construction.

Plots of land—of 0.10 hectare in urban settlements and 0.25 hectares in rural settlements—will be apportioned for construction of individual dwellings and for gardening.

It has been stipulated that ownership of occupied apartments in state and departmental buildings will be transferred gratis to officer personnel, army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended and have twenty calendar years of military service, as well as to individuals who have served twenty or more calendar years and been discharged from the military by virtue of age, illness, reduction in force or health limitations and to combat veterans, soldier-internationalists as well as members of families of servicemen who died or were killed.

Section Three. Tax benefits. The decree consolidates a currently-in-effect, All-Union regulation about the exemption of all categories of servicemen from the payment of income tax on allowances, monetary awards and other payments received in connection with fulfillment of military service obligations. It has also been determined that servicemen who have been allocated plots for the construction of individual dwellings will be exempted from the payment of land tax to the Russian Federation. The Russian Government has been instructed to put forth a proposal on procedures for granting tax benefits connected with privatization of housing to servicemen and individuals discharged from military service.

Bearing in mind that the maximum rates of compensatory payments to servicemen without apartments for the rental of temporary accommodations have fallen far behind the market value of dwellings being rented, the decree provides for an increase in compensatory payments. To provide assistance to servicemen who have declared their desire to solve their housing problems under their own power—by entering housing-construction cooperatives and building their houses—gratuitous financial help will be provided at the rate of 50 percent of the value of the cooperative accommodations or bank loan assumed for individual housing construction. It has also been established that officers, army and navy warrant officers, extended service personnel who have extended as well as those who have been discharged from military services for a number of reasons and have served twenty or more calendar years are to pay for public utilities and occupied living space in state buildings at a rate of 50 percent.

Invitation to Bid on Defense Housing Construction

92UM0633A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Article: "Construction of Housing for Servicemen in the CIS"]

[Text] The Main Command of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States invites interested companies to take part in competitive bidding for delivery, installation and start-up of boiler and central thermal stations and gas supply systems.

Financing is by the Federated Republic of Germany, represented by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) [transliteration] Bank, Frankfurt-am-Main.

Boiler and Central Thermal Stations

Russia: 3 installations, 24-106 MW boiler stations, 3.7-7.0 MW central thermal stations

Belarus: 1 installation, 38 MW boiler stations Fuel for boiler stations: type 100 natural gas or fuel oil Boiler output:

—hot-water, 8 and 20 MW;

—% steam, 3 MW

Gas Supply Systems (Natural Gas); Boiler and Central Thermal Stations; Power in MW

—Russia: 2 installations, gas distribution stations, 160 and 282 nm³/hr

—Belarus: 1 installation, gas distribution station (29 nm³/hr)

Important conditions for qualification of competitors participating in competitive bidding:

—annual turnover in the last three years not less than 20 million DM in machine building, and for CIS organizations, equivalent turnover in local currency;

—solvency and, in the case of selection, bank guarantees (a minimum of 20 percent of the total contract) by a first-class banking institution;

—work experience abroad in the corresponding area;

—a knowledge of the rules and regulations effective in the CIS, and the necessary certificates;

—work experience in the USSR.

Both individual companies and consortiums may take part in the competitive bidding. In the case of consortiums, the leader must have experience in creating the corresponding systems (experience in delivery and installation). Participation of suppliers from the CIS and of companies from new federal lands on the basis of subcontracts, or as members of consortiums, is desirable.

Bids may be obtained from the Consulting Consortium for Housing Construction in the USSR, General Karbyshv Boulevard, No 8, 123154, Moscow, beginning on 2 March 1992 upon presentation of evidence of a transfer of a total of 7,000 FRG marks to account No 220-2307650, bank code 70070010, Deutsche Bank AG,

Munich, addressed to CWU, Moscow, to the attention of: "Bids: Boiler and Central Thermal Stations and Gas Supply Systems."

Telephone: 946-80-26/00, FAX: 943-00-37, TELEX: 911 553 cwu su.

Interested companies must communicate their intention to acquire bids from the above address, telex or fax number prior to 25 February 1992.

Problems of Defense Fuel Supply System

92UM0633B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Feb 92 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel B. Zayarnyy by correspondent P. Altunin; place and date not given: "Where Are We to Get 2.5 Billion?: The Material Base of the Fuel Service in a Critical State"]

[Text] Colonel B. Zayarnyy manages fuel bases and depots in the Central Directorate of Missile Propellant and Fuel. His responsibilities also include military plants manufacturing technical resources.

[Altunin] Boris Yakovlevich, the fuel situation is very complex today in many regions. As far as I know, the army is still hanging on. Is this true?

[Zayarnyy] Even in today's stressed fuel situation the country is showing concern for the army and navy. While not in its former volume, fuel is still being delivered. But it does not dispense itself into tanks and airplanes. We have an entire network of technical resources with which to deliver, store and dispense it. This is where we find the main problems, ones which have accumulated, of course, over a period of more than just a year. And they could obstruct the entire support process unless emergency measures are implemented.

Judge for yourself. Last year the Ukraine, for example, never did supply 4,015 tons of rolled tubing and 285 tons of petroleum and arc-welded tubing. Nor is the picture any better in Russia: Given a demand of 6,600 tons of plate steel, only 74 tons were allocated to the same plants.

The monopolism typical of our economy was a considerable obstacle even before, but now it is becoming totally intolerable. For example there is a plant in the Ukraine that produces truck-mounted fuel dispensing and pumping equipment. It is the only one in the CIS. And in turn, it receives many of the machine units it needs only from Russia. As a consequence in our complex political situation there are many places where coordination is lacking.

The increasing cost of equipment is having an effect in the face of drastic reductions of allocations for it. For example instead of a quite recent price of 60,000 rubles, a fuel tanker truck on a KrAZ chassis is now offered to us for R4.8 million. Need I say more?

[Altunin] Boris Yakovlevich, the editor's office is receiving letters complaining about pollution of the environment by the military, and the fuel depots and bases under your care are seen as a major factor.

[Zayarnyy] The complaints are valid, and we receive them as well. Sometimes extremely critical situations are created locally. Our share of the blame for this is sizable of course. Incompetency and carelessness of officials cost us dearly. But we cannot avoid the fact that the equipment was designed over 30 years ago, and the technology became obsolete long ago. How can we observe strict ecological norms under such conditions? In the past, we could get away with many things: Local and military authorities would make a deal with each other, establish some special rule, and that would be the end of it. But now people do not sit silently, and people's deputies are on guard. If you lay a pipeline over a distance of a few kilometers, there's money to pay. And if a fuel spill occurs, you've got a major disaster.

The demands on safety and on protection of the environment have noticeably risen today, and this is valid. For example according to today's norms every storage tank must have an oil pan which would prevent penetration of a petroleum product into the ground in the event of a spill. The forces currently operate around 150,000 movable storage tanks. None of them have oil pans. According to our calculations, if we were to provide each storage tank with an oil pan, we would need R2.5 billion. Where are we to get it?

Here's another example. The majority of airfield fuel depots consist of movable storage tanks. This is besides the fact that in comparison with permanent tanks, handling their contents is several times more complicated, and fuel is spilled and misappropriated.

Many fuel depots are in residential zones, and adjacent to large industrial enterprises. Considering safety requirements, they must be moved immediately to other places. According to the most modest estimates moving just one costs R2 million, and we have over 20 such depots.

[Altunin] But you do have military builders. We know that they also provide services to your facilities.

[Zayarnyy] Yes, they do. But first of all, all of their energies are now committed to making homes for units withdrawn from the groups of forces. Second, their strength has been weakened by the chronic manpower shortage in military construction units and a lack of materials.

One other problem is personnel. People are leaving the military plants, the depots and the bases. Even though the wages of blue and white collar workers were increased as of 1 October of last year, this increase is incomparable with the wage increases enjoyed by neighboring enterprises. A turner with the top qualifications working for us received R600-800 (prior to 1 January of this year), while next door, at a kindred enterprise, a

3d-rank turner receives R1,200 or more. Electricians, milling machine operators and welders, especially ones working with nonferrous metals, are leaving. The whole problem is that the prices paid to civilian plants for their products were increased several times over, while as you know, the prices are fixed at ours.

[Altunin] How, then, are we to solve all of these problems?

[Zayarnyy] What we need now is additional profit, and this means that we need to be bolder in introducing progressive forms of production such as SP [not further identified] and leasing, and we need to expand production of consumer goods. Otherwise the outflow of workers will increase even more, and the shops will become completely empty, all the more so in this time of liberalization of prices.

But on the whole, the solution has been indicated in the latest directives from the Main Directorate—commercialization. We could sell, both to the national economy and to entrepreneurs at the market price, equipment that has served its useful life but is still fully operational. And the receipts could be used to pay wages, to rebuild production operations and to prevent environmental pollution.

[Altunin] That is, you could find those millions yourselves?

[Zayarnyy] Many, if not all.

Shortage of Funds for Defense Food Supply Program

92UM0621C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel Boris Valentinovich Shtanko, chief of Moscow Military District Food Service, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Vorobyev, occasion, date and place not specified: "A Parade of Food Products on the 'Parade Ground'?"]

[Text] *Today it is difficult to buy food products in stores, and if the products are there, they are very expensive, especially in the capital. This is why the Minister of Defense Order No 570 of 5 December 1991 "On Providing a Food Ration to Certain Categories of Servicemen" was received with satisfaction in the troops. It was presumed that officers and warrant officers were to receive it as of 1 January, which will help them deal with problems of service above all and free them from standing in lines.*

But many difficulties and discrepancies arose with the fulfillment of this decision, above all because of a shortage of funds. This is where our correspondent began his conversation with Colonel B. Shtanko, chief of the Moscow Military District Food Service:

[Vorobyev] We know that officers of many units of the capital and of suburban Moscow posts, including, for

example, of our editorial office, did not receive the promised food products in January. Well, we did not see the ration, but perhaps we can at least hear what it is proposed that we receive?

[Shtanko] This is a combined-arms ration established at one time by USSR Minister of Defense Order No 445 of 15 December 1990. Officers and warrant officers are issued food products at the level of the soldier's daily norm, i.e., meat 185, butter 30, sugar 70, cabbage 130, potatoes 600 (all figures in grams), chicken eggs 4 per week and so on. But we could not provide officers even this minimum in January, since district resources clearly are insufficient. The situation would have been much worse had it not been for the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] Armed Forces Central Food Directorate, which supported us.

[Vorobyev] But still, where are you getting the products?

[Shtanko] We almost completely lost former ties with the republics because of the existing political situation in the country as well as the economic slump in production. Previously we were assisted by Tsentrosoyuz, [V/O] Sovrybflot and USSR ministries, but now one hope remains—direct ties. We are letting contracts with sovkhozes, farmers and agricultural enterprises, but not always successfully. A producer from that same Ukraine says: "We soon will have our own money and we do not need your rubles" and demands: "Let us exchange by barter—passenger cars and refrigerators in exchange for food products." But we ourselves essentially are purchasers and not producers of refrigerators or cars, and so we have to knock on all the doors in hope of help, right down to servicemen's social protection committees. Alas, not everywhere do they express readiness to help us. For example, in a telegram of 5 February N. Konov-alov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Trade Committee, demanded that Rosmyasomoltorg [expansion not given] associations release commodities to military consumers even on a priority basis, but... "within limits of last year's funds." But in this case servicemen who were to receive rations beginning in 1992 do not in any way fall into the calculation of last year's deliveries...

Nevertheless, in January the Moscow Military District Food Service succeeded in organizing the issue of food for basic descriptions in 60 percent of military units. In February these figures will grow to 80 percent.

[Vorobyev] But what keeps you from organizing the issue of rations in other units?

[Shtanko] Food services are not everywhere, and so we are forced additionally to deploy distribution storerooms and food depots to organize storage and issue of rations. In particular, we are establishing a district distribution depot for the military units, establishments, staffs and central directorates which have no food services. The district command proposes to accommodate it on the territory of an alternate airfield. This is the so-called "parade ground," which is not far from the center of

Moscow. A large number of necessary structures, refueling points, food depots and a system of messhalls which can be easily altered as distribution storerooms already are here, and there also are cooling chambers. In short, these are rather good conditions for a post food distribution depot, although here too it is not without problems. The field is planned to be given up for a national museum of aviation and cosmonautics. No one objects to this idea, but the fact is we must also remember about today and the problems which will have to be solved in the interests of the city and post.

[Vorobyev] Boris Valentinovich, we will hope that the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Commissariat and the capital municipal administration heed these arguments. But now about the food ration: Does the district still have reserves to provide servicemen with rations? And is it possible to help workers and employees if only in some way, for they too are representatives of the military department and the vital activity of units depends on them to no small extent?

[Shtanko] Yes, we are attempting to produce additional agricultural products through the efforts of military sovkhozes (we have seven of them) and subsidiary farms, and not only in support of servicemen, but also workers and employees. We sell them as inexpensively as possible—of course, not below the production cost—for these categories of persons.

The district provides itself with milk for six months, meat for three and a half months, and potatoes for four and a half months of the annual requirement through the work of military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms. And this year by decision of Major General V. Churanov, chief of Moscow Military District Rear, we planned to

double milk and meat production in each subsidiary farm of rear units, which will become an example for other units. District Commander Colonel General V. Toporov allocated eight million rubles from his fund for these purposes for 1992. Money also will go to build sausage shops, slaughterhouses and smokehouses and for subsidiary trades.

[Vorobyev] I would like to end our conversation with a question about what problems must be solved in the interests of service right now. Recently we placed an announcement and telephone numbers of the Moscow Military District Food Service in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for farmers, organizations and sovkhozes which can sell food products. Did it help?

[Shtanko] Yes, thank you! After your publication we received many proposals for selling us meat, milk and other food products. So the March ration of servicemen will be of much better quality and assortment...

But with respect to other problems, they really exist. One of the main ones is cadres, absence of the necessary number of positions, poor pay of workers and employees, and a shortage of housing. Every other person in the Moscow Military District Food Service is homeless, including me and my deputy, and the situation is much worse in the troops. There is not enough transportation for specialized delivery and refrigeration equipment. What is to be said if we are not issued funds for that same wrapping paper? There is no item for this in the estimate of expenditures. So even if you do receive a ration, I do not exclude that there will be nothing to wrap it in...

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Shaposhnikov Wants Return of Stolen Military Hardware*92UM0679A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article from CIS Ministry of Defense Press Center: "To Stop Escalation of Conflict"]

[Text] On 28 February of this year, Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, sent a telegram to President A.N. Mutalibov of the Republic of Azerbaijan, President L.A. Ter-Petrosyan of the Republic of Armenia, Colonel-General V.A. Patrikeyev, Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District and to the army commanders of the 4th and 7th Armies of the Transcaucasus Military District.

In particular, the telegram notes that unfortunately, despite the measures which are being taken, the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh shows no tendency towards peaceful settlement. There is evidence of an escalation of military activity. Crimes dealing with the seizure of equipment, arms and ammunition at military facilities are being accompanied by the death and maiming of completely innocent people. In Azerbaijan, during this year alone, eight servicemen died, 22 were wounded and 28 taken hostage. Incidents of abuse are not infrequent. In 1990 and 1991 similar negative phenomena were recorded on the territory of both states. In spite of this, the culprits remain unpunished and law-enforcement authorities are taking a position of noninterference.

Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov appealed to the presidents of both independent states with a request that they take all measures for returning seized equipment, arms and ammunition to the Unified Armed Forces, preventing illegal actions against servicemen and their families, and calling to account the initiators and executors of illegal activities.

The full authority and political influence of the presidents must be employed for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces instructed the Commanders of the Transcaucasus Military District and the 4th and 7th Armies to strengthen security around cantonments, depots, motor parks and other military facilities and to deny entry into them by outsiders. In case an attack on military facilities

occurs, it is to be decisively repulsed. If seized equipment, arms, stores and the like are not returned, measures are to be taken to destroy them on the spot in accordance with established procedure while not harming peaceful citizens.

The Commander-in-Chief ordered that the 366th Motorized-rifle Regiment be withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh and that all outposts be removed from the administrative border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov insisted that the commanders settle all questions concerning the vital activities of forces in close contact and cooperation with representatives of the legally elected or appointed government bodies.

Lithuanian-CIS Border Troop Standoff Continues*92UM0678A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh under the rubric "From Klaipeda": "CIS and Lithuanian Border Guards: Each Side Is Obeying Its Orders"]

[Text] The situation continues to be tense in the area of the detached "Klaipeda" checkpoint and of the CIS border troop detachment deployed in Klaipeda. As KRSNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, a group of Lithuanian border guards, headed by Stanislav Stancikas, commander of the republic border guard troops, arrived at the checkpoint and demanded that the premises be vacated.

Judging by all appearances, the Lithuanian officials were not acting on their own initiative; they were evidently obeying some orders. But the CIS border guards had not come there on their own free will either and they refused to comply with the demands of the Lithuanian officials.

Neither can the CIS Baltic Border District commanders, in their turn, order their subordinates to leave since the commanders themselves have to get a political decision in order for the CIS guards to give up their positions.

Meanwhile, conflict situations keep emerging and their outcome is sometimes hard to predict. The Lithuanian officials who occupied one of the checkpoint areas without permission declared a hunger strike there, unexpectedly for many people. This fact was presented later in a totally different light; a claim was made that the CIS border guards had captured and were detaining Lithuanian Republic Border Guard Troops Commander Stancikas and some other people. This entailed picketing the "Klaipeda-Mukran Ferry" border sector.

The confrontation continues. But no political decision has been made as yet.

Military Migration Continues

Ukrainian Troops Request Transfer

92UM0681A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Kovalev]

[Text] Migration of officer personnel has also affected the Transbaykal Military District. More than 100 men left the district for their new posts, largely in the Ukraine and Belarus, in January and February alone. Requests for transfer continue to be received, according to Colonel Yu. Chekunov, deputy chief of the District Personnel Directorate. Five or six officers leave every day, on the average.

Are there cases of the opposite kind—ones where officers declare their intention to continue serving in the Transbaykal? It seems that there are, but far too few to fill the vacancies left by officers lost to the western republics of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], according to Colonel Chekunov. For every five officers leaving, there is only one incoming into the district. Considering that natives of the Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Moldova comprise almost a quarter of the officer corps of the Transbaykal Military District, the situation is attaining alarming proportions.

Riga Military School to Relocate

92UM0681B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article]

[Text] RIGA—(RIA) The Daugavpils Higher Military Aviation Engineering School has received an order to relocate to the city of Engels in the Volga area. The move will require at least three years, according to school authorities.

The majority of the officers feel that the housing problem should be resolved, even for personnel remaining in Daugavpils, before the move is made.

Ukrainian Conscripts To Go Home

92UM0681C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd rank A. Kosolapov]

[Text] The Pacific Ocean Fleet has received an order issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces Department, CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] on the subject of sending home, by 1 May, conscript personnel inducted in the Ukraine. Lists of names are being compiled aboard ships. However, there has been a concurrent development, whereby requests from Ukrainians for permission to continue their term of service in the Pacific Ocean Fleet have been piling up. The reasons given are varied. For example, Seaman A. Chursin, a

conscript from Odessa, stated in his request that he considers the entire CIS to be his motherland. Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Ignatochkin, a native of Mariupol, deciding to make the sea his career, will enroll in a maritime school after his discharge.

In a word, the reason varies with the individual. In the subunit commanded by officer P. Kiriyan, of 11 seamen, five have stated that they do not wish to leave. In officer S. Cheplygin's unit, of 21 men, seven wish to stay. Unfortunately, in the General Staff order there is no mention of what is to be done in this situation. For the time being, Admiral G. Khvatov, the Pacific Ocean Fleet commander, has taken upon himself the responsibility of issuing an order offering all personnel who wish to remain the opportunity to do so.

Troops in Moldova to Take Oath or Transfer

92UM0681D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article]

[Text] KISHINEV—(RIA). With the creation of armed forces in Moldova, each officer and warrant officer is being offered the opportunity of deciding whether to continue his service in Moldova or in other states of the CIS. Those who choose to join the Armed Forces of Moldova will carry over their length of service credit, position classification, and rank. Personnel who declare their intention to serve in other CIS states will be transferred to their new post as a group. This is the subject of an instruction issued by the Moldova Ministry of Defense on 27 February.

Russian Officer Blasted for Taking Oath to Ukraine

92UM0707C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA's Lyudmila Savelyeva under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "About What Major Astakhov Forgot"]

[Text] The short letter by Major Astakhov "I, a Russian, Swore Allegiance to Ukraine" (IZVESTIYA, No. 29) evoked hundreds of comments: Something like this is seldom encountered, but it means that not just high prices and empty purses, and not just personal burdens trouble us now.

But what, one thinks, happened? Yes, a Russian officer, a native of Ivanovskaya Oblast, takes the oath of allegiance to Ukraine: There is the usual service, an apartment, and friends. Does this mean that, having sworn allegiance to Ukraine, the major has betrayed Russia, which many are trying to accuse him of; that "he sold the honor of a Russian officer for Ukrainian dumplings and rich borsch with fatback?" No, such vehemence obviously is out of place: If everything was that simple there would be no problems. Well, after all, it was not Japan

that he chose to serve, but, in the final analysis, a people who are related and who have always been close to us, among whom, incidentally, are 12 million Russians.

The second squall of accusations: An oath is given only once in a lifetime, and a second oath is always a dishonor for an officer. Emotions aside, we ask ourselves: Can an oath to a state that does not exist be considered binding? Yes, A. Zhurba, a major in the reserve from Kolomna, reminds us that the oath has words like this: "I swear to my last breath to serve my people" (Did Major Astakhov have a second breath?" he asks). But even here, it is totally unclear. Just several months ago everything was simple: One's own people—this was all of the people of the USSR, regardless of nationality. But now, under the new conditions, how is this concept to be interpreted—one's own people? Exclusively according to a "nationality" chart? And according to this chart is belonging to one people an obstacle to loyal service to another? With such an approach we will probably achieve only one thing—a huge army will become a tribe of nomads, armed to the teeth, and wandering over the entire territory of the former USSR in search of its people.

As is known, Azerbaijan and Moldova have declared the establishment of their own armies. Belarus has given notice of a two-year transition to its own armed forces, but Ukraine, urgently, and in a flash, confronted its soldiers with the need to take an oath and, correspondingly, with a choice: either—or. "But why should I, a Russian officer, take an oath to the people of Ukraine, but not to Russia?" asks I. Goncharov, a captain from Kiev. "Only because by the will of chance I ended up on this territory? Such an oath is not worth anything. I have never divided and I do not divide Russia and Ukraine, and I am ready, if necessary, to defend the Russian and the Ukrainian and other peoples—why today should I, a military man, be forced to choose only one people?"

It is not difficult to guess what all of this is leading to and will lead to. Here are several typical stories. "My son, a senior lieutenant, served in the Carpathians," writes L. Shcherbakova from Vladikavkaz. "He refused to take the Ukrainian oath. He is now serving in the Far North, in Murmansk Oblast. His wife and two children are with her parents in Kolpino, and he is in a barracks (there are no apartments, and it is not known when there will be any at all), their belongings, which were broken in the move, are now in a military depot. But it is not the belongings that are important—it is the destinies and lives that are being broken, and the military today are the most unfortunate people, and even more unfortunate are their wives and children."

"My husband is Ukrainian, and when I got married seven years ago, it did not even occur to me that this could affect our life. Having gone mad from the appeals of politicians for an independent Ukraine, he is now dying to take an oath to Ukraine. Meanwhile I, without any kind of oath, love and feel sorry for poor Russia, as I do for my own children, and I will not abandon it. He will leave, and my sons and I will remain here. It turns

out that they have messed up our family, just like the Union, but who, and why?" (Ye. Pavlenko-Mikheylova, Leningrad Oblast).

"My son is a military pilot, a colonel, and he serves in Ukraine," explains G. Minin from Tver Oblast. "In his last letter, my son wrote: I refused to take an oath to Ukraine. I am not without a country, I am an officer of Russia, and I consider it immoral to serve another state for a three-room apartment and a few dozen kopecks. He also wrote that all requests for a transfer are still unanswered: After Yeltsin announced that he would take all officers and station them in Russia, he did not give any instructions to higher headquarters. An effort is being made to coordinate two opposite flows—Ukrainian officers from Russia and Russian officers from Ukraine. This is a stream of people who are tormented by confusion, disorder, and uncertainty; these are the sons and grandsons of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers who laid their heads on one indivisible patch of common land in the years of the war. It is terrible, bitter..."

The oath, the Fatherland, the people, and "an officer's honor have I..." We knew that these sacred concepts were always in the singular case. What now: Are they losing their value, or are they simply being filled with new, their own (and this means living) content? Changes have occurred like an avalanche: How does one interpret them immediately? How does one reconcile oneself to the fact that there also can be a second oath (and this means a third, and even more)? That a Fatherland will now have to be acquired, chosen, and searched for again, and that perhaps the choice will have to be paid for with total disorder in life. Where is there an apartment? What about work: And at the labor exchange, when the Armed Forces are reduced. That is, what awaits a Russian officer in Russia and a Ukrainian officer in Ukraine? And if you are alone the misfortune is not that great, but if there is a family—there is trouble for everyone.

In the opinion of S. Sokovnova (Orenburg), "many problems would be removed if there was confidence that there would be no hostility between Ukraine and Russia." But instead there is confidence, judging by the mail, that the situation is far from the best—waves of anxiety and apprehension are coming from the presidents, who have gone too far in their disagreements, under strained friendly smiles before the cameras, and from political figures of various ranks who are playing on feelings of patriotism that are sacred to everyone. A. Chernykh from Semipalatinsk, addressing Major Astakhov with the familiar "you" (for the reason, he explains, of his far from young age), asks: "But if the territorial disputes cannot be settled peacefully and it becomes necessary to whip each other, what will you do, major? Today this seems improbable, but there are a lot of things that would have seemed improbable just yesterday?"

Not believing the possibility of hostility between two peoples who have been related from time immemorial, many—both Russians and Ukrainians—write with

alarm about the intensification of this hostility. "Think once more, major, about your logic," recommends Yu. Smirnov, a Tver University professor. "You do not mention the fraternity of people; apparently, you do not sense it. Why? Well, because you live in Luts'k, where the slogan 'Who ate my meat?' has for several years now been practically official (I worked for many years in Ukraine). But the politicians who are inciting two Slavic peoples against each other are rubbing their hands. And you, major, will always eat 'foreign meat,' no matter how diligently you study the Ukrainian language. This is where our common trouble lies. And if the politicians, for the benefit of their ambitions, succeed finally in pulling the people apart from each other, they (the politicians) will win, and the people, as usual, will lose. You, incidentally, and your wife, and your child, will always be last in this game."

Today, we have all ended up in a situation we have never been in before. You can stigmatize politicians as you like for "pushing the military and their families into a trap," but one should not engage in self-deception: What has happened has happened. And it is probably necessary to look at this new, changing reality and one's place in it honestly and soberly.

An understanding of this is in the majority of the letters. Indeed, the fact itself of a Russian officer's oath to Ukraine would not have aroused such a stormy reaction if it were not for the motives that guided the major: The portrait he drew of Russia (impoverished, cold, hungry, with fields overgrown with willows, and where the "people are malicious," while in Ukraine the "fields are well-groomed" and the "people are hard workers") offended Ukrainians no less strongly than Russians. They rushed to defend Russia from the Russian major. "Major, remain where it is better for you, but do not at the same time belittle Russia, your own Motherland. Or are you hurrying this way to gain the favor of Ukrainian command authorities in order to make major general quicker?" (M. Romanenko, Kherson.) "Why are you satirizing Russia, which, by the way, has always lived according to the residual principle. Are you beating Russia?" asks I. Korniyenko from Donetsk. "Even I, a Ukrainian, was distressed by this position." G. Pyatisotov (Kiev) is more specific: "Did you not sell too cheaply, major, in selecting Ukraine in particular? After all, there are so many countries where the fields are much richer and life is much fuller?"

It will certainly be unpleasant for Major Astakhov to read such rebuffs aimed at him. But he himself gave the excuse. Not one nation that respects itself will allow the humiliation of another nation, and it especially will not permit this with respect to its own nation. Someone who humiliates does not ennoble himself.

Everyone today makes his own choice, and we must keep in mind that everyone has his own vision of what happened. Hampered by confusion, circumstances, and frequently in desperation, we are, more than anything, inclined to mutual accusations and angry labels. The

incitement of political passions around professional army problems leads to the fact that squadrons of fighters in one moment take off into the air, and in the next moment, it turns out, are in another state. To heighten tensions is a dangerous and very unpromising undertaking for everyone. We have to stop.

UKRAINE

Morozov Appeal to Black Sea Fleet Viewed

92UM0639 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Feb 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Capt 1st Rank Yaroslav Knyazev, by K. Istomin: "I Am Ready to Serve Ukraine and the Navy"]

[Text] The Saturday issue of NARODNAYA ARMIYA printed an appeal from the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K.P. Morozov, to the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet: "Respect the Rights of Man and His Personal Dignity." Its text was also broadcast over the radio and over Ukrainian Television. What has been the response to the appeal among the Black Sea sailors? Our special correspondent got in touch with the honored Ukrainian journalist Capt 1st Rank Yaroslav Knyazev and asked him to answer this and other questions concerning Navy service.

[Knyazev] I listened to the text of the appeal by the Ukrainian minister of defense to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet on a program of Radio Station Promin. I must honestly say that it was not a surprise for me, as at the beginning of January, I had become familiar with the Ukrainian law "On the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families" which was published in our newspaper as well as with the draft Ukrainian laws "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" and "On Pension Support for Servicemen and Workers in Ukrainian Internal Affairs Bodies." The appeal by Col-Gen K.P. Morozov was precisely a guarantee for the legal protection of servicemen and, in our instance, for the Black Sea sailors.

[Istomin] Do you know how the appeal has been received in the Fleet?

[Knyazev] I served on the Black Sea for 28 years. I had a career, as they say, that ran from correspondent on the fleet newspaper FLAG RODINY to being its editor. And of course, I have many friends, acquaintances and others who share my views. And they began to phone me literally minutes after the appeal was read over the radio. Some did not have a very good knowledge of Ukrainian and for this reason asked me to clarify certain aspects in the text of the speech by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, others spoke about the timeliness of the appeal while still others were frankly happy for me. As is known, Col-Gen K.P. Morozov stated specifically that the Black Sea sailors who, because of their patriotic feelings, had been removed from their posts or discharged into the reserves, would be returned to service.

[Istomin] Yaroslav Iosifovich [Knyazev], why were you discharged into the reserves?

[Knyazev] I have not yet been discharged into the reserves. I have simply been removed from the post I held by the fleet commander, Admiral Kasatonov. But there have been so many rumors and discussions about my case throughout the Ukraine that I would like, with your permission, to shed some light on what happened...

On 10 January, the fleet newspaper which I edited published the appeal of the Ukrainian President to servicemen serving on the territory of Ukraine and outside it and an interview was announced with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense entitled "The Rights of Servicemen Will Not be Encroached." I planned to publish this on Saturday, 11 January.

But in the morning of 10 January, I was ordered to phone the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Admiral Kasatonov immediately opened the conversation in a coarse, disrespectful tone. He was angry that the appeal of the Ukrainian President had appeared in the newspaper without his approval. I replied that the text of the appeal had been received over the state communications channel and I was obliged to publish it. If Admiral Kasatonov did not agree with the content of the materials coming over the teletype, then let him shut down this state communications channel. To this the Commander replied as follows:

"I shall not shut down the channel, but I order you to step down immediately and report to the VVK [military medical commission]."

I was immediately phoned by the Chief of the Fleet Cadres Department, and having invited me to his office, he handed me orders to undergo a medical commission examination, for without its conclusion they could not send my documents to Moscow for being discharged into the reserves.

I was still talking with the Chief of the Cadres Department when the telephone rang. Kasatonov was again on the line. Clearly, having just read the announcement of the Saturday interview with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, he summoned me to the phone and, almost shouting, ordered me to immediately cancel the already set and imposed material and in its place to reprint the interview with Flt Admiral Chernavin from SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The Fleet First Deputy Commander was ordered to check on my actions.

So I was left with just one reprint of the interview which was so crucial to the Black Sea sailors. The next issue of the newspaper had been signed [for press] by a new Editor-in-chief.

[Istomin] How do you explain such behavior toward you by Admiral Kasatonov?

[Knyazev] Clearly Igor Vladimirovich had forgotten that people serve in the Navy and not machines. And that they have their own opinions and their own personal

dignity. They should have a right to possess all the information about events which are occurring, they should be able to draw their own conclusions, take decisions and not blindly trust the viewpoint of the Admiral. Even if he is the Fleet Commander.

It was for that reason that I had published the appeal of President Kravchuk and was planning to acquaint the readers of FLAG RODINY with the interview with the Minister of Defense as well as with the already mentioned draft laws and laws of Ukraine concerning Army and Navy personnel. But Admiral Kasatonov is forcing the fleet to see just one side of the coin. Although I should say that he has been under constant pressure from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin.

[Istomin] Yaroslav Iosifovich, information on your removal was broadcast over the Ukrainian radio and television. Almost instantly the Fleet Press Center stated that the information was not true and that the decision to retire Captain 1st Rank Knyazev into the reserves for the number of years served and because of age had been taken in 1991. How do you explain this?

[Knyazev] Are you not alerted to the fact that the day after Admiral Kasatonov failed to receive the deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Council, a press release appeared in FLAG RODINY by the Chief of the Fleet Press Center, Captain 1st Rank A. Lazebnikov, where seemingly a persuasive explanation is given to why the fleet's Admiral was inattentive to the Ukrainian members of parliament.

The Fleet Press Center is an obedient tool in the hands of Admiral Kasatonov. And chiefly because, contrary to the directive of the Chief of the Main Staff of the Ministry of Defense, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, regardless of the criticism in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, submitted for this crucial position his fellow serviceman from the North, the political worker Andrey Lazebnikov. And this was in spite of the fact that the personnel commission was reviewing the candidacies of two leading journalists from the fleet newspaper. But personal factors gained the upper hand...

[Istomin] Forgive me, but you did not answer the question about you personally...

[Knyazev] In point of fact, in August of last year I became a sort of pawn in political games. After Gorbachev had announced to the entire world that the Black Sea Fleet had not participated in the putsch, but the fleet prosecutor established that the fleet newspaper had published materials of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] transmitted solely by TASS, the representatives of various publications rushed to Sevastopol in the search for "cooked up" facts. Soon thereafter an article by Genadiy Cherkashin appeared in the Leningrad newspaper CHAS PIK where it was said of me that on the pages of the newspaper on the eve of the putsch, I had been involved in the brainwashing of the fleet personnel.

[Istomin] Did you actually prepare for the putsch ideologically?

[Knyazev] Yes, but only if you consider as this the publishing of Yeltsin's book "Ispoved na zadannuyu temu" [Confession on a Given Subject]. Incidentally, FLAG RODINY was the only newspaper in the Armed Forces of the former Union which printed this book in full and I was given a rebuke by the fleet Political Directorate.

Then events developed in approximately the following manner. CHAS PIK was placed on Gorbachev's desk. Taking a look, he gave his orders to Shaposhnikov, and the latter summoned Chernavin, and as a result of this, like a bolt out of the blue, the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of 30 September 1991 appeared, stating: "Captain 1st Rank Yaroslav Iosifovich Knyazev, editor-in-chief of the newspaper FLAG RODINY, is to be released from the position held and is to be referred to the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for subsequent discharge into the reserves."

But what is the reason for which I have been removed? Up to now no one has answered this question for me.

Moreover, as the lawyers have advised me, the order of Admiral Chernavin is illegal. He has exceeded his powers, since I was appointed to the position of editor by a First Deputy Minister of Defense, and only the First Deputy, with valid grounds for this, has the right to discharge me from the position. Chernavin at the time the order was issued was the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense.

Hence there has been a major infraction of the laws committed. In addition, neither the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy nor his assistants talked it over with me and they did not establish the opinion of the editorial collective.

[Istomin] What is your opinion as to why Admiral Kasatonov did not receive the deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Council?

[Knyazev] When I saw on television how the Ukrainian members of parliament and the representatives of the Ministry of Defense were standing around the gates of the Fleet Staff like some poor relatives, it was both painful and shameful for the Black Sea Fleet. Where is the famous Navy hospitality? And particularly for persons of such rank...

The importance of the questions being discussed at the military council was not any justification. I am more than certain and you can call Admiral Kasatonov. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy could have turned the running of the military council over to his first deputy and could have talked for the required time with the Commander-in-Chief. Was it impossible to grant five minutes' time to the Ukrainian deputies? Moreover they were not insisting on a meeting with the Commander himself. They would have been completely happy with

talking to any of his deputies. The main thing the deputies wanted was to meet with the sailors. But they were not permitted to do this.

And all of this occurred against a setting of a visit by Deputy Baburin and other representatives of the Russian Parliament. Although they arrived at the fleet upon their own initiative on 19 January, Admiral Kasatonov, regardless of it being a day-off, found the time to meet and talk with them and in the evening, as I learned, organized a reception at the Omega-2 official dacha.

[Istomin] I would like to hear first-hand just what is the situation in the Black Sea Fleet now?

[Knyazev] At present the fleet lives under conditions of an information blockade. The Ukrainian laws concerning service, pension coverage and so forth have not been made available to the officers and warrant officers and there is no place that they can find and study the appeal of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense to the Black Sea sailors. I myself personally went round to four Soyuzpechat [State Committee for the Distribution of the Press] kiosks and tried to buy the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA with this document. But as I was told by one of the kiosk vendors, the newspaper had not been received for sale since the start of the new year. Why has Soyuzpechat refused to handle the paper? Certainly it does not languish at the kiosk. Hence, again it is a question of instructions "from above."

But correct information sooner or later will make its way to the people. Many Black Sea sailors are ready to take the loyalty oath to the people of Ukraine. Such persons are to be found at the Fleet Staff and in other collectives. The officers are simply afraid to voice their viewpoint. Certainly it is easiest of all to settle scores with the military. An example of this is the dismissal of Captain 2d Rank Yu. Shalita and the training detachment officers V. Polevoy, V. Yashchenko and N. Guk...

[Istomin] It is always easier to speak for others. Are you yourself ready to take a loyalty oath to the Ukrainian people?

[Knyazev] I am an Ukrainian. I was born and grew up in the village of Khrinniki in Rovno Oblast. Of the 31 years which I have dedicated to the Navy, I have served 28 in Ukraine. In essence I have always defended its interests. Both when I was standing watch on submarines and when I became a military correspondent. Hence there is no question of my taking the oath. I am ready to serve Ukraine and the Navy.

[Istomin] Thank you for the chat.

Morozov Meets with US Defense Delegation

92UM0724A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by Ukraine Ministry of Defense Press Service: "In the Ukraine Ministry of Defense: Interest in Cooperation"]

[Text] On 20 February 1992, Ukraine Minister of Defense Colonel General K. Morozov was visited by an

American military delegation headed by U. S. Undersecretary of Defense P. Wolfowitz.

In the long talk, the Ukraine minister of defense informed the Pentagon representatives of progress made in implementing our concept of defense and military construction. Taken up was a range of topics dealing with control of nuclear weapons located on Ukraine soil and the reduction in stages of the latter. The discussion included conventional armaments, the forthcoming reforming of troops stationed in the Ukraine, reductions in the latter, and the associated questions of social security involving servicemen and their dependents.

The parties discussed with interest problems pertaining to conversion and cooperation in military matters between the Ukraine and the USA.

Colonel General K. Morozov, responding to a number of questions of interest to the American side, spoke in a positive manner of suggestions for cooperation advanced by the representatives of the U. S. Defense Department. He requested that his gratitude be conveyed to U. S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney for his extending an invitation for an official visit to the United States in the near future.

The American military delegation the same day visited the Kiev Higher Tank Engineering School.

Colonel General K. Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine, held a press conference for representatives of foreign news media, who are also members of the Association of Foreign Journalists in Moscow. Presented were topics related to the creation of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine and problems currently facing the republic's Defense Ministry. A detailed account will be published in the press.

NATO Chief's Ukrainian Trip Viewed

Morozov Meets Weorner

92UM0698A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
25 Feb 92 p 1

[Article released by the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "NATO Offers Collaboration"]

[Text] On 23 February 1992, a meeting was held between the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov, and the NATO Secretary General M. Weorner. In the course of this both sides exchanged information on the problems which are of mutual interest.

In discussing the questions related to nuclear armament and conventional weapons located on Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainian minister of defense emphasized that, in implementing our overall plan of defense and military organizational development, we firmly adhere to the policy set out in the important political documents and according to which Ukraine will seek a nuclear-free and

nonaligned status. In establishing our Armed Forces, we proceed from the principle of defensive sufficiency in order not to represent a military threat to our neighbors and to other states.

Having thanked M. Weorner for the offer to take part in the work of the NATO Coordinating Council, Col Gen K. Morozov took a positive view of this and pointed out that we are interested in such collaboration.

At the conclusion of the meeting, both sides agreed that the conversation had been useful and constructive. In the course of it mutual understanding had been found on all the discussed questions.

Weorner Comments on Meeting

92UM0698B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
25 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Major S. Nagoryanskiy: "A Handshake Between Yesterday's Enemies"]

[Text] "I am quite satisfied with my visit to Ukraine. The meetings with its leadership were carried out openly and in a friendly manner. This was a good beginning."

The NATO Secretary General Manfred Weorner began his press conference in Kiev with the preceding statement. He had been in Ukraine upon the invitation of its President.

In the course of the visit the highly-placed visitor had important conversations with L. Kravchuk, I. Plyushch, A. Zlenko, D. Pavlychko as well as with other leaders of our state. Also very beneficial, in the words of the head of the North Atlantic Alliance, was the meeting with the Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov.

M. Weorner had high praise for the foreign policy course of Ukraine which has announced its neutrality and nuclear-free status. As he told the journalists, I have come here to establish closer contact. Future interaction can be seen in three spheres: information, consultative and in the sphere of collaboration.

What currently is of the greatest concern to our enemies of yesterday? Above all the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the departure of nuclear specialists to other countries. In the opinion of M. Weorner, the task is to create all the necessary conditions in the homeland for such specialists. Then they will not look for something better somewhere else.

One other important problem is the observance of the Treaty on Conventional Weapons under present conditions, when the principal of this treaty is not the former Soviet Union but rather the sovereign states. There is also a definite concern for tactical nuclear weapons. We, said M. Weorner, welcome the position of Ukraine on this question. As of today, some 50 percent of these weapons have been removed for destruction and in the summer Ukraine will completely clear its territory of them.

The NATO secretary general informed the correspondents about those changes which had occurred in this alliance over the last two years. Its main task is to ensure stability in the world. With the end of the Cold War, processes have begun encouraging a move from confrontation to collaboration. In particular, for these purposes NATO has set up a Coordinating Council and, in the opinion of M. Weorner, Ukraine could become a full member. The corresponding proposals have been made about this. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Zlenko has been invited to Brussels to the NATO Headquarters, to a meeting which should be held on 10 March. An analogous meeting on the ministers of defense level has been planned for 1 May. Col Gen K. Morozov has been invited to it.

In replying to the questions of the correspondents, the highly-placed guest again emphasized the sincere intention to collaborate with Ukraine. We are extending a hand to yesterday's enemies, he said. Today you are our partners, and tomorrow our friends. As for the statement by the Russian President B. Yeltsin on the retargeting of nuclear weapons from U.S. territory, for now, noted the NATO head, we do not have any confirmation that this has been actually carried out. Certainly it would take a good deal of time to retarget such complicated missile systems.

Soon after the press conference, M. Weorner left for Moscow where he was to hold talks with the Russian leadership.

New Kiev MD Commander Interviewed

92UM0638A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Feb 92, pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General V.D. Boriskin, commander of the Red Banner Kiev MD, by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Shvyrev, correspondent of NARODNAYA ARMIYA: "Believe in the Strength of the Laws of Ukraine"]

[Text] Valentin Danilovich Boriskin began his career in the Army after two years of regular service, having become an officer candidate at the Kharkov Guards Command Tank School. Having completed it with a gold medal, he was sent to the troops as a platoon commander. Since then more than 25 years have passed. Over this time Valentin Danilovich has moved from the commander of a tank platoon to a district chief of staff. No matter where he has been, no matter whom he had command of, he devoted himself totally to the cause to which he had dedicated his life—the training and instruction of the personnel. At the same time he did not forget to improve his own professional knowledge and skills and to broaden his views. For this reason, in 1975, he completed with honors the Military Academy of the Armored Troops imeni V.Ya. Malinovskiy and in 1985, the Academy of the General Staff.

The distinguishing features in the character of Lieutenant-General V. Boriskin are honesty, industry, accessibility and for this he has respect and authority among his subordinates.

This year he will be 50 years old. He is married and has two sons. Both of them are officers. Yuriy is the commander of a separate reconnaissance training battalion, while Aleksandr is the Assistant Company Commander for Personnel Work. Like their father, Yuriy and Aleksandr Boriskin have inseparably linked their further lives and careers with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

By the Decree of the Ukrainian President of 27 January 1992, Lieutenant-General V.D. Boriskin has been appointed the Commander of the Red Banner Kiev MD.

[Shvyrev] Valentin Danilovich, first of all accept our congratulations on your appointment to the new position and please tell us what were your feelings when you learned of the Decree of the Ukrainian President.

[Boriskin] Thank you for the congratulations. As for the President's decree, I must admit that it was received with some excitement. Need I say, on the one hand, of course I was pleased that during this difficult period in the organizational development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, I had been entrusted with such a large military formation as a district, and, on the other, I was fully aware of the enormous burden of responsibility which rested on my shoulders as of that moment. In truth I was somewhat assured by the fact that I was not a novice in the Kiev MD. All in all, I had headed its staff for over two years and prior to this had been in command of the 6th Guards Tank Army for about two years. In a word, there are experience, a good knowledge of the men and the situation on the spot. And this, believe me, is little enough for a rapid, and I would also add, painless introduction to a new position.

Like any other commander who was in my shoes, I would count above all on the help and support of the generals and officers of the district staffs and directorates as well as close contact with the commanders of the field forces, formations and units. As before, I shall base all relations with subordinates on professionalism, I shall support in every possible way the men who dedicate themselves to improving combat readiness, to training and educating the personnel, and I shall show impatience with those who permit negligence in work and callousness toward the officers, warrant officers, soldiers and members of serviceman families.

[Shvyrev] It is a natural desire not to lower the level of combat readiness among the district troops, the state of military discipline and the morale of the personnel in the units and subunits. But how in fact are things in the district and what problems concern you the most?

[Boriskin] In comparison with last year, this year the district as a whole is quite up to strength in personnel. If you want me to be more precise, it is somewhere around

95 percent. At present, for example, we are not concerned about the problem of driver personnel. However, if one is to be realistic, in the not distant future we shall again encounter a lack in this category of specialists. And this is not all. What do I mean here? From the time when an agreement will be reached between the member states of the CIS on the procedure for dispatching home servicemen who have not taken the military oath, and as of now we have more than 6,000 of them, we shall be forced, if one can put it this way, to say farewell to many men who now largely determine the combat readiness of the units and subunits. According to our forecasts, in addition to the drivers, the subunits will lose a portion of the commanders of tanks and IFVs as well as driver-mechanics for the tanks and IFVs. The ranks of Missile Troops, Artillery Troops and Communications Troops will be somewhat thinned. However, no tragedy should be made from this. In time, in the place of the departing servicemen, we will receive soldiers and NCO's of Ukrainian nationality and who are currently serving outside our republic.

Another problem. At present the district has over a thousand generals and officers available to the commander. Our personnel bodies are making every effort to somehow place them in future service. Alas, it is not possible to find work for everyone, particularly in the specialty and considering place of residence. In truth, there is one way out here. Many of the "old boys," having served 20 and more years, could now be discharged into the reserves but under the condition that they are given apartments. Unfortunately, we cannot now even meet them half-way. There are even many difficulties in providing housing for those who have been on the housing lists for years.

So we come to the third problem. And, it seems to me, the most acute and intense one. Judge for yourselves. Last year the district provided new housing for more than 6,000 officers and warrant officers. At first glance, this is an impressive figure. But it is very far from the figure which could remove the "painful" question from the agenda. Is progress foreseen in providing apartments for servicemen families during the current year? The calculations which have been made indicate that we will not be able to increase the completion of housing using the allocated limits, if the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers does not provide additional funds and does not take decisive measures to accelerate housing construction for the armed defenders. The recent decrees of the President and the decisions of the Ukrainian government instill optimism in us and make it possible to hope that the servicemen currently taking shelter in corners and paying fabulous amounts of money in apartment rent will not be overlooked.

The next problem. This is inseparably linked with the rise of market relations. I do not want to give any figures or calculations for this, but will merely say that due to the disrupting of the former ties, the halting of deliveries from the former center and the abrupt rise in prices for everything, and without these combat training cannot

have a steady pace, the life of a military collective, and I do not shy from using the word, must be "hammered out" with great difficulty. For instance, now the time is approaching for testing the professional skills of the young drivers in a 500-kilometer drive. But in the units this cannot be done. There is no gasoline. Due to the lack of fuel, trips by the missile and artillery troops to winter camp have been deferred indefinitely. The tank, motorized and communications personnel have suffered losses in precious training time. We certainly have sought out and are seeking adequate solutions for the arising difficulties. In particular we are trying to fully utilize the capabilities of the training facilities and the simulator equipment, and we are urging the commanders to conduct exercises using the "walk-through as if mounted" method. At the same time we are hopeful that the coming lull at the ranges is a temporary phenomenon. The day is not far off when the Tank Troops, the Motorized-rifle Troops, the Artillery Troops and the men from the other specialties will reinstitute full and intense training work. Incidentally, I was assured of this by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, in the course of our recent meeting. The time has come for us to consider the realities of life and take a serious look at the consumed mechanism in organizing the exercises, drills and trainings. In other words, we must now calculate the money and means on conducting measures in the sphere of combat readiness. Previously, and this we must admit, this was the prerogative of the financial officers and a limited group of superiors. Now everyone must figure just how much an exercise, field trip or march costs. For myself, this is how it should be. For any unjustified expenditures have a painful effect on the state treasury and are a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people.

[Shvyrev] Valentin Danilovich, at present one often hears the arguments that the difficulties and flaws in the economy and the complexity of supplying the servicemen with everything necessary cause great harm to combat readiness. What is your opinion on this?

[Boriskin] It has been pointed out that the nation is living through a hard time and the same applies to the army. And this hits the nail on the head, as they say. At present it is actually much harder than several years ago to organize combat training, to achieve coordinated actions among the subunits of the different branches of arms and provide high-quality growth in the tactical, weapons and special skills of the personnel. There are numerous reasons for this. But there would be many less if certain commanders and chiefs did not blame everything on objective factors, did not fall under the sway of despondency but rather on a daily basis were engaged in concrete work in the training and educating of their subordinates. Nevertheless, it can be said with all responsibility that as a whole the combat readiness of the district troops remain as high as before. And no one should doubt this.

[Shvyrev] Are you not implying that the commanders who for various reasons have not taken the loyalty oath to the Ukrainian people are those who have made mistakes in their work?

[Boriskin] Not directly. Although among the officers and warrant officers who have not taken the military oath there is quite a number who have recently cooled noticeably toward their service duties, and are not working as hard as they were before on improving their professional skills. This of course is not to their credit. I am waiting with hope for an agreement to be reached among the member states of the CIS on the dates and procedures for the exchange of servicemen. This, I feel, will lead to the rapid resolution of the present problem.

[Shkyrev] Are there many officers in the district who do not want to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Boriskin] Not many, a few more than 600. All of them have given their temporary obligation to carry out their military duty conscientiously in the Ukrainian Army until a decision is reached on sending them to a new place of service.

In a word, the failure to take the loyalty oath to the Ukrainian people does not release anyone from carrying out official duties. I want this to be firmly understood not only by the officers and warrant officers, but also by the NCO's and soldiers, since recently they have attempted and sometimes succeeded in unauthorized absences from the unit or subunit. You might ask where they are going. To Russia, Moldova, to the Transcaucasus and Central Asian republics, causing by their rash acts a great deal of trouble for both us and their parents.

One begins to wonder from where those who refuse to take the oath are leaving, and the answer is approximately thus. They are leaving from places where no one works with the men and where the legal education of the personnel has been completely abandoned. All shifts of personnel who do not want to serve in Ukraine must be done solely on a legal basis. Otherwise we cannot avoid difficulties in the given question.

[Shvyrev] You have taken over the district's leadership in a difficult time for it. As far as I can see, a conversion to new structures is not just over the hill. How will this be carried out and when do you intend to complete the enormous scale of work?

[Boriskin] Major changes are actually coming in the life of the district. In the next few years we shall convert to a new structure which envisages the organization of corps and brigades in the place of the army formations. What will this provide? The corps and brigades, in comparison with the current tactical units, will be more mobile and maneuverable and will make it possible for their commanders to vary freely the forces and means available to them. As for the district, at the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993, it will cease to exist.

Of course, there is a lot of work to be done. And we are working to carry this out without rushing and at the same time keep within the established dates. We shall endeavor to see to it that all the measures relating to the reorganization of the staffs and other district structures and reducing the table of organization are carried out in a calm, constructive situation, considering the interests and wishes of the personnel and solely on a legal basis. The Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk drew particular attention to precisely this in receiving the three appointed district commanders.

Under these conditions, I consider the main thing not to permit a drop in the pace and quality of operational and combat training or a lessening of work to maintain strong military discipline, organization and order in the troops. I also consider it important to exclude legal nihilism from the minds of a certain portion of the personnel, and to see to it that each serviceman trusts the strength of the Ukrainian laws and has a sense of high responsibility for the security of our independent state.

[Shvyrev] How are your relations going with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense?

[Boriskin] Our relations are normal, so to speak, working ones. In everything I find support and understanding from the Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K.P. Morozov as well as his deputies and the chiefs of the directorates. This undoubtedly will work solely for the good of things.

[Shvyrev] You have become the District Commander. What is your cherished wish?

[Boriskin] For now I only want one thing and that is to continue serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and after the reorganization of the district. I want to be of maximum benefit to the fatherland to which I have sworn my loyalty.

[Shvyrev] Thank you for the interview, Comrade Commander. Let me express the hope that the current relations between the district leadership and the editorial collective at NARODNAYA ARMIYA will be closer and more constructive than they have in previous times.

MD Financial Chief Interviewed

92UM0683A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Ivan Ivanovich Shtopenko, chief of the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, by Lt Col V. Dmitriyev, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Ukraine Will Not Stint on Its Army"]

[Text] Each person has his own small homeland, the place where he was born, and where, as the saying has it, he has put down roots. For Ivan Ivanovich Shtopenko, this is the Kherson area. He was born in 1937 in the village of Novo-Petrovka in Vysokopolskiy Rayon.

When he had to choose a career, he selected a specialty which I would not term wide-spread, however it is one that is very essential and important in the army environment. This is precisely what he felt in being admitted to the Yaroslavl Military Financial School. So, since 1959, Shtopenko has been inseparably tied, if we can put it this way, with monetary matters. He has served in the posts of military financial officer in units and formations of the Baltic and Ural MD. In 1967, he completed the military faculty under the Moscow Financial Institute.

When at the end of the 1960's the decision was taken to establish the Central Asian MD, Shtopenko participated in organizing its financial service.

He has served in the Kiev MD since 1973. In 1984, he was appointed the chief of the financial service in an air army.

He was among the first of the generals and officers in the personnel of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to take the oath of loyalty to its people. Since December 1991, he has been the chief of the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The entire family of Ivan Ivanovich Shtopenko is closely linked to the army. His wife, Lyudmila Grigoryevna, works in the reception office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. His son, a senior lieutenant, is also a financial officer. His daughter is married to an officer.

[Dmitriyev] Ivan Ivanovich, judging from the lines of those waiting in your office to see you, I can already understand what a complicated and crucial period the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is now living through...

[Shtopenko] What can we do, we must work under emergency conditions, from early morning to late at night. You yourself realize that finances are the fundamental of fundamentals. And even more if you take into account the complexity of the period through which the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has gone...

[Dmitriyev] How are things with the personnel of the Financial Directorate? Has it already been completely organized?

[Shtopenko] The process of setting up the Financial Directorate is going on in parallel with the solving of all the urgent and immediate tasks.

[Dmitriyev] Are you selecting the personnel personally?

[Shtopenko] Yes, I have to get involved in this myself. And not because I don't trust anybody else. I want to lay the foundation of the directorate's staff, in being guided by two criteria. I am selecting the most worthy and qualified financial workers. Here there is one other particular feature. Our directorate is involved in close contacts with many Ukrainian ministries and departments. And naturally there is the very high professional training of our employees. At present we are working out

many joint guiding documents with both the Ukrainian Ministry of Finances and the Cabinet of Ministers.

[Dmitriyev] So you can now clearly assess the level of these contacts?

[Shtopenko] I would like to point out that I have worked from the very start under the leadership of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Morozov. We had to go into all questions involved in the financing of the Armed Forces. And naturally the closest contacts were established with the Ukrainian Ministry of Finances. On its behalf there has been complete understanding for all our problems. For this reason virtually no difficulties arise in the work. And this mutual understanding is growing everyday.

[Dmitriyev] Well and good. Next please answer for me a very important question for today and which will be of interest, clearly, not only to me. Ukraine has assumed the financing of the units and formations stationed on its territory along with the Black Sea Fleet. Then the decree of President Kravchuk was promulgated on increasing the amount of pay for the officers as well as wages for the employees and workers. Yet the Russian leadership in turn has stated that it is to provide the money for supporting the army in all the CIS states. Who finally will support the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Shtopenko] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense financed in January all the units, military enterprises and institutions located on the Republic's territory. Until the Ukrainian budget is approved, the Ministry of Finances allocates us money primarily for meeting the vital needs of the troops as planned for the first quarter of the current year. This includes the money for the pay of servicemen, the wages of workers and employees, payment for food, material supply and the solving of immediate problems of housing and sociocultural construction.

With the approval of the Ukrainian budget by the Supreme Council, the Ministry of Defense will be granted a budget for the entire current year. At the same time I want to emphasize that the amount allocated by the Ministry of Finances to the Armed Forces is completely sufficient for their viable operation. Ukraine will not stint on its Army!

Moreover, I have personally issued orders in the field that they immediately telegraph the Financial Directorate for any additional requirements for money. In particular, the Black Sea Fleet at the end of January, received another 150 million rubles in addition to the already allocated 350 million...

As for the statement by the Russian leaders... The money was actually delivered in January for the support of the Kiev, Carpathian and Odessa MD as well as the Black Sea Fleet. But, in the first place, the money was sent in amounts smaller than needed and, secondly, almost 10 days after Ukraine had done this.

[Dmitriyev] How was this money used?

[Shtopenko] It was not deposited to the budget accounts of the State Bank and it has not been used. The money is not in special accounts and it cannot be used.

[Dmitriyev] This is all about finances. But certainly a multiplicity of other problems must be solved and these to a large degree will determine the operation of the Armed Forces.

[Shtopenko] Of course. For example, take such a question as the repairs of equipment, weapons, property and so forth. As of now, our Ministry of Defense makes the payment to the enterprises located on Ukrainian territory.

[Dmitriyev] If that is for the needs of the Kiev, Carpathian or Odessa MD and the Black Sea Fleet—then that would all be clear. But what happens with equipment which was repaired or manufactured at Ukrainian military enterprises for the CIS states? Now, let us assume, they refuse to pay for an order...

[Shtopenko] There are more than enough cases of this. If a customer refuses to pay for a military product, then the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense pays for it. The equipment or weaponry itself is stored temporarily at the enterprise.

[Dmitriyev] But these are losses. Why is such a practice required?

[Shtopenko] Here we are guided by the following considerations. The military enterprises involve thousands and thousands of working people. Not to pay for labor in the form of a finished product means to be deprived of wages. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and its Financial Directorate never forget this...

[Dmitriyev] However things are going bad for you now. Prices are constantly rising. As some politicians joke bitterly, they are being liberalized. You certainly must find it hard to keep up with them?

[Shtopenko] You have correctly pointed out that we have many difficulties. Under the agreement with the Ministry of Finances in 1991, in working out the estimates for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, we took a correction factor of 2.6. In January, this estimate was redone and a correction factor of 4.5 was now used. With further changes in the prices, the correction factors will also be changed. Incidentally, the Military Trade Directorate in the Kiev MD, considering all the taxes, has reached a correction factor of 8.0. Now imagine how much it costs, for example, to make an overcoat in a shop. For this its old cost must be multiplied by eight times...

[Dmitriyev] Oho!... Ivan Ivanovich, in such an instance could salvation come from the proposal of Russia to establish an international body within the CIS which would directly finance all the Armed Forces and be involved in the planning of expenditures and so forth...

[Shtopenko] The question of forming a unified military budget on the principles of proportional participation by the CIS states will be discussed during the forthcoming meeting of the CIS states in Minsk. I feel that we must have intergovernmental agreements on the basis of which a certain percentage of the financial assets would go to carry out certain tasks. However, here a major role should be played by the expert commissions. In each specific instance they must determine the involvement in the question, for example, of the Ukrainian economy.

As for the single military budget. We have already had this. But control over the expenditures of the budget in the former Union was completely lacking. The press has published an income and expenditure balance. Seemingly everything balanced. Then all of a sudden a major budget deficit was discovered. How could this be all of a sudden? Where, for what purposes were the funds used? Whoever rendered an account realistically for this? Now we are offered to return to the old principle of everything in the common pot. But what will we get back from this? And who will supervise this?

[Dmitriyev] Then where is a way out to be found?

[Shtopenko] At present, everything that is on Ukrainian territory (units, facilities, military enterprises and institutions) is financed through our Ministry of Defense. However we should study all of this and determine their further fate. A stage-by-stage reform precisely will make it possible to significantly reduce defense expenditures.

[Dmitriyev] The editors of NARODNAYA ARMIYA receive many letters in which the servicemen, members of their families, workers and employees complain of their poor social protection. Does the Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense have a strategic line for easing the life of those who have vowed their loyalty to the Ukrainian people?

[Shtopenko] Yes, we do have a set of priorities. In particular, the funds for capital investments in the year 1992 have been completely earmarked for the construction of housing for the servicemen and the members of their families. With our participation, a law on pension coverage for servicemen has been worked out and has been passed in its first reading by the Supreme Council. Its provisions differ favorably from the corresponding articles of the all-Union document. Thus, the limits have been removed from the amount of pay (salary for the military rank, pay for appointment and percentage for years served) used as the basis for figuring a pension. The law also provides a number of other benefits for various categories of servicemen. At present the military commissariats are recalculating the pensions for all military pensioners proceeding from the amount of pay set on 1 January 1992.

[Dmitriyev] Ivan Ivanovich, what could you say about such a category as the workers and employees of the

troop units and institutions located on Ukrainian territory? Are they not under unequal conditions in comparison with employees in the civilian sectors. How long will such a practice go on?

[Shtopenko] Your question is very timely. The Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has proposed to the Ukrainian Ministry of Finances that the workers and employees of the Armed Forces be made the equals of the remaining workers in the republic. Such a document is now being drawn up. I believe that it will be passed in the very near future.

[Dmitriyev] That is very good news. Many thanks for finding the time for our conversation.

Maj-Gen Zhivitsa Addresses Servicemen's Social Security Issues

92UM0640A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Major-General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa by a NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent under the rubric "From Reliable Sources": "Ukraine Guarantees"]

[Text] It is generally acknowledged that Ukraine is considerably ahead of the other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] members in the establishment of its own armed forces. It has already passed an entire package of military legislation and is actively working out other military laws. This is an indication of our government's firm resolve to carry out military development within the framework of inter-state agreements and on a solid legal basis.

Being the leader in this matter is creating numerous problems, however. There are no ready formulas, no highways to follow. This is why the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine receives an enormous number of letters every day from servicemen and members of their families requesting answers to questions troubling them. Such questions are also posed in the reception office of the Ministry of Defense by hundreds of people, who have frequently come from afar.

Our correspondent asked Major-General Georgiy Vladimirovich Zhivitsa, first deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, to provide authoritative answers to the most urgent of these questions.

[Correspondent] What caused the haste in administering the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine? President L.M. Kravchuk previously announced that the transitional period would last 2-3 years.

[Zhivitsa] There has been no haste in the administration of the military oath. Fulfilling the will of its people, Ukraine made its historic choice and, in accordance with the Act Proclaiming the Ukraine's Independence and with the All-Ukrainian Referendum, Ukraine is building a sovereign, democratic, law-governed state.

The states of the Commonwealth signed the Agreement on the Armed Forces, the Border Troops and the Strategic Forces on 30 December 1991 and affirmed their legal right to sovereignty also in the military area.

It was established that Ukraine would begin exercising this right as of 3 January 1992.

[Correspondent] Will the serviceman who has taken the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine be granted citizenship in another state upon his discharge into the reserve and the right to move to a place of residence of his choice?

[Zhivitsa] The law of Ukraine provides for dual citizenship. That is, while remaining a citizen of Ukraine, an individual may become a citizen of another state with which Ukraine has an agreement on the matter. The question of granting citizenship in another state upon discharge into the reserve will be decided by the appropriate state agencies of that state to which the individual wants to move as his chosen place of residence.

[Correspondent] What will be the interstate legal procedure for transferring to serve in a different state a serviceman who has not taken the oath?

[Zhivitsa] All the groups of troops and forces stationed in Ukraine, except for troops which Ukraine includes in the strategic forces, comprise the armed forces of Ukraine.

All servicemen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine must take the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

Every serviceman must calmly and rationally make his own personal decision and determine what his continued military service will be.

The transfer of servicemen who have not taken the oath to serve in other states will be carried out only on a legal basis, in accordance with international treaties and agreements and with the procedure worked out for implementing them.

Prior to a decision to transfer, all servicemen conclude a temporary agreement with the command element.

[Correspondent] Are there provisions for serving under contract during the transitional period for servicemen who have not taken the oath, particularly in the fields in which there is a shortage?

[Zhivitsa] This question is a subject of impending interstate agreements. I want to point out that those who want to serve in Ukraine, including specialists of which there is a shortage, far outnumber those who want to leave Ukraine to serve elsewhere.

[Correspondent] How is the matter of the professional reorientation and social adaptation of servicemen discharged into the reserve being handled at the practical level?

[Zhivitsa] The statement issued by the President of Ukraine on 5 January 1992 says that Ukraine ensures the social and professional adaptation of servicemen discharged into the reserve. They will be provided with jobs in accordance with the Ukrainian law. Training centers and courses will be set up at Ukrainian educational institutions for the professional reorientation and social adaptation of servicemen discharged into the reserve, where the servicemen can acquire the necessary knowledge of management, economics and other sciences.

[Correspondent] Will benefits be preserved for the "Afghaners," "Chernobyl personnel," individuals serving in remote areas and other categories of servicemen with respect to pensions?

[Zhivitsa] The draft Law of Ukraine on Pensions for Servicemen, which will be passed in the near future, calls for preserving all the benefits and privileges for these categories of servicemen.

[Correspondent] How is the matter of monetary incentives for the military service being resolved?

[Zhivitsa] The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Minister of Defense of Ukraine are doing everything within their power to enhance the prestige of serving in the armed forces of Ukraine.

An 18 December 1991 decree of the President of Ukraine increased pay rates for servicemen by a factor of 1.9 as of 1 January of this year. The Law of Ukraine on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families has been passed. It establishes a 41-hour work-week for servicemen and increases their annual leave. In the immediate future the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine will pass the Law on Pensions for Servicemen and Workers in Internal Affairs Agencies. It will preserve all types of state pensions, benefits and other guarantees of social protection for servicemen and their families, and these will be no lower than the amounts they previously had, with income indexing. All measures of the Ukrainian state to provide social protection for the population in the situation of the freeing of prices and the placing of reusable coupons into circulation are extended to servicemen and their families.

[Correspondent] Will per diem and field allowances be increased as prices rise?

[Zhivitsa] Absolutely. Monetary payments were increased 5-fold as of 2 January 1992 in accordance with Paragraph 8 of Decree No. 1 passed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 1 January 1992.

[Correspondent] Who will pay the pensions for servicemen moving to other states, and with what? What unit will be used (if every state has its own currency)?

[Zhivitsa] The procedure for paying pensions to servicemen who move to another state after retiring is established in accordance with interstate agreements which have been ratified.

[Correspondent] Is it permitted to use the Russian language for communication between servicemen and the Directorate of Troops, and what measures will be taken to teach the Ukrainian language to the servicemen?

[Zhivitsa] On 1 November 1991 the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine passed the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of the Ukraine, Article 3 of which states: "The Ukrainian state ensures for its citizens the right freely to use the Russian language."

Citizens of Ukraine will serve in the armed forces of Ukraine without regard for their nationality. There can be no talk of "Ukrainianizing" the officer corps, of which some servicemen are so afraid.

The study of the Ukrainian language in the armed forces of Ukraine will proceed gradually, on a legal basis, throughout the transitional period.

Servicemen's Group Seeks Return to Ukraine

92UM0707B Kiev *VECHERNIY KIEV* in Russian
10 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Svetlana Sinyakova under the rubric "Political Palette": "At Least Give Us Hope"]

[Text] A delegation of the Baku regional union of servicemen-citizens of Ukraine "For Return to the Motherland" has flown into Kiev. It is headed by Colonel A. Slyusarev, who passed to the editorial office a copy of an appeal from the union to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet. The question concerns the fate of many thousands of our countrymen who are serving in the 4th Army. And it does not just concern them.

We will recall: Azerbaijan is a world "hot spot." The sons of Ukraine did not end up there of their own free will. A. Slyusarev himself served in the Kiev Military District during his first nine years. "Does this mean that if the democratic revolution had occurred then I could have served Ukraine, but now I do not have the right?" he asks.

Really, the place of service is not the best of criteria for the selection of personnel for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Especially when you recall the statement of one of the participants in the all-Army conference of officers in Moscow that "in some republics, officers are forced to take an oath by promising them money and apartments. But the moment will arrive when officers will fulfill not that oath that was administered to them, but the one in their hearts." Cynical, yes, but on the other hand frank...

Our countrymen, whose fate has taken them to distant lands, cherish the honor of an officer. They do not want to take an oath to Azerbaijan, because they have Ukraine in their hearts. They do not want to conclude contracts, because many Ukrainians also serve in the neighboring 7th Army, which is deployed in Armenia. And, to put it mildly, in the event of a dangerous situation how could they look into the eyes of Ukrainian mothers?

They also do not agree to serve "just for the hell of it" (a version that is also suggested by local authorities). Because to become a "free volunteer" means losing citizenship and being outside the law.

Hopeless situations do not exist. In the final analysis, they will pack their suitcases, abandon everything that they have acquired over a dozen years (because of today's prices and the crime-conducive situation, sending one's things in a container or by trailer is not even worth thinking about; one trailer, for example, in Azerbaijan requires from 16,000 to 25,000 "wooden" rubles [R], but an officer's monthly pay is around R2,000). And together with their wives and children, they will somehow get to their native land. "If we are not needed in the Ukrainian forces," said Major F. Vepro, "then at least we will grow potatoes." But this, as the saying goes, is the extreme version. The union "For Return to the Motherland" brought completely specific proposals for parliament, the president, and the government on how to resolve the problem. First, conclude a government agreement between Ukraine and Azerbaijan on the creation of a military mission of Ukraine in Azerbaijan and a military staff to train personnel for a republic army there. Include military citizens of Ukraine in this setup, take jurisdiction over them, and include them on the table of organization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Also include our countrymen who are cadets of the Baku combined arms and naval schools in this organization. Second, bring in representatives of the union to staff a commission under the Supreme Soviet that decides questions of repatriation and certification. In addition, establish a commission under parliament which, on a competitive basis, would examine each candidate and would select the really best of the best officers for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The delegation is also petitioning that the union "For Return to the Motherland" receive the legal right to administer the military oath of loyalty to Ukraine to all military citizens of Ukraine who at present are on the territory of Azerbaijan.

The plans of the delegation include meetings with people's deputies and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. They also would not decline a conversation with President L. Kravchuk.

B. Yeltsin, whom it is so fashionable to criticize now, deserves praise: He declared publicly that Russia is taking its sons under its protection, and it will accept everyone who does not want to serve under the banner of a foreign state. Russia, which by no means can brag of a high standard of living, can, nevertheless, still pride itself with concern for Russian officers. But can we?

"Indeed, Yeltsin's statement is still not everything. But so far we have not heard even such a statement," say members of the delegation with anxiety.

We hope to hear everything. And not just promises alone. We will be realists: They defend the land, they die for it in battle, not for money and apartments, but out of

love for this land, because it is dearer than anything. Because this is—your Fatherland.

Ukrainians Serving in Other Republics, Strategic Forces Voice Concerns

92UM0629A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian Feb 92 p 1

[Article: "We Count on and Believe in You, Ukraine"]

[Text]

"We Count on and Believe in You, Ukraine," Say the Military Personnel Serving Outside Ukraine and in the Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]

In the flow of letters currently being received at the newspaper of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine the following stand out. They were written by people serving outside Ukraine or as part of the strategic deterrence forces. Remarkably, all of them are properly accepting the establishment of an independent state and its armed forces, and are applying all their strength and knowledge to develop them as rapidly as possible. In addition, all of the letters give off a sense of alarm over the writer's own fate. After all, these people did not leave their homeland by choice. Unfortunately, the people in uniform have seen from the bitter experience of our entire history how high-sounding promises to look after them have remained empty words.

"I Am Concerned About my Future"

I am presently serving at Belaya Garrison in Irkutsk Oblast. I was born in Ukraine (Zaporozhye Oblast). I am a Ukrainian. I studied at the Zaporozhye Medical Institute. I then transferred to the department of military medicine and was assigned to Siberia in 1990 (even though I requested Ukraine). There is no point in complaining about my lot at this point, however. I am the doctor for an air regiment and live with my wife and two children in a comfortable four-room apartment. I like the service, my wife has a job (although not in her field), and we want for nothing.

Numerous problems have arisen as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the separation of Ukraine, however. I am very much concerned about the future for myself and my family. We do not intend to spend the rest of our lives in Siberia. We want to return to Ukraine. People like me make up around 40% of the regiment. Very little information reaches us in Siberia, but we do receive some. Personnel bring back newspapers from leave, and our parents and friends write us. A rumor has gone around that many deputies at the session are speaking out against paying pensions to officers who have not served inside Ukraine and that they not be placed on the waiting list for apartments. It seems to me they want to create all sorts of conditions to prevent the officers from returning to their homeland and to make them refugees. I do not understand how we are at fault.

We did not come here to serve by choice, after all. And the most significant thing is that we are unable to leave here in a normal, humane way. When I mentioned a transfer to Ukraine, I was told to serve out the required 10 years and then go wherever I like (it is not clear who established this period). When I announced that I wanted to be discharged from the army entirely, I was told that this was possible only by discrediting the "esteemed title of an officer" or for reasons of service incompatibility. That is, they hinted unequivocally that I would be discharged only if I committed a crime or played a fool and a loser. This is how things are.

Could you please clarify the situation? In the first place, will the government of Ukraine pass any sort of measures (decrees, ukases) to help the Ukrainian officers transfer to their homeland? Or, do such decrees already exist but we are simply unaware of them? How does one legally arrange to serve in the army of Ukraine in view of the fact that local authorities simply will not release us? Or will the government simply wash its hands of us and leave us to the mercy of fate? Even now it is a big problem to get away on leave, to visit one's parents: tickets, inspections at airports, and so forth. And what will it be like when they introduce the new currency and new passports? We will go to visit our parents as though from abroad, filling out visas, exchanging currency, going through customs. Do not forget that thousands of our compatriots are still not aboard.

Who can tell us what the future holds for Ukrainians serving outside Ukraine? Which government will pay our pensions? Will we be permitted to register for an apartment? It seems that after serving 20-25 years in the military we are being left without a place to hang our hat and ending up back where we started from. Is it perhaps not too late to drop everything and return to the homeland and start all over again? I am upset at our government, which cannot (or does not want to) stand up for our compatriots. I am upset with the people's deputies, who have forgotten us, as though there are just no Ukrainians outside Ukraine. But there are many like me, who, I would point out, did not leave Ukraine by choice. Give us the opportunity to return home. Give us at least some possibility of doing that.—Sr Lt Med Service V. Popelnyuk, Irkutsk

As a Loyal Son

I am forced to write to you by events occurring both in Ukraine and in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

I am an officer and I serve in the long-range aviation, which is a part of the strategic forces. Sooner or later our unit will be removed from Ukraine in accordance with decisions adopted in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Consequently, I will have to change my place of service.

Since I am a citizen of Ukraine, I want to serve on its territory and particularly in the armed forces of Ukraine. I want to protect my homeland, my state.—Capt P. Alkhimov

Do Not Forget Us

I want to inform you of the feelings of those of us whose military careers have taken us to the Far East outskirts of the former Union. There are many of us here, officers and warrant officers honorably fulfilling our military duty but never for a minute severing our ties with Ukraine. Today we hear alarming news—not even news but rumors, since we have no way of obtaining reliable information.

Majors Mikhail Vyacheslavovich Syrutsinskiy and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Kondak and I, compatriots, met to discuss some news reported by an officer with the billeting service of our Far East Military District. The report alleges the existence of a document stating that the right to reserved housing and other benefits, particularly pensions, for servicemen departing for remote areas have been abolished in Ukraine. They say that pensions will not be paid to those discharged into the reserve outside Ukraine who return to their native parts. The worst part is that no one can refute these rumors. And so we stew in our own juice, as they say.

Now, a little bit about myself. I was born in Korostyshevskiy Rayon, Zhitomir Oblast. Upon graduating from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, my career took me from one garrison to another, large and small, in the Transbaykal Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Carpathian Military District and the Far East Military District. Now I am tormented by the question: Have I not earned appreciation for my labors? The time is approaching for my discharge into the reserve, and my heart is troubled over how Ukraine will receive its soldier.

Despite all the rumors, however, I have faith that I will not be denied the care of a great people. I would simply like for representatives of Ukraine serving outside the Ukraine to have an accurate picture of what is happening in the homeland.

I made the decision to request a leave just for the purpose of bringing back news from Ukraine. The unit commander received my request with understanding. But then not all of us who want to do this can be released.—Maj V. Dalkevich, chief of the Motor-vehicle Service of an Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, Far East Military District

Our Commentary

We already have answers to some of the questions raised in letters from servicemen. There is and there can be no discrimination against those who are serving or being discharged into the reserve outside Ukraine with respect to pensions, housing and so forth. Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk and Colonel-General K.P. Morozov,

Ukrainian Minister of Defense, have stated this repeatedly. This is borne out by laws which the Supreme Soviet has passed on servicemen and their families and by a package of draft laws on the basis of which decisions will be adopted in the immediate future. All of these documents, incidentally, have been or will be published in our newspaper. Major Vikentiy Avgustinovich Dalkevich, author of one letter from the Far East Military District, saw this when he recently visited the editorial office.

With respect to transfers to the Ukrainian armed forces, there are more questions than answers. And not just because it has to do with the personal fate of each individual. In a recent interview with republic television, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense stated that it is important first of all to create a situation in which an officer or warrant officer in the armed forces does not experience need and does not have to take find a haven in other parts.

Here is some recent information from the press. Almost 900 officers and warrant officers from the Far East Military District alone have submitted to their commanders requests for transfer to continue their service in their own states. Most of them are Ukrainians. Not all of them have an apartment in the homeland, of course, or job possibilities for their family members. And the option of escaping to Ukraine, which is suggested in some letters and which is desired by those for whom it is advantageous to whip up hysteria around the establishment of its own armed forces by the independent state, is unacceptable. It is therefore essential to continue performing one's duty and proceed in strict accordance with the law, as called for by the president of Ukraine in his appeal to servicemen serving outside the Ukraine.

Many of the letters request help in filling out subscriptions to NARODNAYA ARMIYA, which, in the opinion of the authors, is the only newspaper objectively covering the establishment of the armed forces. To our great regret, it is not yet possible to subscribe to the newspaper outside Ukraine. There is a way, however. We ask relatives and acquaintances of servicemen serving outside Ukraine to subscribe to the newspaper and forward it to the latter. This will perhaps reduce the number of bitter and confused questions, foolish rumors and gossip.

And one last thing. Letters from afar containing expressions of support and approval are further confirmation of the correctness of the path chosen by the Ukrainian government, contrary to the sometimes artificially created circumstances. Write us and tell us about your concerns and problems. What you have to say is extremely important to us.

Letters selected and postscript written by Maj O. Vachayev.

Collegium Discusses Tasks, Problems of Border Guards

92UM0647A Kiev *POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY*
in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed press release from the Press Center of the State Committee on Affairs for the Guarding of the Ukrainian State Frontier: "From the Law to Practical Actions"]

[Text] As is known at the end of August last year, the ukase was adopted of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on subordinating to Ukraine the Border Troops stationed on its territory. Soon thereafter, on 4 November 1991, the laws were passed "On the Ukrainian State Frontier" and "On the Ukrainian Border Troops." The establishing of the State Committee on Affairs for the Guarding of the Ukrainian State Frontier was a logical extension of these legislative enactments.

On 22 January 1992, the first session was held for the Collegium of the State Committee on Affairs for the Guarding of the Ukrainian State Frontier, where the functioning of the structures in the recently established administrative bodies was conceptually laid out. The Chairman of the State Committee and Commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops, Lt Gen V.A. Gubenko, in opening the session, introduced the members of the collegium and defined its duties in the area of the responsible tasks of combat, service and other vital activities for the Ukrainian Border Troops.

The chairman of the State Committee emphasized that in its work the collegium is to be guided by the laws of an independent sovereign state, by the ukases of the Ukrainian President, by the decrees and orders of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, by the orders and instructions of the Committee chairman and commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops, as well as by the Regulation on the Collegium of the State Committee on Affairs for the Guarding of the Ukrainian State Frontier.

Then the Board Member and First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee, Maj Gen V.A. Voruchenko, gave a report on the basic areas of work for the State Committee. He, in particular, accentuated that proceeding from the Regulation on the State Committee, the main areas of its activity should be, above all, the elaboration of the legal, economic and special military mechanism for guarding the Ukrainian frontiers and other types of combat service activities for the Border Troops, the directing of all types of their activities and ensuring combat and mobilization readiness. The Committee must determine the make-up of the border representative personnel and direct their activities, as well as participate in the preparation of the enforceable enactments relating to border questions. In working out and implementing measures relating to the legal structure of the Ukrainian frontiers with bordering states, it must thwart any attempt at the illegal altering of the already recognized Ukrainian frontiers on the spot.

The State Committee, together with the concerned state bodies, is to work out and submit to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers proposals on the opening of new and the reconstructing of existing border crossing points, it is to maintain the border regime in the border zone and conditions at the crossing points, it is to organize work in providing foreign citizens with short-term visas for a temporary stay in Ukraine and so forth.

Among the main, and to put it more correctly, problem areas of work by the State Committee on Affairs of the Guarding of the Ukrainian State Frontier will be economic activities, including commercial, for establishing normal social and domestic conditions for the servicemen and members of their families. In the near future, with the aid of the contracting organizations, it is essential to settle the questions of building housing and offices, to organize the delivery and efficient use of equipment and weapons, to create the conditions for their basing, upkeep and repair, as well as monitoring the quality of developing and testing the new equipment required for the secure guarding of the frontier and the economic zone of Ukraine.

There are numerous tasks also confronting the personnel bodies in the area of manning the Border Troops, in establishing for the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] conditions which encourage an interest in service growth as well as their legal and social defense. This is the main guarantee for successful combat and service activities in the Ukrainian Border Troops.

In the conclusion of his speech, Maj Gen V.A. Boruchenko drew particular attention to raising the professional competence of the administrative bodies in the Ukrainian Border Troops. The time of prompting, of "taking by the hand," as the speaker put it, is over. We ourselves must see the problems, promptly raise and independently resolve them. There will not be any more 'guides' from Moscow. We must skillfully and professionally resolve the arising problems and show activeness and purposefulness in our work. Certain questions (a list of them must be determined) will be brought up for review by the collegium, while others must be settled independently with the powers of the State Committee directorates.

Participating in the discussion of the report were the collegium members: the Deputy Chairmen of the State Committee on Affairs of Guarding the Ukrainian State Frontier Maj Gen Yu.V. Babanskiy, Maj Gen A.S. Artemov, Col A.I. Bannykh, and Col V.L. Shugaliy, the Chief of the Inspectorate Maj Gen A.F. Borisov, and the Chief of the Directorate for Guarding the State Frontier, Col V.M. Bondar.

The results of the discussion of the main areas of activity for the State Committee on Affairs for the Guarding the Ukrainian State Frontier were summed up by the Commander of the Ukrainian Border Troops, Lt Gen V.A. Gubenko.

A detailed decree was adopted on the question discussed.

Military Training Problems Viewed

92UM0695B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
25 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed interview with Maj A. Krapivin, deputy battalion commander for personnel work from the Odessa Garrison: "From the Odessa MD: How Should a Soldier Be Educated?"]

[Text] At present many assistant commanders are finding themselves in a difficult situation in working with the personnel. The establishing of the Ukrainian Army also requires a new approach to educating the men. Some forms of work are dying out while others are being created. This was the subject of a conversation between our correspondent and the deputy battalion commander for personnel work, Maj A. Krapivin, from the Odessa Garrison.

[Correspondent] How are things going with explaining the documents on the establishing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Krapivin] In the system of humanities training and in social and legal defense, we are holding exercises on studying the laws which have already been adopted: "On the Defense of Ukraine" and "On the Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen and Members of Their Families." We are also becoming familiar with the drafts which are still under review by the Supreme Council.

But here as well we have our problems. Thus, we are not always able to obtain skilled aid from the lawyers and for this reason we must explain everything to the soldiers as we understand this. It would also be a good thing if the specialists not only spoke to us but also directly to the soldiers.

Extremely little of the required material can be found in the press and for this reason it is hard to secure things to study. In order for the assistants for personnel work not be left completely up to their own devices, it is essential that they be given more explanations and consultations by specialists.

[Correspondent] And how are things going in explaining military traditions?

[Krapivin] Here we are still following the old forms such as the campaign record of the unit, the Great Patriotic War and Afghanistan... At present we have noticed that our libraries have extremely little literature on the history of Ukraine and the struggle of its people against foreign invaders.

In addition, many have studied in the schools in other republics and have not studied Ukrainian history at all. It is bad enough to study this by yourself, but there is not even the essential facilities for it. The given question must also be thoroughly discussed. At present the situation is such that some fellows imbued in a negative

attitude toward the army, in subsequent years no longer make any distinction between the former Union and the current Ukrainian. This is partially because we still educate using the old methods and not on a fresh basis.

Ukraine Demands Return of 'Highjacked' Bombers

92UM0705A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 1

[Statement by the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Aircraft Highjackers Will Be Held Responsible"]

[Text] In recent days the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov personally, have received telegrams, letters and appeals from the servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and which express indignation over the illegal actions committed by the highjackers of six combat aircraft from a bomber aviation regiment.

The telegram signed by the commander of an air formation, Maj Gen Avn L. Fursa, states that the personnel views the given event as a political act aimed at destabilizing relations between the sovereign states and an attempt to use the Army in the interests of ambitious forces. The aviators expressed the hope that the competent bodies will investigate what happened and will hold the guilty parties properly responsible. They requested the Ukrainian minister of defense take emergency measures to quickly resolve the given incident and recover the military equipment.

The officers of a separate reconnaissance aviation regiment also voiced profound indignation over the illegal actions of the officers who carried out the highjacking of the six SU-24M and the unit's colors. The officer assembly considered this fact a hazardous venture aimed at undermining the mutual relations between Ukraine and Russia and destabilizing the situation in the troop collectives during the period of the formation of the Air Forces of an independent Ukraine. The personnel expressed confidence in the just and balanced solution for all questions relating to the personnel of the bomber aviation regiment, considering their services in the past.

'Social Protection' of Servicemen Raises Troublesome Questions

92UM0673A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
13 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Major A. Trubitsyn: "What is Troubling Officers"]

[Text] At present, many are being troubled by the fate of the army of the independent state and the fate of those servicemen who voluntarily took an oath to the Ukrainian people. The anonymous questionnaire of the officers of the pontoon-bridge brigade in Kiev and of the Belotserkovskiy Garrison confirms this. In the presence

of a polarity of views concerning a number of issues of military organizational-development and the necessity to conduct an All-Ukrainian Officer's Assembly (some consider that one ought not to take place), our respondents were practically unanimous on one issue: at present there is no social protection for servicemen and their families in the Ukraine, and they demand significant augmentation of the law.

It would seem that servicemen ought not to be especially disturbed by the issue in question. It is a well-known fact that our parliament has moved far ahead with respect to the legislatures of other states of the former Union. In its very name, the adopted Law on "Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and their Families" speaks for itself in its very name.

It deserves mention, by the way, that even the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Ground Troops spoke highly of the Law at a meeting with participants of the All-Army Officer's Assembly. Nevertheless, many professional service men still are anxious ...

Lieutenant-Colonel Shulygin, a participant of the last Officer's Assembly, noted that it attempted to resolve many questions in the context of a "unified and indivisible" Armed Forces. But of course, this applied little to us, the representatives of Ukraine, because the guarantees which were promised to officers by, so to speak, Russian President B. Yeltsin, were for others.

We would like to hear something like this from the lips of the leaders of our state and, first and foremost, from President L. Kravchuk, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Indeed the situation in Ukraine differs somewhat from the views about it which were held by those who addressed the All-Army Officer's Assembly, who touched on the issue of officers taking an oath to the sovereign states, and who fought for restoration of the "age-old links between parts of a country which was recently united."

The failure to take an oath by a segment (even if small) of officers and army and navy warrant officers engenders a serious situation which may be complicated under certain circumstances which, so to speak, are hovering in the background.

What do I have in mind? First and foremost, increased pressure on servicemen who did not take the oath. What's the use of hiding the fact that in our midst are other zealous commanders and supervisors who are granting "disgraced" servicemen week-long and month-long periods to search for new places to serve outside Ukraine. This is one side.

On the other side, the forthcoming reduction of a vast number of officers can vastly enlarge the ranks of the dissatisfied.

...And furthermore, in spite of all of its shortcomings, the All-Army Officer's Assembly showed that the Army is

entering the political arena and beginning to fight for its rights. In my opinion, the famous slogan "an army removed from politics" currently appears just as bankrupt as attempts to resuscitate the former USSR.

All this taken together portends a social explosion of the most organized segment of our society.

But let's return to the Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and their Families, which, as it seems, could significantly smooth over sharp corners within the Army. I think that it is not by accident that even after its introduction, professional servicemen in Ukraine did not begin feeling more comfortable.

For some it [the Law] is strong protection from concerns for their own army, but as for others, it above all else makes them defenseless before an approaching barrage of market and other relations.

Some thought that upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people they would instantaneously fall under the guaranteed protection of the young state and their knowledge and experience would be needed by the Armed Forces which are coming into being.

This is only partly so. The fact of the matter is that [with respect to] the military force stationed in Ukraine: first, [it] is subject to reductions under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces which was concluded between the USA and former USSR; second, Ukraine does not need an army of many hundreds of thousands; third, prolonged maintenance of forces that are due to be reformed will cost a pretty penny.

As a practical matter, this means that transfer to the reserves awaits many officers in the near future. And there is no guarantee in the Law that upon being transferred a serviceman will be provided with an apartment or even a minimal pension. While such guarantees were found in its draft, they later vanished for some reason ...

So as not to make unsubstantiated statements, I will cite specific articles and paragraphs of the Law which speak for themselves. Here is Article 8, Paragraph 2, "Fundamental Rights of Servicemen, Concerning Service." We read: "Servicemen with the exception of those who are serving normal periods of duty, cannot be discharged from military service prior to acquiring the right to retirement for long service, except for cases when service stops of one's own accord, in connection with state of health, completion of term of service or failure to comply with contractual conditions...", and further, [in connection with] "*reductions in force or manning levels...*" (Italicized by me—A.T.)

Are any clarifications needed here for those who served in the Army for even the shortest period? I think that it is clear as is: an infinity is possible here.

But we continue reading the Law further. In the last paragraph of Article 12, Paragraph 1, "Provision of

Servicemen and Their Families With Living Accommodations", it is written in black and white that "Upon transfer from military service to the reserves or retirement for long service as well as in connection with reductions in force or manning levels, officers, army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended will be provided with living space in accordance with procedures established by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers."

The directive can only be "deciphered" as follows. It is not ruled out that you will be discharged without an apartment. It is difficult to understand where there is protection of servicemen in the laws if it is absent in the main one. It would be all right if we were talking only about youths, but what is to be done by those who served in the army for fifteen or more years? To again wait that long for an apartment? And it is fully possible that the Cabinet of Ministers will not shift the problem to local government bodies.

And so there is no "confidence in the future," not only among officers of the Transcaucasus, Moldova, the Northwestern Group of Forces, but among servicemen in Ukraine. As a result of this, the army reformers are replete with loop-holes for voluntaristic actions and lawlessness. Or all of this will take place in a legal framework not prohibiting the taking of liberties with professional servicemen.

History knows a precedent of this type, when the decision to significantly downsize the army cost the treasury and people a pretty penny, and when human destinies were bent over the knee. True, at that time a social explosion did not take place among servicemen. However, if one follows Marxist logic that history repeats itself twice and takes a tragic course the first time, then the conditions for this are more "favorable" today than in those years...

It does seem worthwhile to discuss these problems at the All-Army Officer's Assembly, and they are only a small part of the issues which require attention from the powers that be. Of course, [this can happen] only if the forum bears a constructive character and does not turn into the humiliation of the Moscow Officer's Assembly.

And God forbid that we take up the 1917 position of the Bolsheviks—"Who is not with us is against us." All efforts ought to be directed at mollifying the complex situation in the army, first and foremost, in one's own [army]. Second, we must clarify our position on those problems of force development which will become a topic of discussion at this year's 14 February meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state. Our President and Commander-in-Chief is obliged to know the opinion of his subordinates about the tactics and strategy of reforming the military structures of the former USSR. [This is so] because much depends on this, first and foremost being the spiritual condition of people wearing shoulder-boards and their desire to conscientiously serve for the good of independent Ukraine.

Photo Caption

Major Aleksey Alekseyevich Trubitsyn. Completed the Lvov Higher Military-Political School in 1982. Served in the Transbaykal Military District (Mongolian People's Republic). Is working for our paper since 1988.

Work telephone—216-66-05.

Retirees Raise Questions on Pension Provisions

92UM0720A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Feb 92 p 3

[Letters from readers under the rubric "We Are Discussing Draft Laws of Ukraine": "Following Release Into the Reserve"]

[Text] Every day the editors' mail contains an abundance of letters a considerable portion of which are about pension provisions. Various questions are troubling people who have devoted most of their lives to the military service. In the situation of an impending free market, they speak with alarm of the future....

Eliminate the Injustice

I served in the Northern Fleet beyond the polar circle from October 1939 to June 1941 and then at Cape Korabelnyy on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula from May 1945 to June 1947. The sad thing is that all of this time was recorded for me as one year for one year. We know, however, that as of 1949, under a decree passed by the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of the USSR on the special computation of military service performed in remote areas with a harsh climate, length of service was computed at the rate of one and a half or two years for each year served. And although I am now well over 70 years old, I still have a bitter feeling in my heart from this injustice. Is there no way today to change our law so that justice triumphs? There are not many of us left.—Maj (Retired) V. Chubenko

And What About Those Who Were on Alert Duty?

I feel that the proposed draft on pension provisions ignores the matter of service in special conditions. While for such categories as stand-by flight personnel and submariners the special conditions were taken into account for computing length of service, such benefits were not established for military personnel performing alert duty in the Strategic Missile Troops, the Air Defense Troops and so forth. Does it have to be proved that alert duty involves special responsibility?

I therefore recommend that the following be added to Article 17, which covers pension increments for length of service:

"...for pensioners who served in the Strategic Missile Troops or the Air Defense Troops pensions are to be increased by 0.5% of the pay from which the pension was computed for each year of alert duty."—Maj Gen (Reserve) V. Pavlenko

On What Amount Is the Computation Based?

Article 13 of the draft law on pensions for servicemen states: "...the size of pensions for length of service is increased by 10% for individuals in categories 1 and 2 who suffered while helping to mop up following the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant] and by 5% for those in categories 3 and 4."

The amount from which these percentages are computed should be specified. That is, whether it is based on all pay and allowances or on the amount of the pension. If it is based on the pension, then it is a trifling increment.—V. Malenko

An Adjustment Is Needed

When I was released into the reserve I had to sell all my furniture literally for next to nothing, since there was nowhere to take my household goods. For four years I lived in a private apartment for which I paid an enormous price. My pension was increased somewhat as of 1 January 1991. The increase was wiped out after 2 April, however. And there is no describing the situation today. Even in the state stores prices have risen 5- to 10-fold. Civilian enterprises more or less provide their pensioners with some relief, but the Ministry of Defense only procrastinates. It should help us with the acquisition of inexpensive furniture, household appliances, linen, even civilian clothing, among other things. Some of us served at garrisons where these things simply could not be bought.—Maj (Reserve) Lufirenko

Why Did They Remove 5% of the Pension?

I served 29 years in the army and sacrificed my health to it entirely. I served in six different military districts during that time. When I was released into the reserve I was given a pension increment of 10%, but in 1991 that was cut to 5%. I do not know whose idea this was, but it was not well thought out. Today I have been struck by so many ailments, there is no describing it. In this situation of exorbitant prices will those few pennies actually not be given back to me?—Lt Col (Retired) M. Shevtsov

Propriety Is Needed

In the draft Law of Ukraine on Pension Provisions for Servicemen and Workers With Internal Affairs Agencies of Ukraine the last paragraph of Article 16, "Increasing Pensions for the Disabled and Veterans of War, and Those Who Suffered from the Chernobyl Disaster," states: "The increase in pensions specified in points b and c of this article may be computed simultaneously."

I recommend that the word "may" be removed and that the paragraph be worded thusly: "it must be specifically indicated in which cases the pension increase specified in points b and c are computed simultaneously, when they are computed only in accordance with point b or only in accordance with point c.—Lt Col I. Repetiy

Do Not Infringe Without Justification

The draft law on pension provisions states that pensions for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, extended-duty military personnel, supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of internal affairs agencies are computed from the highest pay earned during their last three years in the service.

The following amendment is recommended: "earned during any period of their service."

This is the basis. During the reorganization and reduction of the armed forces of Ukraine a considerable number of officers and other categories will be assigned to positions with a lower pay rate as a result of organizational measures. Accordingly, they will receive also a smaller pension. This is not consistent with the law of Ukraine on social protection for servicemen, however.—Col (Reserve) V. Zhadko

Moscow Officer Group Appeals to Ukrainian Government

92UM0647B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Feb 92 p 1

[Resolution of the General Assembly of the Association of Ukrainian Officers in Moscow and signed by the Chairman of the Association, B. Batko and the Executive Secretary, V. Zorin]

[Text] 1. We fully support the decisions of the Ukrainian Supreme Council and government in establishing their own Armed Forces and in giving the Ukrainian military oath to all the Army, Navy and Air Forces units stationed on the territory of our motherland.

2. We propose that the Ukrainian government immediately assume the defense of the officers who are Ukrainian citizens and are temporarily serving on Russian territory and recall them for further service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In the aim of settling this question, a bilateral personnel commission should be set up for the Russian and Ukrainian governments in order to set the times and procedures for a reciprocal exchange of officer personnel. Particular attention must be paid to the possibility of employing the officers working in the scientific research institutes of the various departments.

3. We request that the Ukrainian government quickly settle the question of the legal defense and financial support for continuing training of the officers and officer candidates who are Ukrainian citizens and studying in the Moscow academies and schools and guarantee the possibility of their return to the motherland.

4. We request that the Ukrainian government organize the taking of the Ukrainian oath by the officers who are Ukrainian citizens and temporarily serving in Moscow during a period of stay in Ukraine (leave, official mission and so forth).

5. We consider it essential to establish immediately on Ukrainian territory formations of officers who are Ukrainian citizens and are returning from the other states of the former USSR in the aim of their further employment in the Air Forces, MVD, the Border Troops, the National Guard and so forth. They can be quartered at the bases of the military training facilities which are currently being reorganized or at other places. Hundreds of officers have asserted that in the name of the independence of Ukraine and its Armed Forces they would be ready to endure the hardships of primitive facilities for two or three years. It is essential to ensure a possibility for the return to the motherland of a maximum possible number of officers who are temporarily located outside it.

CIS Ukrainian Servicemen Appeal to Government

92UM0685A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Ukrainian 15 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed Article: "We, Army Specialists, Appeal to You... An Appeal to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine from Servicemen Stationed Beyond the Borders of the Fatherland"]

[Text] Esteemed Deputies!

We, who appeal to you, are the sons of Ukraine—servicemen sent by order of the former Soviet government, and thereby also by order of the former government of our native Ukraine, to perform our military duty outside the borders of our Fatherland and who, in this historic time, are temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Today, in the wake of the revolutionary changes in our Fatherland when Ukrainain Supreme Soviet passed the resolution on the independence of our state and the creation of its own Armed Forces, we, servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine, regard it as our duty to act in unity with our Fatherland and share with it all the hardships at this important juncture in history.

We, military specialists, appeal to you to make use of us for the good of our Fatherland and find a way to incorporate us into the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

We will not take an oath of loyalty to any state except our native Ukraine, because we have only one Fatherland, just as we have only one mother who brought us into this world.

Today all the republics of the former USSR, which has now become the CIS, have announced that they would safeguard the social security of the servicemen who are their citizens.

Unfortunately, this cannot be said of Ukraine to the fullest degree.

Eight states, which adopted a decision approving the continued existence of a single armed force, have given their citizens serving in the military a guarantee that

should those performing their service on the territory of Ukraine, Moldova, or Azerbaijan find themselves in circumstances in which these states attempt to require them to take an oath of loyalty and they refuse to do so, they will be transferred to continue their military service on the territory of the eight states in question.

In addition, both Azerbaijan and Moldova are interested in having their citizens in the military returned to their national territories.

We, military servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine, are the only ones, whose transfer our president has rejected as impossible at this time. And that is that! With no hope or promises for the future.

The reason—lack of housing in Ukraine and no vacant military posts in our own Armed Forces.

If the availability of housing and service vacancies are currently the most important considerations in the selection of cadres for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the criterion is a dangerous one.

Allow us to cite an example from the statement made by naval officer Barykin, a delegate to the general army conference of officers in Moscow, on Program I [not indicated whether radio or television] on 16 January of this year. "In some republics officers are being compelled to take a loyalty oath and are being promised money and living quarters in return. But the moment will come when these officers will fulfill not the oath they took but the one that is in their hearts."

Undoubtedly, all of you understand what this statement means, and what the speaker had in mind is in no doubt. The principal criteria for service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine should not be money and the current posting but rather professional qualities; a candidate's blood ties with Ukraine and his great love for it; and that each serviceman's trench on the line of defense of the border of his Fatherland be the door to his own home.

If you think that by refusing your citizens their applications for transfer into the Armed Forces of Ukraine you will be able to reduce the stream of those returning to their Fatherland, you are mistaken.

We will not swear an oath of allegiance and serve another state, and we will definitely return to our Fatherland, and Ukraine will then have two armies, as it were.

The first will be made up largely of those who were compelled to take the oath by their need for housing and security.

This will be an army made up of those officers, who at their officers' conference of the Kiev Military District in August 1991 "CONDEMNED" the first congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine (SOU), which proclaimed its goal to be the creation of a separate Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Such an army will not be distinguished by particular steadfastness in the defense of the Ukrainian state.

The second will be an army of your compatriots, forced to leave their service postings, leave their living quarters, and return to their Fatherland.

This will be an army of unutilized potential, an army of people genuinely qualified to defend their Homeland, but with no right to do so granted them by their Homeland.

Realizing that at this time our general transfer to our Fatherland is not possible for understandable reasons, we, the members of the Baku Regional Union of Servicemen-Citizens of Ukraine RFor the Return to Our Fatherland propose to you, appeal to you, and, at the same time, demand that you:

1. oblige the government of Ukraine to enter into negotiations with the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the creation of a Ukrainian military representation in Azerbaijan and an organization of military specialists to train professional military cadres for the republican army of Azerbaijan.

Include servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine in this organization, place them under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, and include them into the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Grant them Ukrainian citizenship and place them under the legal protection of Ukraine.

Also include in this organization the students of the Baku general military and naval school who are citizens of Ukraine. Allow them to complete their studies.

This will not cost Ukraine a single ruble, and in return she will gain a reserve of military cadres and halt the stream of large numbers of citizens who are returning to the Fatherland and who, moreover, are demanding pensions, housing, and employment in the civilian sector, while expressing their dissatisfaction over having lost their military careers and exhibiting a cool attitude to the fate of their Homeland.

This will enable us to create our own military reserve of future reinforcements for the Armed Forces deployed in Ukraine.

There is an interest in this on the part of Azerbaijan. As two states, which were among the first to step on the path of independence and begin to build their own Armed Forces, Ukraine and Azerbaijan could assist each other in these matters.

2. Include the representatives of servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and who are temporarily stationed in the Republic of Azerbaijan in a committee of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine responsible for repatriation and certification.

Ukraine summoned us into the ranks of the army and only Ukraine has the right to release us from this service.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia are currently at war. Ukrainian citizens are serving on the territories of both republics, in the ranks of the 4th and 7th armies. This is a dangerous situation. It will grow worse after 14-15 February. If our citizens serving in the army are not repatriated or are not granted their legal status while they are serving in this region, events will take an unpredictable course.

3. Form a certification commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, which over a designated period of time will examine each candidate's qualifications on a competitive basis and select the truly best candidates.

4. Form a commission on the repatriation of servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and begin their transfer into the Armed Forces on their national territory as positions become available in military units and on ships.

5. Grant the right to our republican union in Azerbaijan to administer the oath of loyalty to Ukraine to all servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and who are currently serving on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Issue us the necessary official documents to this effect.

Esteemed Deputies! Defend today the fate of your servicemen-citizens so that they will be able to defend you in the future. Pass a decision to adopt our five proposals. We will serve you as a true bulwark against political and military pressure from outside.

We assure you that there is no force in the world capable of separating us from our Homeland.

Delegates to the 2d Conference of the Baku Regional Union of Servicemen-Citizens of Ukraine "For the Return to Our Fatherland."

Representatives from:

Caspian Military Fleet

Baku General Military School

Baku Naval School

295th Baku Division

75th Nakhichevan Division

23d Gyandzha Division

General Staff of the Southern Forces

Staff of the 4th Army

Nasosnaya Aviation Regiment

General Military Hospital

Navy Hospital

Perikeshklyul [Missile Brigade

Military Departments of Baku Institutions of Higher Learning

Baku 110th Construction Administration

Baku 11th Military Construction Detachment

Nakhichevan Separate Helicopter Squadron

Head of the Regional Union, Colonel A. Slyusarev

Secretary of the Council of the Union, Captain 2d Class U. Shpyka

During its visit to Kiev from 6 to 14 February, the delegation of the Baku Regional Union of Servicemen-Citizens of Ukraine "For the Return to Our Fatherland" submitted a petition with respect to these issues of substance to the President of Ukraine, the Defense and National Security Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, and to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on human rights issues, to the Committee for the Social Security of Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Union of Officers of Ukraine, the Union of Writers of Ukraine, and to certain other key political movements in Ukraine.

The Baku Regional Union submitted a petition demanding the convening of the 3d extraordinary congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine. A decision to this effect was adopted at the 2d conference of the Regional Union on 2 February.

Ukraine Border Troops Promotions

92UM0707A Kiev *POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY*
in Russian 14 Feb 92 p 2

["Ukase of the President of Ukraine on Promotions"]

[Text] 1. Promote to the rank of colonel general:

Lieutenant General VALERIY ALEKSANDROVICH GUBENKO—chairman of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs, commander of Border Troops of Ukraine.

Promote to the rank of major general:

Colonel VIKTOR IVANOVICH BANNYKH—deputy chairman of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs, deputy commander of Border Troops of Ukraine, chief of the operational-investigative directorate of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs;

Colonel VLADIMIR MIKHAYLOVICH BONDAR—first deputy chief of staff of the Border Troops of Ukraine, chief of the directorate of state border security of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs.

Promote to the rank of rear admiral:

Captain First Rank BORIS PETROVICH RYABOV—deputy chairman of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs, deputy commander of Border Troops of Ukraine, chief of the naval directorate of the state committee for the security of the state border of Ukraine affairs.

2. The ukase is in effect from the day it is signed.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. KRAVCHUK.
City of Kiev.
5 February 1992.

Ukraine Military Appointments

92UM0695A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 2

[Ukase of the Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk on the Awarding of Military Ranks]

[Text] 1. To award the rank of lieutenant-general to Maj Gen Georgiy Vasilyevich Zhivitsa, the first deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

To Maj Gen Nikolay Yevgenyevich Zabelyy, military commandant of the city of Kiev.

2. To award the military rank of major-general to the following:

Col Grigoriy Grigoryevich Avdeyev, deputy chief of rear service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense;

Col Viktor Nikolayevich Kovalev, commander of the 254th Motorized Rifle Division in the Kiev MD;

Col Vladimir Yakovlevich Litvintsev, commander of the 72d Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Kiev MD;

Col Viktor Vasilyevich Pavlenko, deputy commander for rear services and chief of rear services in the 24th Air Army under the Supreme High Command;

Col Yuriy Mikhaylovich Prokofyev, chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense;

Col Leonid Yevgenyevich Utkin, chief of Weapons Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Col Vasily Aleksandrovich Fomin, chief of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of staff of the Carpathian MD;

Col Ivan Ivanovich Stopenko, chief of the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

3. The ukase comes into force on the day of its signing.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk
Kiev, 20 February 1992.

Deserters Take Ukraine Oath

92UM0683B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lt Col V. Novikov: "Deserters Take the Oath"]

[Text] Until recently it was always noisy around the KPP [command and control post] of the Civil Defense brigade located almost in the center of Kiev. And not because the assigned patrol contributed to this. Mothers and fathers brought their sons here in cases when they abandoned their military units for various reasons.

"Everyday up to 30 deserters arrive here at our post," explained the duty officer for the unit.

I recalled the sign hanging in the staff of the Kiev MD that an assembly point had been assigned for the men absent without leave. Sgts Gennadiy Mogilnyy and Aleksey Starodubtsev and Pvt Yevgeniy Burdak had been there until recently along with two others whom had been taken up for service by the commander of one of the troop units, Lt Col Yu. Lyalchenko.

"Will deserters serve?" I asked Yuriy Georgiyevich [Lyalchenko].

"Well come to the oath taking and then you can draw your own conclusions."

It was very crowded at the ceremony attended by the chief of one of the rear services directorates of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Maj Gen N. Shmarkovskiy. Parents of the soldiers, relatives and simply acquaintances came to congratulate their sons.

Among those who took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people that day were the brothers Arkadiy and Vadim Shundik.

"They are fine fellows," responded their commander... "Pvt Sergey Chubko has also begun his service well."

"But what about being yesterday's deserters?"

"I can't say anything bad about them. They are good sergeants and soldiers."

During this obscure (and alarming in its ambiguity) time, Yuriy Georgiyevich was not afraid to assume responsibility, taking command of those who could not serve under the leadership of other commanders. But is this all of the story?

As I was able to learn, one of the sergeants had arrived from a "hot spot," and another right from the Transbaykal steppes. Some had arrived from Kharkov, where the military had suffered reprisals.

Having carefully studied each deserter, Lt Col Yu. Lyalchenko boldly permitted them to take up the corresponding positions in the assigned collective. The fellows are trying and for now have no reprimands.

Their voices rang out loud when they, the citizens of a free Ukraine, vowed loyalty to it.

Sevastopol Officer: 80 Percent Ready to Take Ukraine Pledge

92UM0687A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
12 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by V. Minyajlo, "Respublika" Information Agency, Special to NARODNAYA ARMIYA: "What Admiral Kasatonov 'Does Not See'"]

[Text] Cold, frosty weather greeted us in Sevastopol, but our initial melancholy impressions were dispelled by a questioning of the local inhabitants and sailors. To the question "To whom should the Crimea belong—Russia

or Ukraine?" more than a third of those surveyed answered that it was all the same to Ukraine. Approximately the same number expressed their support for a Russian Crimea. The remainder stood for independence with purchase of water and electricity from Ukraine. We also found those for whom it was all the same where they lived, as long as there was food.

It was the Black Sea Fleet that interested us most in Sevastopol. It ought to be noted that a fleet was created here in 1783. You will agree that it is now impossible to calculate who constructed more of its ships and coastal fortifications—Russians or Ukrainians. Following the break-up of the Russian Empire in 1917, a controversy also ensued over the Black Sea Fleet. Without going into details, we will note that on 28 April 1918 Fleet representatives decided at a meeting to turn it over to the Ukrainian Central Rada [Council]. At that time Admiral Sablin, the Commander in Chief, issued the order to hoist the yellow and blue flags over the ships. A definitive resubordination of the Fleet to Ukraine was prevented by the overthrow of the hetman Skoropadskij.

Now that the Soviet empire has disintegrated, an analogous situation has taken shape. Due to the contradictory information about the condition of the Black Sea Fleet which continues to emanate from Russian as well as Ukrainian mass media, I wanted to clarify the actual situation. Captain Third Rank Alexander Plyashechnikov, a member of the Sevastopol organization of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, told us about the attitude of Black Sea Fleet sailors. According to him, over 80 percent of the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet are ready to take an oath to the Ukrainian people. The problem is that Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander in Chief of the Fleet, constantly raises resistance to the sailor's desire to take an oath to the Ukrainian people; he directs repression of those who already took the oath and ignores the laws of a sovereign state in every way possible.

Numerous conversations led to the impression that the admiral is acting with the support of a very insignificant number of senior staff officers, who, according to one of them, have fallen into a common circle with Kasatonov and who well understand that their future destinies are directly dependent upon him.

It ought to be noted that information about the military [illegible] base in which Ukraine is constructing its armed forces virtually does not exist in the Crimea. We did not find a single Ukrainian newspaper at Sevastopol's "Sojuzpechat" kiosks. The information blockade was also confirmed in the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, but there they cited the complexity of translating the decrees of the minister of defense from Ukrainian to Russian.

Colonel Victor Lazorkin, a representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense who was then staying in Sevastopol, also confirmed all of the aforesaid. In particular, in an interview for the "Respublika" Information Agency, he said: "We arrived together with other members of the governmental parliamentary delegation and stood in the wind for one and a half hours by the gates of the Fleet Headquarters. We were interested, first and foremost, not in the command element but in the sailors, officers and warrant officers. In spite of difficulties, we met with personnel of one of the units and found out that the information which is proceeding from the government's mass media channels is being distorted or is not reaching the sailors at all. And they were amazed when they found out that legislation concerning the formation of Armed Forces exists.

Colonel Lazorkin said of the Commander in Chief's position: "Admiral Kasatonov is proceeding from the tenet defined in the first part of the article of the 30 December Minsk Agreement [which states] that strategic forces include the Navy. However, he completely ignores the lower part of the first article. It states that a list of units included in strategic forces will be determined for each member of the CIS by a separate protocol. One cannot, that is, say that the Black Sea Fleet is currently the property of the Commonwealth or of the Commander in Chief. However, he [the Commander in Chief] is continually putting pressure on and infringing upon the rights of servicemen who took an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. We have a number of facts [indicating] that these officers were relieved from duty positions and that their future destinies are in question.

The name of Captain Second Rank Yuri Shapyt, whose brigade took an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people despite opposition of the Fleet Command, has resounded throughout the whole of Ukraine. To the question about what Ukraine can guarantee Shapyt, Victor Lazorkin responded: "A restoration of all his rights. The Minister of Defense took him under his protection, as he did all others who took the oath. The colonel also spoke about yet another officer—Igor Teniukh. He is celebrated [for having won] the Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class for the campaign in the Persian Gulf. He was decorated personally by Vice Admiral Larionov. However, as soon as Teniukh came out in favor of an independent Ukraine, he was immediately deprived of the right to enter into an academy and obstacles were put in the way of his promotion to the next rank. He was hastily removed from ship duty and transferred ashore.

Despite all the attempts to play the "Crimean card," create a "flash" point on the peninsula and provide disinformation, the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimea will remain Ukrainian.

Crimean Naval Unit Takes Ukrainian Oath*92UM0677A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service: "We Will Not Go Back On Our Oath ..."]

[Text] Colonel-General K. Morozov, Ukrainian Minister of Defense, received a telegram signed by Captain Second Rank Yuriy Shalyt, commander of a brigade of security vessels of the waterways of the Crimean Naval Base. Despite opposition from the Black Sea Fleet Command, the personnel of this brigade swore a military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people.

The telegram states that facts surrounding events associated with the swearing of an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people are being falsified and juggled in the newspapers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and FLAG RODINY. Material is being presented tendentiously, from the position of the Fleet Command. Mud is being slung in every possible way at the brigade's personnel. Not only is the Brigade's Command being discredited on the pages of these newspapers, but so is the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In spite of this, not a single reporter from the aforementioned publications has worked in the unit or met with its personnel and command element.

After the swearing of the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, the Fleet Command and the Crimean Naval Base Command have been continually putting pressure on sailors. At the same time the ships' command element and personnel desire to follow our example.

Captain Second Rank Yuriy Shalyt also states: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and his apparatus are suppressing the faintest attempts at taking an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. Material being published in the newspapers NARODNAYA ARMIYA and GOLOS UKRAINY are not reaching the Fleet. Appeals of the Ukrainian President and Minister of Defense are not being fully reported by the naval press. Under the guise of the CIS, the Fleet is in fact subordinated to Russia. The idea of unity only with subordination to Moscow is being imposed and propagandized.

We believe in the Ukrainian Fleet and its future. We will not go back one bit on the oath we have taken.

As the issue was going to print:

It was reported to the editorial staff that the officers and warrant officers of a Black Sea Fleet medium amphibious warfare ship commanded by Captain Third Rank Georgiy Savchenko swore an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. Sailors of other ships of the unit swore an oath to the Ukrainian people along with them.

Morozov on Uzin Air Unit, Military Oath*92UM0705B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by Maj V. Knysh, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Follow-Up of an Event: Considering the Interests of All"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov conducted a press conference for the representatives of the foreign mass information media. Having acquainted the foreign journalists with the content of the overall plan for defense and for the establishing of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, he answered numerous questions related to the course of carrying out this plan.

Was the taking of the oath by the servicemen in Uzin actually voluntary? Does this mean that the given division has been transferred to Ukraine?

In replying to these questions, Col Gen K. Morozov stressed that the taking of the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people from the very outset was a strictly voluntary matter. As for those servicemen from the personnel of the Strategic Forces from the Uzin Garrison and who took this oath, the status (until the end of 1994) of the Strategic Forces on Ukrainian territory has forced them to give some thought to what they might be doing at the end of this period. But this does not mean, explained the minister of defense, that the division had been transferred to his department: "The units of the Uzin Garrison continue to remain in the structures of long-range aviation of the Strategic Forces." This naturally removes the question of the supposedly seen split in these units.

But the meticulous colleagues from the Western mass information media were still interested in whose operational orders these forces would obey?

The reply was as follows: the orders will come from Mar Ye. Shaposhnikov, from his General Staff. But we shall monitor them to see what these units located on Ukrainian territory are up to.

Then the press conference turned to the question of what problems will inevitably arise with the establishing of the national Armed Forces and difficulties in cutting back the strategic weapons. The answer of the minister of defense came down to the view that the problems are no longer so acute. Particularly if all the states will be guided in their actions by the principle of justice, considering not only their own interests but also those of neighbors. Only in this manner is it possible to reach agreement very quickly and easily understand one another. But, as the minister of defense said, the approach to the establishing of the Armed Forces should be such that this not create conditions for reducing the security of the partners.

Then there was the question of the group of pilots who had flown back to Russia and whether such a thing had happened before. Generally they asked of course just what had motivated these men.

As Col Gen Morozov said, previously there had not been such instances. And a dangerous precedent has been set. "We possess accurate information that not one of them had been under pressure," replied Konstantin Petrovich [Morozov]. "They in no way differed from those pilots who took the oath and they had not been grounded." At present, "other officers who have not taken the oath will be in an awkward position." Although they, of course, have not been restricted in their service activities.

The minister of defense said that for now an official reply had not been received from the Russian authorities on the return of the hijackers, the military equipment and the colors.

As for the final size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and here the journalists were quick to ask, the minister of defense said that our grouping was to be cut more than in half, down to 250,000-300,000. But we shall further reduce this level.

Will the construction of military camps by German firms be continued on Ukrainian territory?

The reply to this question was the following: We are seeking to keep the construction volume on the same level as was agreed upon in the signed documents. But the Moscow leadership has revised this plan upon its own initiative. Now Ukraine will receive a small part of the camps and these have already basically been built.

The question was asked how soon the ships could be taken from the Black Sea Fleet for Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov, replied that "the principles of our approach to establishing naval forces on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet is as follows: All the fleet formations and units located on Russian territory are Russian. Those on Ukrainian territory are Ukrainian." From these forces a certain part will be assigned to the Strategic Forces.

To the question of the prospects for training officers in the military schools, Konstantin Petrovich replied that we understand the interest of the other states in having specialists trained at our training facilities. And we shall collaborate.

Many other questions were asked and to all of them the minister of defense provided complete and accurate answers. Thus, he said that they planned to reduce allocations for defense by two-fold by the end of 1995 and by three-fold by the end of 1998. The destruction of the nuclear weapons will be carried out on Russian territory. But certainly we will be helped by all the interested parties and states of the world community.

Uzin Airmen Divided Over Loyalty Oath

92UM0646A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by N. Belan: "The Uzin Break"]

[Text] The weather was changing every half-hour. At one moment a piercing wind was blowing, whipping up clouds of snow and all of a sudden, everything quieted down and a high, bright sun shown in the sky.

We drove around the airport with Col Ye. Vinokurov, the Regimental Commander. On a large, well-tended field, as if scowling, were the ranks of the big-bellied IL's, the tanker aircraft, and the supersonic missile aircraft. The tankers were in one regiment and the missile planes in another—both under the command of Colonel Vinokurov. Together they formed the Air Unit imeni 60-letiya SSSR. But the Union has split and this is now the call here.

Just an hour and a half ago in the residential town, Vinokurov had stated to the officers surrounding him tightly in a circle:

"As of this minute, I am again in command of the regiment," with an approving murmur from his fellow servicemen, he added, "And pass this on to anyone who did not hear."

Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich [Vinokurov] serves in that very Uzin Garrison in Ukraine where the mass information media several days ago announced that supposedly a majority of the military aviators had taken the loyalty oath to the Ukrainian people.

"That is not quite right," clarified Vinokurov. "The oath was taken by 37 percent of the tanker regiment's personnel and in ours it was less than half. A predominant majority of our aircraft commanders and navigators refused to do this."

"And you as well?" I asked.

"Yes. Also my deputy, the regimental chief of staff, the squadron commanders and, with the exception of Major Panasyuk, all the subunit commanders. For this all were immediately removed from their positions by the division commander."

The division commander, Major-General of Aviation M. Bashkirov decided on 13 February to take the oath, on the eve of the Minsk meeting of the CIS leaders, and where they set the status of the long-range aviation and hence the Uzin formation. It was to be part of the Commonwealth's strategic forces.

"On Monday, I formed up the regiment in parade dress," related Colonel Vinokurov. "The division commander walked in front of the men, and putting me behind him, began to order that the oath be given. Then he announced that the regiment's leadership which refused to take the oath would be dismissed by him. And he gave a command to Lieutenant-Colonel Shapovalov who had

just been appointed in my place to select officers who had just taken the oath to fill the other positions.

Several days later at a garrison officer assembly, Major-General Aviation Bashkirov explained this decision in the following way: "This measure was forced upon us when a duality was created in the division's organization." I must admit that it was strange to hear such a thing after his heated appeals not to permit any repression against those who refused to take the oath.

Incidentally, I had flown here to Uzin with the Commander of Long-Range Aviation, Colonel-General Aviation M. Kalugin, and I had the most improbable feelings. At times it felt like it was some 75 years ago. The garrison was buzzing like some disturbed beehive, passions were running high and the men were constantly being caught up in one meeting or another. For instance, Colonel-General of Aviation Kalugin went to the officers' club to meet with the commanders, the pilots and the engineer-technical personnel. One can understand their dissatisfaction with some of the replies, but it is hard to believe the stubborn resistance to hear out the arguments. For example, the commander said that he had followed the Minsk agreement, that it had been published in the newspaper, so read it. In reply came "We do not believe the newspaper." All of this would have been funny had it not been so sad. Particularly when they started to escort the commander out of the auditorium with whistling and stomping. It was embarrassing even for me, an outsider.

"Stop this racket!" rang out the voice of the division commander. "I beseech you not to commit such escapades in any situation. We must maintain our calmness and a respectful attitude toward our superiors in rank. In so doing, we emphasize that we demand the same attitude toward ourselves."

The division commander spoke correctly. But suddenly in these words of General Bashkirov, I picked up that the auditorium had divided into "us" and "them." The "us" were those who remained seated after the commander had left and the "them" were those who followed the Colonel-General and surrounded him in the street. A mass of questions and indignant words poured forth.

"In our regiment, 45 percent took the oath and why depict things as if it had been a majority?"

"And what is to happen to the person who is on the list of those taking the oath but in fact he did not?"

"Who will protect us from the arbitrariness of the division's leadership?"

The officers had a good deal to say. But let me give two other fundamental opinions. Major S. Shipanov, the commander of a strategic aircraft: "I took the oath of loyalty to Ukraine 22 years ago when I took the oath to the Ukrainian, the Belorussian, the Russian and all the other peoples of the nation. How can I now remove this

obligation from myself?" Lieutenant-Colonel V. Bogatyrev, the deputy regimental commander for personnel work, said: "At present the division's command is talking about some appeal sent to the Ukrainian leadership and supposedly approved by the formation. Our regiment has not adopted this appeal. We request that the personnel not be divided. But things have now reached such a point of mutual recrimination. A number of comrades has stated that they would throw chocks into the propellers so that the aircraft could not take off. It is shameful and painful when the oath is used not to unite but to split the men."

"You can see what happens when the Army is dragged into political games," said Major V. Grebennikov, a subunit chief of staff, and he resumed the conversation commenced in the morning.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich [Grebennikov] was one of the first officers whom I had met in the garrison. This was immediately after a talk with Lieutenant-Colonel V. Bukin who described the reasons impelling a portion of them to take the oath. "We have housing here, our wives have jobs and Russia does not want to give any guarantees for resolving the social questions," he said. "The strategic forces will be withdrawn from Ukraine in two years and what awaits us at the new post?"

"This is what our life has been reduced to: chiefly about apartments, domestic and social problems, while military duty comes later," complained Maj Grebennikov.

"But aren't you concerned with the 'terrestrial'?" I said surprised.

"And how, only I am still an officer. It is sad that something very important and major has been lost by us and without which aviation cannot fly."

In human terms one could understand the persons I spoke with and also those from the tanker regiment. But I could not understand one thing. For instance, their commander, Colonel A. Kuznetsov, spoke about the isolation of the leadership of the Army and long-range aviation from the needs of the regiment's personnel and that as before the commission was coming here with just one goal in mind, to make an "appearance" and this supposedly was the main reason which determined the decision to take the oath to Ukraine. Or Colonel A. Pakhomovskiy, the deputy division commander for personnel work, told me about the telegrams on the relocating of several aircraft, the mistrust of the division commander and so forth. The arguments were serious ones, but is the oath such a serious matter to take a decision on the oath on the eve of the Minsk meeting? It turns out that the Commonwealth nations have still not succeeded in creating strategic forces but an effort is being made to split them from within. But who is doing this? Can it be that the Minsk agreements which required such a torturous, difficult effort, are needed only by the presidents and Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov? No, not only they are responsible for the security of the Commonwealth, and this responsibility must be felt by all—

by the men in epaulettes and by the civilians. Certainly the experience of 1917 shows that the collapse of the army brought a great disaster to the nation.

...I returned to Moscow with a heavy heart. What will result from this "Uzin break"? Will it be a bitter but useful lesson or is this the first hint of what difficult times await the Army?

CAUCASIAN STATES

Turkish Troops Deployed Near Armenian Border *92UM0644A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Feb 92 p 1*

[Article by M. Pereplesnin: "Personnel Are Not Dozing"]

[Text] In connection with reports that Turkey's armed forces are deploying on its side of the Armenian-Turkish border, a correspondent of the Armenian Press Agency asked the Commander of the Seventh Army stationed in Armenia, Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Meshcheryakov, to comment on this information.

"Indeed, the Third Field Army of the Turkish Armed Forces is deploying in the border areas with Armenia," he said. "According to our estimates, the Turkish side is preparing and conducting a scheduled exercise. I would like to believe that this action has nothing to do with the events in our region. It is natural that in these conditions, the personnel of our army, as part of the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which the Republic of Armenia is a member, are vigilantly performing their duty and closely monitoring all troop movements on the neighboring territory."

Transcaucasus MD Denies Shooting Officer *92UM0564A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 8 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by Sergey Doronin: "'Hero' Under a Cloud"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense has distributed a statement that Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, allegedly gave orders to summarily shoot Major V. Mudrak. Two armed warrant officers wearing civilian clothes were supposedly detailed to carry out the death sentence.

According to a report from the press center of the republic's Ministry of Defense, the major earned such a

severe measure by assisting Azerbaijanis to seize 6 armored personnel carriers, 3 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 13 assault rifles, 26 pistols and 2 automatic antitank grenade launchers.

Mudrak was able to accomplish this operation by capitalizing on the discipline of his privates and sergeants. He ordered them to get out of their vehicles, form up, lay their weapons on the ground and step back 50 meters. This is what rebels hiding in ambush at the practice range were waiting for, and they acted quickly.

Here is the information the Main Military Procuracy has on the incident:

Criminal proceedings have been initiated against Major Mudrak. He had not been arrested, and he is presently in Baku under the protection of National Guard soldiers. Negotiations between the district command and the leadership of the republic regarding the major's surrender and the return of the seized equipment and weapons did not produce any positive results. The Azerbaijani side declared that all of this was property of the republic.

Attempts to arrest Mudrak had to be rejected because of the possibility of bloodshed and retaliatory measures.

Colonel General V. Patrikeyev did not of course issue any commands to shoot.

The statement made by the republic's Ministry of Defense regarding Major V. Mudrak can be interpreted as nothing other than provocation.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

No Oath for Uzbekistan Troops *92UM0644B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 92 p 2*

[ITAR and TASS reports: "Uzbekistan Servicemen Will Not Take an Oath Again; Cheboksary Hospitals: If You Want To Survive, Eat at Home"]

[Text] "The army stationed on the territory of Uzbekistan is being transferred under the jurisdiction of the republic. With the exception of National Guard soldiers, no one will be taking the oath again." This is reported by the newspaper NARODNOYE SLOVO, which carried an interview with Rustam Akhmedov, the minister for defense affairs and commander of the National Guard of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The pay for individuals performing military service on the territory of Uzbekistan is being at least doubled.

ARMS TRADE

Soviet Weapons for Sale in Poland

92UM0671A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Feb 92 p 7

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "Contraband":
"2,500 Soviet Tanks for Sale"]

[Text] Warsaw—"The sale of various weapons brought from Soviet depots in Poland and Germany, as well as from the former USSR, has become a common thing in the NATO exchange," the Polish newspaper SLOWO POWSZECHNE recently stated. "The latest offering is 2,500 armored vehicles. Fortunately, Soviet regulations still in effect restrict this trade. One therefore has to assume that in this case we are dealing with the Mafia and contraband."

According to the newspaper, not just thousands of armored vehicles but also rare, smuggled chemical substances are available in the Polish market. Three and a half kilograms of crystallized scandium which sells for 1 million dollars per kilogram was recently displayed for sale in the Silesian commodity-money market. For the uninitiated SLOWO POWSZECHNE explains that this element, appearing for the first time in the open market, is used in space and military electronics.

The newspaper states that there has recently been a rich selection of goods from the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] nations in the Silesian market. They include gallium, rhodium, titanium, cobalt, selenide and other rare chemical elements. So-called "red mercury" has even shown up in the market, the sale of which is forbidden without a special license from the international Euroatom organization. One of the most recent offerings was a large quantity of mercury, which sells for around 70,000 dollars per kilogram.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Scramjet Flight Test Confirmed

927Q0083A Moscow POISK in Russian
No 8, 15-21 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Sergey Leskov: "Details for POISK—
Concerning the Best Engine in the World"]

[Text] Several days ago, information appeared in the press about the successful tests of the world's first hypersonic ramjet engine (PVRD) [scramjet], which was developed in our country. Similar tests are being planned in the United States and in other developed countries at best within three to four years. Today, we have an opportunity to talk in more detail about the unique engine that has no analogs in world aircraft engine construction, and in this way satisfy the natural interest of specialists.

At the present time, world aviation has come close to the mastery of so-called hypersonic speeds that exceed the speed of sound by many times. Fundamentally new ramjet engines are necessary for this. In our country, which has surpassed all other aviation-space powers in this development, a whole cooperative effort worked on the creation of the engine: the Moscow machine-building KB [design bureau] Fakel (equipment for the flying laboratory), the Turayev KB Soyuz (engine manufacture), the Moscow aggregate KB Temp (automation of engines), the Moscow KB Gorizont, the VNII [All-Union Scientific Research Institute] of Aviation Materials, the NPO [Scientific Production Association] Kriotehnika, and subdivisions of the Ministry of Defense. The ideological leadership, work cooperation, engine design, research data checks on the operational process and cooling and regulation, and also the manufacture of systems for engine feed and fueling of rockets with liquid hydrogen and preliminary stand tests were accomplished by the Central Institute of Aero-Engine Construction.

The creation of a ramjet is associated with the resolution of very complex scientific tasks. The engines must work at air temperature entry conditions of more than 2,000 degrees Centigrade, liquid hydrogen is used as the fuel, and its efficient combustion in subsonic and supersonic streams must be assured.

Perhaps the main achievement of the developers of a native ramjet, which successful tests of 28 November of last year in Kazakhstan confirmed, can be said to be the fact that, for the first time in world practice, it was possible to ensure combustion inside a combustion chamber under conditions of supersonic streams in it (M-2). Previously, this capability was confirmed only theoretically or in ground-based laboratories. This was the first time that it was possible to achieve this process in flight. The engine itself operated at a Mach number equal to six, but reserves exist to raise it to 10. And in this case, it was not a hindrance that the flight took place at an altitude of 28 kilometers under conditions of a highly rarefied atmosphere.

During the world's first test of a scramjet engine, the engine was mounted in the nose section of a two-stage missile of the surface-to-air class. The creation of a hypersonic flying laboratory can also be justifiably evaluated as a great success of the developers. This laboratory will make it possible to test other engines at high speeds as well. It is not surprising that many countries and aerospace agencies, including NASA, are displaying an interest in joint work on the hypersonic flying laboratory.

Fundamental also is that the ramjet works on liquid hydrogen. This ecologically clean fuel, which possesses a high fuel efficiency and a great cooling capacity, is almost the only possible, but extremely capricious, component for a ramjet. However, for the first time in the world, our engineers succeeded in "disciplining" liquid hydrogen at hypersonic speeds.

The successful resolution of a whole range of complex tasks in the development of a ramjet makes understandable the shocked state of American specialists who learned of the tests in Kazakhstan. But the first success should not dampen our ardor. The experimental engine is an important but intermediate stage in a major problem. Obviously, development of the ramjet will now move at an intensified pace in the United States. And it will be stupid if we yield leadership in the resolution of this very important and priority task because of the confusion that reigns now. But such an unhappy prospect, we will be frank, is entirely real.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Draft Military Doctrine Accounting for National Changes

92UM0287A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col A. Klimenko: "CIS: Does It Need a Common Military Doctrine?"]

[Text] With the abolition of the USSR, the question has arisen of the fate of a military doctrine which has been used as the guide in recent years by what was essentially an unitary state and which represented a single political and military force. Does this now conform to the altered situation? Will it remain the common one for all the independent states comprising the Commonwealth? Certainly here the final word will be said by the politicians. But it would be a serious mistake not to consider the opinion of military experts.

Specialists from the Center for Operational-Strategic Research [TsOSI] under the General Staff of the Armed Forces have devoted a major effort to working out a draft military doctrine which would meet the realities of the times. The editors have asked the TsOSI co-worker Colonel A. Klimenko (he is part of the group working on the document) to share certain of his ideas related to this.

As of now a Commonwealth has been established which includes 11 independent states. And each of them can have its own military doctrine.

As is known, a portion of the states comprising the Commonwealth has taken the decision to establish their own armed formations. At the same time, Alma-Ata has taken the decision to keep the common military strategic space under the joint command as well as have a single control over nuclear weapons.

With the greatest efficiency—from the political, economic, diplomatic and strategic viewpoint—the security of the established Commonwealth can be ensured by the joint armed forces on a basis of a military doctrine which would be adopted by all the Commonwealth members and would consider the security interests of all the participants to the agreement.

Of course there can also be different viewpoints, but we feel the positing of the question on the need for a coalition military doctrine is natural and timely. Such a document, which would take into account the defense, political and other interests of all the sovereign states and be ratified by all of them, can, when necessary, become the basis for elaborating a military doctrine for each of the states.

In speaking about our military doctrine, we cannot help say something about such an important aspect, in my view, as its place in the security system of the CIS. In the former USSR, it came about historically that the military aspect in the question of security reigned over the others. All the basic resources of the nation were channeled into the strengthening of military might. Our doctrine made no provision for measures to counter such phenomena as for instance an economic crisis, ecological disasters, ethnic and religious contradictions... And it is well known that all these types of threats are interconnected. And it follows that the measures to counter these should be worked out comprehensively. Clearly the systematizing of all the possible threats and the elaborating of measures to neutralize them (in observing international law and the interests of the states) is the prerogative of the general plan for the Commonwealth's security and a component part of this plan should be the military doctrine.

What should the military doctrine be like if the leaders and parliaments of the independent Commonwealth states consider its commonality and unity advisable?

As is known, the stockpiling of enormous supplies of nuclear and qualitatively new conventional weapons and an awareness of the danger of their employment for all mankind moved the problem of preventing war to the forefront. A recognition of the primacy of common human values over class and group interests led to the deideologization of international interests. The threat of the outbreak of a world and primarily a nuclear war was significantly reduced. These factors raised the problem of the approach to the correlation of forces on the international scene in a new light. The traditional division of all of the principals of international relations into enemies, allies and neutral states has become problematic. For this reason our doctrine cannot view any specific state or military alliance as an enemy.

At the same time it is well known that far from all the contradictions between states have been eliminated. The powerful groupings of armed forces deployed in peacetime and the claims of individual states to a dominant position on a global or regional scale remain a reality. Military doctrine, should define the ways and measures for neutralizing the sources of a military threat and primarily by diplomatic means, and this, it seems to me, is the prerogative of its political aspect. The elements in the mechanism for carrying out this task can be the already existing security structures as well as new ones created on three different levels:

- within the CIS—by organizing the states' collaboration within a common defense space;
- regional—by the collaboration of the CIS and NATO and within the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] with its European neighbors as well as with the nations of the Asian-Pacific, Near and Middle East regions;
- global—by collaboration in maintaining strategic stability with the U.S. and within the UN with other states of the international community.

Here in matters of ensuring international security, any state, the policy of which is aimed at preventing war, can be an ally of the CIS.

Along with defining the methods of preventing war, the chief purpose of military doctrine is to define the optimal areas in preparing to repel possible aggression, if it cannot be prevented. Correspondingly, the military organizational development in the Commonwealth and the training of the troops and naval forces should be carried out proceeding from the economic abilities of the independent states, the assumed nature of a possible war, the strategic tasks of the Army and Navy and other factors.

Over five years ago, the former Soviet Union unilaterally adopted the obligation "never to be the first to employ nuclear weapons." Military doctrine, undoubtedly, cannot help but consider this fact. However, without casting doubt on the obligation assumed, it must be pointed out that from the strategic viewpoint, it has a contradictory nature. On the one hand, the nuclear threshold that is, that limit beyond which the employment of nuclear weapons can follow, is raised. On the other hand, nuclear weapons are ceasing to carry out the role of a deterrent factor in relation to so-called conventional war. Thus, we must recognize that as long as nuclear weapons have not been destroyed by all nations, nuclear deterrence will serve as an inseparable element in strategic stability.

The military doctrine should focus the Army and Navy personnel on the readiness for any possible variations in the unleashing and waging of a war, both conventional and nuclear. But because of the fact that the fatal consequences of a nuclear war are becoming ever more apparent, while the possibility of unleashing it is less probable, it is logical that primacy in the training of the troops and naval forces be given over to preparing them for waging an armed struggle employing modern conventional weapons.

It must also be kept in mind that under the conditions of the effect of our obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons, the aggressor will be able by conventional weapon strikes to upset the functioning of the strategic nuclear forces or at least maximally reduce their effectiveness. It is also possible to have the destruction of potentially dangerous installations and this, in terms of its consequences, is tantamount to the use of weapons of

mass destruction. This can be seen convincingly from the disasters at Bhopal (India), Chernobyl and others. For this reason such actions by the aggressor must be viewed as its use of weapons of mass destruction with all the ensuing consequences.

The security of the Commonwealth and its members can be ensured by military means with the aid of nuclear deterrence, carried out with the minimum necessary potential for these purposes by the Strategic Deterrent Forces and by maintaining the General Purpose Forces at a strength and condition which ensure the preventing of military conflicts and in the event of aggression, its thwarting.

In my view, the chief defense tasks of the Commonwealth could be:

- in peacetime—the maintenance of military potential on a level sufficient for the defense of the CIS, ensuring the inviolability of its frontiers and airspace; the thwarting of possible provocations and encroachments on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Commonwealth and its members;
- with the outbreak of a war—the repelling of aggression, the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Commonwealth; the defeat of the aggressor and the creation of conditions for the quickest end of the war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace.

In the opinion of the military experts, under the new political conditions, particular importance has been assumed by the principle of centralized leadership over the defense territory of the CIS and by unity of command of the nuclear and other strategic forces and weapons.

One other question the answer to which cannot help but be given by military doctrine is the question of the methods for repelling aggression under the new conditions and the training of the troops and naval forces. The range of opinions here is broad. Some have argued that it is only by offensive active operations that the enemy can be routed, referring here to the experience of history. Others refute this experience, basing their adherence to the defensive on the fact that any large-scale invasion of a foreign territory would provoke a nuclear war with all its catastrophic consequences.

Without understating the importance of either of these arguments, we would like to draw attention to the following circumstances. As was already stated, the Soviet Union assumed the obligation not to be the first to begin military operations against any state and not be first to employ nuclear weapons. The troop groupings have been pulled back from the so-called "forward lines" and have been reduced significantly in strength. In this manner we are reducing the concern of our neighbors over the threat of a surprise attack. These measures, if in fact consistency is maintained in carrying out the previously assumed obligations, would characterize our military doctrine as a defensive one.

But the choice of the specific methods for repelling aggression is dictated by its own patterns. The dialectical relationship between the defensive and the offensive as types of military operations contradicts the absolutizing of either of these. The art of military-political leadership lies in a correct assessment of the developing strategic situation and in choosing the appropriate types and forms of armed combat. If we speak about the probability of choosing such a method of military operations as the preplanned defensive for repelling possible aggression, then the armed forces must be oriented not toward a passive but rather an active defensive, combining positional and maneuver methods of armed combat. Such a defensive would include retaliatory engagement attacks, meeting engagements and battles, counterstrikes, flanking attacks and a counteroffensive to defeat the invading aggressor or force him to break off military operations. With the outbreak of aggression, all restrictions in the choice of the forms and methods of military operations should be lifted. They will be determined by the situational conditions, by the nature of operations and by the means employed by the enemy. Such an approach to the choice of a future strategy determines the necessity to prepare the army and navy equally to conduct all types of combat operations—both defensive and offensive.

Along with the organizational development of the armed forces, military doctrine, if it is possible to maintain its unity for the Commonwealth, should provide an answer to the questions of organizing the command of the defensive for the CIS territory under the new conditions, reforming the military infrastructure, carrying out Civil Defense tasks, and preparing the public and the national economy to promptly switch from peacetime to a wartime status.

In a word, the new military doctrine should become the basis for working out and implementing a radical military reform. But for the final elaboration of these documents, it is essential to have complete clarity in the relations of the Commonwealth states.

Gareyev: Objective Constraints on Doctrine

*92UM0684A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Feb 92 First Edition p 3*

[Article by General of the Army M. Gareyev, doctor of military sciences, under rubric "Viewpoint": "Does Russia Have Its Own Interest? or One More Time About What Military Doctrine Is To Be Like"]

[Text] Judging from the press, many minds are occupied today by the question of military doctrine, and this is understandable. That always was the case at critical moments in the development of states and armies, since not one state with a military force can exist without some kind of military doctrine. This also goes for the former Soviet state. And it is difficult for me, for example, to agree with A. Kotenkov's assertion in the KRASNAYA

ZVEZDA interview on 7 February 1992 that "the USSR never had a military doctrine."

The concept of a military doctrine as a system of officially accepted views on defense questions was introduced in the USSR for the first time at the initiative of M. V. Frunze. It is another matter that not all countries have that understanding of military doctrine. For example, in the West any military-theoretical views are called doctrine, while military doctrine proper does not include all existing military-theoretical views (which in science can be not only different, but also opposite), but only basic, guiding, officially accepted provisions of military theory and practice which are mandatory for state entities and military cadres.

This circumstance is of fundamental importance for ensuring unity of approaches to an understanding and accomplishment of defense tasks. There can be arguments on any question; this is even good for science. But at some stage the leadership must firmly determine the guidelines, based on which it will build defense and carry out military organizational development. And in this sense I understand the reproach of Russian parliamentarians which came from the lips of General of the Army K. Kobets during parliamentary hearings on 18 February. There can be no purposeful practical work without precise aims.

No matter how a particular state regards the need for and content of military doctrine, governments as well as society cannot help but express their attitude toward political aspects of defense problems in one form or another which one has occasion to encounter in life. This is above all the attitude toward war and ways of preventing it, the view on the presumed nature of the military threat, military-political goals and missions of ensuring security and defense, and the direction of military organizational development.

There also exist purely military (military-technical) questions connected with determining the strategic nature of a possible war; the composition, organization, system of manpower acquisition and technical outfitting of armed forces; and methods of their combat employment and training (military training and education). Despite a difference in terms in different countries, all this makes up the essence of military doctrine.

Thus, military doctrine takes in a very broad range of questions beginning with military policy and ending with organization of military duties. It selects the most advisable views conforming to the state's political goals and economic capacities and incorporates them in legislative measures, government decrees and enactments, combat and combined-arms regulations, manuals, and fundamental military department orders.

Frunze deemed it "advisable to set forth basic practical provisions stemming from the essence of doctrine especially in a separate regulation which would be the Red Army's basic catechism," but this was not destined to come about. Not only in the USSR, but to this day not

even in a single state has there ever really been a military doctrine encompassing at least the basic questions of those enumerated and set forth in some one document, and evidently there will not be. But this does not mean that there never has been nor is there a military doctrine as such. Objectively it always exists as an expression of realistically accomplishable defense missions.

As shown by the experience of Warsaw Pact countries in adopting a military doctrine in 1987, its most important lines can be set forth in the form of a military-political declaration. That is also approximately how the NATO military doctrine appears. This also can be done with respect to individual states. There are questions of military doctrine which always have been formulated and henceforth, one must assume, always will be formulated as legal documents (for example, the Law on Universal Military Obligation and so on).

Meanwhile it is difficult to imagine how it is possible, for example, to legislatively incorporate (once and for all) questions of military doctrine whose specific resolution will change depending on conditions for performance of missions assigned to armed forces, such as an estimate of the probable enemy, methods of operations of armed forces during war and so on. Many aspects of a doctrinal significance will be reflected in combat and combined-arms regulations and other documents regulating the life and activities of the Army and Navy.

In my view, a number of articles quite correctly pose the question that elaboration of military doctrine must be preceded by a definition of goals and missions of defense at the level of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and for each state. Speaking of Russia, it is impossible to purposefully accomplish both domestic as well as foreign policy missions without precisely establishing its national state missions and priority interests.

At times matters are depicted in such a way that the Russian state should not have any other interests except general human interests. Hence the conclusion: since we do not have our own state interests, there is also no threat to these interests. If that were the case, then in fact there is nothing to defend and concerns disappear about whom to defend against and with what to defend. But if Russia has its own state interests (and they objectively exist and may contradict the interests of other states) and if these interests are not to be ignored, then, as in any sovereign state, many questions (also including in the defense sphere) fall into place no matter how people try to cloud and muddy them. And of course, General of the Army Kobets is correct when he says (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for 5 February 1992): "It is necessary to declare with all honesty and definiteness that Russia has its own state interests and will defend them by force or the possibility of its use."

But this does not mean that to protect the state interests of Russia or Ukraine they need to be isolated from other sovereign states. If one proceeds from long-term interests, then in my view what is most advisable for each

sovereign state individually and the CIS as a whole is to conclude a defense alliance. Both this defense alliance and common interests will necessitate specific coordinated fundamentals of a Commonwealth military doctrine.

It would appear that regardless of particular hasty decisions on defense questions which are being made today in some republics, objective processes and the general state interests stemming therefrom inevitably will dictate the need for a certain integration of military efforts, as is occurring in Western Europe, North America (the U.S. and Canadian unified air defense system) and other regions. A striving for national self-isolation and for only an independent resolution of defense questions is disastrous both in the economic as well as in the strategic sense and threatens fulfillment of international agreements. This is why, in my view, Russia must strive to the last opportunity to organize a defense in the Commonwealth system together with other sovereign states (even at the cost of concessions on certain other matters).

With rejection of a military alliance, Russia will have to create a defense anew within its boundaries when it begins to form its own Armed Forces. And immediately the entire air defense system will fall apart, since the majority of radiotechnical equipment, fixed air defense equipment, airfields, missile attack warning equipment, and command and control facilities will remain on the territory of other states. By the way, in being pulled apart, all this equipment will end up useless for these states as well. Tens of billions of rubles will be required just for re-establishing an air defense and ABM warning system on Russian Federation territory.

In addition, with a joint defense Russia relies on defense forces of other republics, which in turn rely on Russia. But in organizing an independent defense some neighboring states may end up in positions of military opposition, and under certain circumstances in an alliance with other states outside the former USSR. Considering all this, the Russian Federation may undertake to establish its own Armed Forces only after having exhausted all possibilities for establishing a defensive alliance at the CIS level.

Speaking on TV on 23 February, Aleksey Arbatov expressed the fear that, in not being subordinate to any one of the presidents, the Joint Armed Forces will be uncontrolled.

But they will be subordinate to the Council of heads of state. Generally Commonwealth interests demand setting up coordinating entities also in the sphere of the economy, transportation, power engineering and defense, as is done in NATO.

Much also is said in the press about the character and direction of strategy of military doctrine. With some authors it suddenly turns out that strategy does not fit within the framework of military art. But what strategy? If it is political and economic, then yes, but military strategy is a necessary part of the military art; it also

makes up the most important part of military doctrine. There are many different opinions about the defensive nature of the military doctrine which we proclaimed for many years and about the "slyness" which allegedly occurred on our part. In this connection it is of course possible to note that there still is a great deal of that kind of slyness also on the part of NATO states, but it is not a question of who has more of it. The interests of ensuring general security really demand that there be more honesty, openness and mutual trust in military doctrines.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to forget that what is of decisive significance in a defensive military doctrine is its political direction and its being permeated with the idea of preventing war. And when war already has been imposed, the policy of preventing it exhausts itself and everything is subordinated to the interests of defending the homeland, which, strictly speaking, also predetermines the nature of Armed Forces combat employment. Therefore their peacetime training must be subordinate to accomplishment of missions in case of war. Here too one must not be cunning and attempt to convince someone that with a defensive doctrine the Army will only defend and fully rejects offensive methods of operations. If our Army proceeded from this, then how would it have been able to defend the country in the past war?

It is also impossible to rush to extremes: first our Army planned to fight only on foreign territory and now it turns out that it must prepare only to defend its own. The

defensive direction of the political side of military doctrine, signifying that a particular state rejects war as a means of achieving political goals and does not plan to be first to attack anyone, and the methods of military operations in the course of an imposed war are factors acting under completely different conditions. They may not always coincide. In a war not one side will limit itself in using the entire arsenal of the military art. It follows that troops also must be trained both in defensive as well as offensive operations, as is done in armies of NATO, China and other countries. And this should be quite clear in advance to everyone, including a potential aggressor.

It is especially important to take a clear, precise position with respect to nuclear weapons. On the one hand, it is quite obvious that mankind's interests demand their total elimination, and this goal should be persistently strived for on a mutual basis. But as long as other states do not reject nuclear weapons, Russia and the CIS will be forced to retain them in the minimum necessary number, since with all their catastrophically negative properties they nevertheless remain for now the cheapest and most reliable means of deterring possible aggression.

Thus, developing a vital military doctrine at such a complicated time is an especially complicated matter. It demands attentive study of all factors, consideration both of new missions as well as of previous experience, and weighed decisions. An approach is needed that is really scientifically substantiated.

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